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Introduction to the thesis 
  
It is commonplace that in epistemology and the philosophy of  science, the nature of  evidence 
in medicine has become in recent years one of  the most researched topics. An important aspect of  
it is the evidence of  mechanisms, and a group of  philosophers of  science have been urging for some 
time that mechanisms be included in the evaluation of  causal medical claims, at a higher level than 
the one currently afforded by the Evidence Based Medicine (EBM) protocols (Clarke, Gillies, Illari, 
Russo, Williamson 2014), following the general lines of  the Russo-Williamson thesis (RWT). Since 
the present thesis builds upon (and is highly indebted to) the research made by the abovementioned 
proponents of  RWT, the best way to start this introduction is to present very briefly the content 
and purpose of  RWT. 
As laid down in Russo and Williamson (2007), RWT states that both evidence of  mechanisms 
(taken to come from laboratory, microstructural research) and evidence of  difference-making (taken to 
come from population level studies) are necessary in order to establish medical causal claims.1 On 
the one hand, evidence of  mechanisms is taken to have the role of  eliminating spurious 
correlations. On the other hand, evidence of  difference making coming from population-studies 
should establish the direction of  causation and the net effect (which might not be clear just by using 
evidence of  mechanisms) (Russo and Williamson 2007, p. 157).  
For instance, to establish Helicobacter Pylori as a cause of  gastric and duodenal ulcer, one 
needs both laboratory morpho-pathological assessments providing mechanistic evidence of  the 
effects of  this germ on the gastric and duodenal cells (which rules out that the association between 
Helicobacter Pylori is spurious or accidental), and population controlled studies providing evidence 
of  difference making which establishes  the direction of  causation (from the respective infection to 
ulcer and not vice-versa) and/or the net effect (thus counting in alternative mechanisms and factors, 
e.g. preventative, stimulating, neutralising, possibly unknown, which might influence how strongly or 
decisively Helicobacter Pylori acts upon the gastric and duodenal cells).  
A crucial reason for requiring this double evidence in RWT is that, on an ontic level, 
mechanisms are taken to be associated (only) with the so-FDOOHG ¶SURGXFWLRQ· W\SH RI  FDXVDWLRQ  
(Williamson, 2006, Williamson, 2011, Wilde and Williamson, 2016). Accordingly, one needs to 
appeal to population studies because it is only the latter that could provide evidence of  difference-
                                                        
1 ´WKHKHDOWKVFLHQFHVPDNHFDXVDOFODLPVRQWKHEDVLVRI HYLGHQFHERWKRI SK\VLFDOPHFKDQLVPVDQGRI SUREDELOLVWLF





making. Roughly speaking, production causation is causation underlined by identifiable processes 
holding between the cause and effect, whereas difference-making causation needs some 
counterfactually defined dependency between the cause and the effect (where an informal, but 
insightful illustration of  different types of  dependency is offered by the famous Mill methods of  
causation).  
One alternative way in which RWT can then be defined is by saying that establishing causal 
claims in medicine requires evidence of  both production and difference-making (where evidence of  
production should come from laboratory, microstructural studies, whereas evidence of  difference-
making should come from population-studies). This alternative formulation has the advantage of  
distinguishing the evidence of  what is required by RWT (i.e. production and difference-making) and 
the evidence from what (i.e. from what sources should RWT draw out its evidence, namely laboratory, 
microstructural studies for the evidence of  production and population studies for evidence of  
difference-making). In fact, as Phyllis Illari has nicely shown (Illari, 2011), distinguishing the 
evidence of  what  and evidence from what, allows one to disambiguate a certain aspect of  RWT.  
Illari maintains the original assumptions that mechanisms are concerned with production only, 
and that evidence of  both production and difference making is required for medical causal claims.  
However, Illari argues that - as far as the sources of  evidence are concerned (the from what part) - we 
could have evidence of  difference making coming from laboratory, microstructural research. 
$QDORJRXVO\ZHFRXOGKDYHHYLGHQFHRI SURGXFWLRQRURI ¶PHFKDQLVPV·FRPLQJIURPSRSXODWLRQ
studies (Illari, 2011, § 2.2).  
,OODUL·V GLVDPELJXDWLRQ HQODUJHV WKH VSKHUH RI  5:7 DQG XVHIXOO\ DUWLFXODWHV KRZ PHFKDQLVWLF
evidence is to contribute to the confirmation of  medical hypotheses and causal theories. And there 
have been some further, fruitful developments for the RWT framework. Proponents of  RWT 
(Clarke et al. 2014) have set up a project, named EBM+,2 in order to deal with the epistemology of  
mechanisms and back up the abovementioned challenge they address to EBM, that evidence of  
mechanisms should be considered on an equal footing evidence of  difference-making (from 
population studies).   
One central conceptual development brought about by EBM+ has been their research on the 
quality of  mechanistic evidence. The central idea behind looking into the quality of  evidence is quite 
simple. The idea namely is that prior to pursuing confirmation studies, one needs a sort of  hierarchy 
WKDWZRXOGSURYLGH ¶UXOHVRI  WKXPE·GLIIHUHQWLDWLQJEHWZHHQ ¶SRRU· DQG ¶high TXDOLW\· HYLGHQFH DV
well as degrees in-between. Organizing in this way the available mechanistic evidence does not 
                                                        
2 :KHUHWKH´µPHDQV´PHFKDQLVPV WULDOVµEXWDOVRUHIHUVWRWKHSRZHURI  LQWHUVHFWLQJVSHFLHVRI HYLGHQFH7KH
analogy guiding the EBM+ group is that of  steel-reinforced concrete, where the two materials³one good under 
compression, the other good under tension³mutually support each other. For an introduction, seeembplus.org. 
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neglect the truism that any evidence is fallible. However, it is a useful, preliminary step to take 
before proceeding to the confirmation stage. Moreover, obviously, one needs to get this preliminary 
step right. The protocols of  EBM abound in various hierarchies of  medical evidence. Yet, as I said, 
according to Clarke et al., EBM fails to properly take into account the evidence of  mechanisms, 
alongside evidence from population studies, as RWT demands. And, if  one is to effectively 
challenge the hierarchies of  EBM, proposing to integrate quality, good mechanistic evidence is a sine 
qua non condition.  
Now, one slightly different angle from which one can understand the idea of  the quality of  
evidence is by way of  appealing to the weight/balance distinction, a traditional distinction in the 
philosophy of  evidence (Joyce 2005, Kelly 2008, Kelly 2014, McCain and Poston 2014). This 
distinction can best be explained by way of  an example. Suppose we have a chance set up in which 
the initial results have been strongly in favour of  a certain outcome. That means the respective 
outcome has a strong balance. But the respective balance might well be accompanied by a small 
weight, because it might be that the chance set up is biased in various ways. That is why repeating 
the experiment, checking up or changing its methodology, scrutinizing its results, or making a 
different team do the same experiment, would have the consequence of  increasing the weight of  the 
evidence (even if  the same outcome was obtained, and accordingly the balance of  evidence remained 
apparently the same).3  
To choose an example closer to our theme, a population level correlation might have a strong 
balance, and yet, for various reasons, its weight might turn out to be quite weak. That is because the 
size of  the population might be too small and the other potential causal factors might not have been 
sufficiently screened off  (say, by not choosing the right subjects in a case control or observational 
study, or by not randomizing and double blinding accurately in an RCT). When saying then that we 
need good, quality, or, if  you like, weighty evidence, we are saying we are looking for (a large volume 
of) evidence that is unbiased, that is obtained using the right methodology (or ideally, using different 
methodologies that obtain the same results) and that that delivers precise and detailed results. 
 The case of  mechanistic evidence is no exception. Indeed, Clarke et al. have provided in their 
(2014) a protocol that takes into account important criteria for grading mechanistic evidence: the 
independent methods that confirm (or disconfirm) a feature, the independent research groups that 
confirm (or disconfirm) a feature, the proportion of  features found (larger or smaller), knowing 
analogous mechanisms as opposed to not knowing analogous mechanisms or even worse, knowing 
that analogous situations do not exhibit such mechanisms, robustness, i.e. being reproducible across 
a wide range of  conditions, as opposed to fragility of  mechanisms, i.e. not being reproducible even 
                                                        
3 Of  course, it could be argued that one cannot have a strong balance without strong weight, but this side of  the 
discussion does not concern us here.  
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in slightly varying conditions.4 
 
Pluses  Minuses 
Each independent method that confirms a feature 
 
Each independent research group that confirms a feature 
 
Larger proportion of  features found 
Analogous mechanisms known 
 
Robust, reproducible across a wide range of  conditions 
 
Each independent method that fails to confirm³or, 
worse, disconfirms³a feature  
Each independent research group that fails to confirm³
or, worse, disconfirms³a feature 
Smaller proportion of  features found  
The analogy is a weak one, or, worse, analogous situations 
exhibit no such mechanism 
Fragile, not reproducible in slightly varying conditions 
 
 
The list is extensive and covers a large part of  our intuitions regarding the criteria that should 
be employed for assessing the quality (or weight) of  mechanistic evidence. Nonetheless, as the 
authors themselves urge, more work needs to be done. Three issues are in place here. First, on a 
general level, one would want an epistemological theory to justify these admittedly intuitive criteria 
for grading evidence. Second, one would want to put more flesh onto the bones of  these criteria (in 
particular on the criterion of  robustness) and see how these criteria work in the context of  the entire 
medical evidence, i.e. when taking into account  also the evidence of  population studies. Third, it 
would be desirable to set out a plausible way in which the (quality) mechanistic evidence ² 
hierarchized using these criteria at a pre-confirmation stage ² could make a contribution at the 
confirmation stage itself.  
The present thesis us an attempt to address these three issues. The thesis falls accordingly into 
three main parts (which are nevertheless interconnected since the framework and the results of  each 
are carried over and enriched in the next).  
 
i) The first part of  the thesis addresses the first of  the abovementioned issues. Thus, in 
chapters 1 and 2, I seek to provide the epistemic justification for the Clarke et al. criteria, by 
employing the framework of  the Inference to the Best Explanation (IBE). Interpreted in causal 
terms, IBE says that we discover causes starting from their effects, simply because causes offer the 
best explanation for the existence of  effects. It is an inferential theory founded by Gilbert Harman 
in 1965 and developed successively by Peter Lipton in his (1999) and (2004), having nowadays 
amongst its proponents prominent philosophers of  science such as Alexander Bird (2010) and 
                                                        
4Clarke, et al. 2014, p. 357. Since these criteria are crucial for the present enquiry, the above list will be reproduced 




Stathis Psillos (2002).  
Given its crucial importance for the rationale of  my thesis, Inference to the Best Explanation 
will be described in detail in the first chapter of  this thesis. Suffice to say in this Introduction that 
IBE is an ideal choice as an epistemic theory because, beyond its use as a theory of  confirmation, it 
can be employed in the preliminary, pre-confirmation stages I have mentioned above, and does not 
depend crucially on the numerical expression (as is the case for instance with the Bayesian theory, to 
ZKLFK RWKHUZLVH LW FDQ EH ¶D IULHQGO\ FRPSDQLRQ· ² an aspect to be addressed in the subsequent 
chapters).  
After depicting its general features and its principled use in the realm of  theory confirmation 
in chapter 1, chapter 2 will show that IBE can provide a pattern of  inference that can be employed 
to grade the quality of  evidence and justify the Clarke et al. criteria of  mechanistic evidence. This 
pattern of  inference can be obtained developing and re-orienting the usage of  IBE from the 
epistemology of  testimony, VWDUWLQJ IURP 3HWHU /LSWRQ·V pioneering and inspiring work in this area 
(Lipton, 2007). 
Roughly speaking, when applied to testimony as a source of  evidence, IBE infers the 
(probable) truth/falsehood of  testimonial reports, because the reported state of  affairs is 
considered part of  the causal background that determines (as an effect) the respective testimonial 
acts. Mutatis mutandis, when applied to other sources of  evidence, the testimonial pattern of  usage 
for IBE allows us to infer the probable truth of  evidential reports, by taking into account both a set 
of  commonsensical, but insightful causal principles (namely the famous set of  MilO·VPHWKRGV DV
advocated by Lipton himself) and a series of  classical explanatory values (theoretical unity, 
simplicity, scope, and individuation), which are adopted by the large majority of  IBE theorists.  
Thus, as mentioned, chapter 1 describes the main outlines of  the use of  IBE as a theory of  
conformation, providing the necessary background for looking at the alternative uses of  IBE, which 
allows one to make the transition to IBE as a theory of  the quality of  evidence. Chapter 2 begins by 
delineating and developing the application of  IBE to testimony, and shows its direct relevance for 
the medical cases. It then goes on circumscribing the combination of  causal principles and 
explanatory values to be used as a pattern of  inference, which is applicable not just to testimony, but 
to all sources of  evidence, and which ultimately, can be applied (or can do justice) to the criteria of  
grading evidence from Clarke et al., which are thereby justified.  
 
ii) The second part of  the thesis (chapters 3-5) deals with the second of  the abovementioned 
issues, namely that of  adding more content to the backbone of  the Clarke et al. criteria. With respect 
to robustness, for instance, it is certainly useful to know that a robust mechanism is reproducible in 
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a wide variety of  conditions, as Clarke et al claim. However, one wonders - what is it that it is 
reproduced?  
Some ready-made answers come easily to mind. For instance, one could say that it is the 
functioning of  mechanisms that is being reproduced. But such ready-made answers call to mind other 
questions. What does the functioning of  a mechanism consist in? We come thus to an important 
aspect of  evaluating mechanistic evidence, namely that one needs to know or to establish what 
ontically a mechanism is, at least to a certain extent, in order to put more flesh to the bones of  such 
preliminary epistemic criteria. More generally, the epistemic side of  the discussion (grading evidence of  
mechanisms) needs to be attended by the metaphysical or ontic side (grading evidence of  mechanisms). 
In order to reach the largest audience, Clarke et al. use the broad, non-committal definition of  
PHFKDQLVPLQSURYLGHGLQ,OODULDQG:LOOLDPVRQZKLFK,PHQWLRQHGDERYH¶DPHFKDQLVPIRUD
phenomenon consists of  entities and activities organized in such a way that they are responsible for 
WKHSKHQRPHQRQ· ,OODULDQG:LOOLDPVRQSapud Clarke et al. 2014, p.343). It is a subtle 
and neutral definition, which manages to capture the core of  most mechanistic definitions in the 
literature. The purpose of  adopting it would be to narrow the space for controversy over (mostly 
insignificant) details, and the argumentation can focus on the substantial epistemic work to be done 
on mechanistic evidence. However, in the second part of  the thesis, I will seek to particularize this 
definition and make it sharper (taking of  course the risk of  going astray and entering into an area of  
controversy). 
So what is a mechanism ontically, and what is the mechanistic causal relation ontically? Now, a 
strange feature of  mechanistic accounts nowadays LV WKDW PRVW RI  WKHP ,OODUL DQG :LOOLDPVRQ·V
included), while mentioning production, functioning, responsibility for events, etc. avoid the 
terminology of  difference-making (in its counterfactual guise, as probabilistic dependency, or 
whatnot). Here are some well-NQRZQH[DPSOHVEHVLGH,OODULDQG:LOOLDPVRQ·V 
 
Illari and Williamson (2012) ·DPHFKDQLVPIRUDSKHQRPHQRQFRQVLVWVRI HQWLWLHVDQGDFWLYLWLHVRUJDQL]HGLQVXFKD
way that they are responsible for the pKHQRPHQRQ·,OODULDQG:LOOLDPVRQSLWDOLFVDGGHG 
Bechtel and Abrahamsen  ¶$ PHFKDQLVP LV D VWUXFWXUH performing a function in virtue of  its component parts, 
component operations, and their organization. The orchestrated functioning of  the mechanism is responsible for one or 
PRUHSKHQRPHQD·LWDOLFVDGGHG 
Glennan (2002) ¶$PHFKDQLVPIRUDEHKDYLRXULVDFRPSOH[V\VWHPWKDWproduces that behaviour by the interaction of  a 
number of  parts, where the interactions between parts can be characterized by direct, invariant, change-relating 
JHQHUDOL]DWLRQV·LWDOLFVDGGHG 
Machamer et al. (2000) [the so-FDOOHG0'&DFFRXQW@¶0HFKDQLVPVDUHHQWLWLHVDQGDFWLYLWLHVRUJDQL]HGVXFKWKDWWKH\
are productive of  regular changes from start or set-up to fiQLVKRUWHUPLQDWLRQFRQGLWLRQV·LWDOLFVDGGHG 
 
The assumption that mechanistic causation works by production only is, as stated above, 
also adopted by RWT, both in the original framework of  Russo and Williamson (2007), and in the 
revision/disambiguation made in Ilari (2011) (as well as in subsequent work by RWT proponents ² 
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Clarke et al. 2014, Wilde and Williamson, 2016).  
Again, as stated above, this assumption of  mechanistic production by causation only goes 
hand in hand with a pluralistic view of  evidence. This pluralistic view of  evidence is inspired by the 
actual practice of  medicine (which asks for evidence both from population studies and from 
laboratory, microstructural studies) and is reinforced by the position taken on mechanistic causation, 
with respect to evidence of  what is said to be required by RWT from mechanisms (i.e. production). 
The pluralistic view of  evidence is also maintained in Illari (2011) with respect to the evidence of  
what is required in RWT (i.e. evidence of  mechanism/production, and evidence of  difference-
making) - even if, as we have seen, Illari clarifies an ambiguity concerning the source of  evidence (the 
from what side of  evidence). 
However, whereas the pluralistic view of  evidence is a fruitful and justified position, I think 
that the production-only assumption concerning mechanistic causation is wrong, for a number of  
reasons.  
a) First, because it was triggered by two pseudo-problems from the metaphysics of  
causation, namely the problem of  absences and the problem of  pre-emption (Hall, 2004), which can 
be solved.  
b) Second, because it forces us to separate evidence of  difference making from evidence of  
mechanisms, which transforms RWT into a claim that we need both population studies and micro-
structural, laboratory assessments in order to establish causal claims. This is quite problematic 
because the practice of  medicine offers examples in which either population studies alone, or 
micro-structural evidence alone, seem sufficient to justify causal conclusion.5 
c) Third, because it makes unavoidable ontic causal pluralism (i.e. the view that there are 
different types of  causal relations). Indeed, if  mechanistic causation is production-only causation, it 
is hard to imagine how the difference-making relation could be something other than a different type 
of  causal relation. But ontic causal pluralism is a disaster for medical epistemology (and also for 
RWT), since it could not justify why and how different evidence is successfully aggregated. For 
instance, why would we necessarily need evidence of  both production and difference-making when 
establishing causal claims, if  production only could in itself  constitute a full-blown causal relation?6 
One could not use here the reply that epistemically, we would need evidence of  difference-making 
in order to differentiate processes from pseudo-processes (the former genuinely causal, the latter 
accidental) since, on the ontic pluralist view, difference-making just concerns a different type of  
                                                        
5 This is solved by Illari (2011) but following a laborious, unnecessarily convoluted argumentation, precisely because the 
assumption of  mechanistic causation as productive only is maintained.   




causal relation.7 Further on, how could evidence be really aggregated, if  evidence point to distinct 
phenomena (distinct causal relations)? Different variegated evidence (as that provided in the 
framework of  evidential pluralism) would not really reinforce the same causal claim, but refer to 
different causal relations and different causal claims. Hence, one central insight of  RWT (drawn out 
of  medical practice), namely that of  combining evidence from population studies with laboratory 
evidence, seems to lose its relevance (and the rhetoric of  EBM could only profit from that, since 
they advocate only the use of  population studies - their views owing much to a tacit ontic pluralism, 
as I will show). 
d) Fourth, because it does not just blur the reasons for why one would want to aggregate 
results from population studies with results from laboratory studies, but also - assuming that the 
problem outlined above in c) was somehow solved - it makes it difficult to see (or make progress 
on) the methodology of  how they can fruitfully be aggregated and combined, given, again, the fact 
that we would be dealing with different causal relations and different causal claims. 
e) Fifth, because it masks the role mechanisms can play in mitigating the problem of  
extrapolation (and, even more, it masks the problem of  extrapolation itself) by requiring only 
evidence of  production from laboratory studies in order to ground causal claims. It masks the 
problem of  extrapolation because the problem of  extrapolation arises due to minute differences at a 
micro-structural level can modify the intensity, direction and the very existence of  causal relations, 
as reflected most conspicuously in the difference-making of  these mechanistic causal relations 
(where the difference-making of  mechanisms can define their robustness). And it masks the role 
mechanisms can play in mitigating the problem of  extrapolation because it is by their difference-
making that mechanisms can contribute to a solution. 
Chapters 3-5 address and develop the above points, chapter 3 looking at points a)-c), chapter 4 
looking at d), and chapter 5 looking at e). More precisely, chapter 3 proposes that mechanisms 
should be viewed as entailing both production and difference-making. The definition of  mechanisms 
that is accordingly adopted is a modified version of  Illari and WilliDPVRQ·V ² a mechanism 
for a phenomenon consists of  entities joined by causal relations that are simultaneously productive 
and difference-making, organized in such a way that the phenomenon is produced and is dependent 
upon them. I defend this construal of  mechanisms against familiar, but arguably overstated counter-
examples and problems, namely the problems of  causation by absence and preemption, and show 
                                                        
7 Vice-versa, the above argumentation could be applied to difference-making causation. Why would we necessarily need 
evidence of  both production and difference-making when establishing causal claims, if  difference-making only could in 
itself  constitute a full-blown causal relation?  One could not use here the reply that epistemically, we would need 
evidence of  production in order to differentiate genuine dependencies from spurious correlations (the former genuinely 




that it is the best solution that can be adopted against causal pluralism.  
Following this construal of  mechanistic causation, RWT is to be formulated in a revised form 
as follows. In order to establish causal claims, one needs evidence of  both production and 
difference-making. Evidence of  production comes from laboratory studies (and, in extremely rare 
cases, it could also be gathered from population studies). Evidence of  difference-making comes 
from both laboratory studies (the difference-making side of  mechanisms) and from population 
studies. In other words, population studies and laboratory studies amount to two epistemic ways of  
access into the difference-making of  the same causal relations. At the end of  chapter 3, this revised 
form of  RWT is defended against specific objections that have been raised by critics, most notably 
by Jeremy Howick and collaborators (2013).  
The proposal that mechanistic causation should be viewed as entailing difference making 
offers at the same time the possibility to re-think the interplay between mechanisms and the 
population studies, and the way in which the revised RWT works. Again, the crucial notion is that 
of  the quality or weight of  evidence, and accordingly of  how the quality of  evidence should bear 
XSRQ WKH ZD\ PHFKDQLVPV DQG SRSXODWLRQ VWXGLHV UHLQIRUFH HDFK RWKHU·V UHVXOWV 7KXV FKDSWHU 4 
shows on the one hand how evidence from population studies adds weight/quality to evidence of  
mechanisms, and thereby contributes to the grading of  mechanistic evidence. On the other hand, it 
looks also at the converse aspect, showing how mechanisms could add weight/quality to population 
correlations and thereby contribute to the grading of  population evidence. Lastly chapter 4 
compares the revised RWT with the initial RWT with respect to how they handle the interplay 
between mechanistic evidence and evidence of  population studies, and argues that the revised RWT 
offers insight into an additional feature of  this interplay, namely how mechanistic evidence and 
research can individualise and define the causal factors that are taken into account by population 
studies. 
The inferential framework of  chapter 4 is, of  course, that of  IBE. In fact, once the construal 
of  mechanistic causation as both productive and difference-making is adopted in chapter 3, the 
feasibility of  using IBE in order to interpret the quality based interplay between mechanisms and 
population studies is even more obvious. The reason is that ² as I have mentioned above in relation 
to the ways in which the difference making of  mechanisms can be expressed ² the various 
counterfactual expressions of  the dependency between the cause and the effect parallel the informal 
LQWXLWLRQVDERXW WKLVVDPHGHSHQGHQFHDVH[SUHVVHG LQ0LOO·VPHWKRGVAnd moreover, at bottom, 
the interplay between mechanistic evidence and population studies evidence is the interplay between 
two epistemic ways of  access into the difference (and production) of  causal relations, such that this 
evidential interplay could be easily interpreted in the terms of  IBE. 
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Differently put, whereas chapter 2 shows how the quality of  mechanistic evidence can be 
justifiably graded using the Clarke et al. criteria ² given an understanding of  these criteria in terms 
of  IBE and with a neutral, non-committal construal of  mechanistic causation ² chapter 4 moves the 
discussion of  the quality of  evidence on the level of  the interplay between mechanistic evidence 
and evidence coming from population studies, taking on the construal of  mechanisms as difference-
making and interpreting the different stages of  this evidential interplay as inferential moves that are 
justifiable on explanatory grounds. 
Chapter 5 applies the reasoning and results of  chapter 4 to the problem of  extrapolation, 
extending the use of  the revised RWT into this area as well, and defending this construal of  
extrapolation against another critique by Howick et al, advanced in their 2013. 
The central idea is that, in the extrapolation discussions, mechanisms have been viewed as a 
sort of  panacea, one asking from them to solve on their own the problem of  extrapolation. However, 
this all or nothing strategy imposes too much burden on the mechanistic evidence, and it is likely 
that no account of  extrapolation could solve the problem by appealing to mechanisms only. Here is 
where the joint use of  mechanisms and population studies advocated by RWT finds a proper 
application. Fortified with the construal of  mechanisms as difference-making, this extension of  
RWT to the realm of  extrapolation can, for one, explain why mechanisms alone cannot be up to the 
task (since their difference making cannot be fully assessed just by taking into account laboratory 
studies). For another, it can suggest a way out of  the conundrum, indicating that the joint use of  
population studies assessments and laboratory studies can help assessing the difference making of  
the mechanisms in question.   
 
iii) The third part of  the thesis (chapters 6 and 7) addresses the third of  the issues highlighted 
in the beginning of  this Introduction, namely the eventual use of  the pre-confirmation 
hierarchization of  mechanistic evidence for confirmation purposes.  After having circumscribed and 
graded the high quality mechanistic evidence at the preliminary level, how can this evidence be used 
for the confirmation of  causal claims? 
Chapters 6 and 7 suggest an answer to this question starting from the results of  chapter 4. The 
main insight of  chapter 6 is that, if  indeed mechanistic evidence adds weight to the results of  
population studies, then the friendly companionship between IBE and Bayesianism should be traced 
out by looking at how precisely, for confirmation purposes, the weight of  evidence of  population 
studies is increased by mechanistic evidence. It will be suggested - along the lines of  a proposal 
made by McCain and Poston in their (2014) - that the contribution of  explanatory features to the 
Bayesian confirmation of  medical causal claims amounts to the increase of  the resilience of  
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probability functions corresponding to population level assessments that are backed up by 
mechanistic evidence. One additional source of  inspiration for this resilience proposal is 
:LOOLDPVRQ·V DFFRXQW RI  HSLVWHPLF FDXVDOLW\ DQG KLV FRUUHVSRQGLQJ DFFRXQW RI  REMHFWLYH
Bayesianism.  
Finally, chapter 7 complements the argumentation of  chapter 6, by looking at how the 
explanatory values employed in IBE can be objectively justified, in order to be used for constraining 
priors and likelihoods. Chapter 7 will thus provide more speculative justification for the use of  these 
values, in addition to the meta-induction argument from the success of  science, put forward in 
chapter 1. Once again, the main source of  inspiration for this additional justification will be Russo 
DQG :LOOLDPVRQ·V DFFRXQW RI  HSLVWHPLF FDXVDWLRQ $OWKRXJK PRUH VSHFXODWLYH WKLV DGGLWLRQDO
justification of  the objectivity of  explanatory values is meant to be stronger than the usual meta-
induction argument from the success of  science, which is used very frequently in the literature. If  
this stronger justification works, then we should have accordingly more epistemic support in using 
the explanatory values for the (very controversial) move of  constraining priors and likelihoods. In 
the area of  application of  this thesis this move would translate as the suggestion that mechanistic 
evidence could be used. Finally, some other problematic (and related) DVSHFWV RI  WKH ¶IULHQGO\
companionshiS·DUHDOVRGLVFXVVHGFKDSWHU- including the issue of  whether, and how, Bayesianism 
and IBE are distinct methods of  inference. 
 
One complementary way in which the content of  the second and third parts of  the thesis can 
be summarised is to say that, starting the from the introduction of  the construal of  mechanisms as 
difference making and of  the revised RWT in chapter 3, these third and second parts of  the thesis 
discuss successively a number of  epistemic advantages that the revised RWT is meant to bring 
about with respect to the evidential interplay between mechanistic evidence (i.e. evidence from 
laboratory studies) and population studies evidence, both at the pre-confirmation, quality grading 
level, and at the level of  confirmation and extrapolation of  causal claims.  These epistemic 
advantages could be listed as follows 
I) Evidence of  population studies to eliminate confounding and make manifest the difference-
making of  mechanisms (chapter 3) 
II) Mechanistic evidence and research could help to individualise the causal factors taken into 
consideration by population studies (chapter 4) 
III) The mechanistic evidence could increase the weight of  population studies evidence and 
hence could contribute to the pre-confirmation grading of  its quality, in a way that justified on 
explanatory grounds (chapter 4) 
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IV) The difference-making evidence from the population studies could increase the weight of  
mechanistic evidence and hence could contribute to the grading of  its quality, in a way that justified 
on explanatory grounds (chapter 4) 
V) The evidence of  difference-making from population studies could fortify the evidence of  
difference-making from laboratory in order to identify robust mechanisms, which should be better 
prepared to face the problem of  extrapolation (chapter 5) 
VI) In the context of  the collaboration between IBE and Bayesianism, the increase of  weight 
brought about by mechanistic evidence could influence the resilience of  probabilities functions of  
hypotheses established by the Bayesian theory taking into account population studies evidence 
(chapter 6) 
VII) In the context of  the collaboration between IBE and Bayesianism, mechanistic evidence 
could be used employed to constrain the prior and/or likelihood probabilities established by the 
Bayesian theory taking into account population studies evidence (chapter 7). 
 
Note that, throughout the thesis, I will be using two (related) case studies. One will draw 
various examples from the history of  atherosclerosis. The other will look at various treatments for 
hypertension and heart failure, in particular in relation to the treatment with beta-blockers and 
calcium-blockers.   
A word is in place here about the general approach of  the thesis. As it must be clear by now 
from this Introduction, the general approach is that of  trying to offer a global picture by looking at 
quite diverse epistemic consequences of  the revised RWT proposed here. As usual, in writing a 
thesis, I had the choice of  either focusing on a well-delineated aspect of  grading mechanistic 
evidence, in order to chart and explore it to the last detail, or trying to offer a plausible global 
picture by gathering forays into different aspects of  evidence grading and subsequent hypothesis 
confirmation, which my view of  mechanistic evidence and causation led to. With the benefit of  
hindsight, I should have picked out the first option, for the simple reason that it would have been 
easier. I was led to the second option because some of  my intuitions were going against the 
intuitions of  proponents of  the initial RWT, who had already drawn a comprehensive global picture 
of  causal assessment. In defending my views and trying to answer quite diverse, and legitimate 
questions, I had to try and draw such a global picture myself, at the risk, of  course, of  not being 
sufficiently detailed, of  not pursuing further enough my arguments, and of  maintaining the level of  
suggestions where one would have perhaps expected a demonstration or more powerful arguments.  
It is almost superfluous to add that the present thesis owes enormously to (and simply could 
not have been written without) the research done by the proponents of  the initial RWT. The 
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criticism put forward intermittently in this thesis to some of  their assumptions is only intended as a 
form of  suggestion for potential improvement, embraces of  course the caveat that the respective 
suggestion might be wrong, and is made, as I said, under the full awareness of  the great conceptual 
debt owed to their research.  
Speaking of  indebtness, this final part of  this Introduction has in the following two series of  
figures. One series presents successively the content of  the subsequent chapters using as a template 
fig 1 from Clarke et al 2014 ² a template used by Clarke et al in the framework of  the initial RWT, 
and which I have adapted for the revised RWT. Similarly, the other series presents successively the 
content of  each of  the subsequent chapters, but using a different template, directly focused on the 
revised RWT and its epistemic advantages, in landscape.  
The figures from the two series corresponding to each chapter will also be reproduced in the 
thesis before the beginning of  the respective chapter. They are meant to provide a graphic, if  
imperfect, preview of  the content of  the each chapter, giving a sense of  both the continuity and 
difference of  the thesis as compared to previous work, and hopefully helping to draw the diverse 
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of  causal factors by 
mechanistic evidence 
 
III) Increased weight for 
population evidence 
based on mechanisms 
 
The revised RWT-in order establish claims, one 
needs evidence of  both production and difference 
making (Chapter 3) 
Laboratory studies of  mechanisms 
² evidence of  production and 
difference making 
Evidence of  difference 
making from population 
studies 
Mechanisms as both productive and 
difference making (Chapter 3) 
Evidential 
pluralism 





Schematic representation of  the main thread of  the thesis. The left hand side part presents the 
inferential side of  the arguments. The right-hand side presents first the ontic claim about mechanistic 
causation, in the framework of  ontic causal pluralism. I it followed by the revised version of  RWT and a 
series of  epistemic advantages of  the latter ² the first four advantages concerning the pre-confirmation 
grading of  evidence,  the last three concerning confirmation and extrapolation 
Inferential view centered on IBE 
 
Presentation of  IBE (chapter 1) 
----------------------------------------- 
The testimonial use of  IBE justifies the 
Clarke et al criteria of  grading 
mechanistic evidence (Chapter 2) 
---------------------------------------- 
 
IBE as a guide to inference can justify the 
pre-confirmation epistemic advantages of  




IBE and Bayesianism  
Using mechanistic evidence to increase 
the resilience of  probability functions 
amounts to appealing to the explanatory 
values in order to stabilize the Bayesian 
credences (Chapter 6) 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
Mechanistic evidence could justifiably 
constrain the prior and likelihood 
probabilities if  one adopts a strong  
interpretation of  the objectivity of  
explanatory values, which takes these 
values as providing a qualitative rendition 
of  the ideal nomological structure 
described by scientific laws  (Chapter 7) 
 
V) The difference-making of  
robust mechanisms can face 
the challenge of  extrapolation, 
when circumscribed by both 
laboratory and population 
studies 
VI)  Mechanistic evidence could 
influence the resilience of  probabilities 
functions of  hypotheses established by 
the Bayesian theory taking into account 
population studies evidence. 
 
VII) Mechanistic evidence could 
constrain the prior and likelihood 
probabilities for hypotheses 
established by the Bayesian theory 
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A is correlated 
with B here. 
A has a mechanism 
with B here. 
A is cause of  B here. 
A is cause of  B in this 
patient. 
Initial figure in Clarke et al. (2014) p. 255 





studies evidence of  
difference making 
Evidence of  difference 
making from 
population studies  
Evidence of  mechanisms 
(production and difference 
making) from laboratory 
studies 
Grading laboratory 
studies evidence of  
mechanisms 
A is making a difference 
to B here. 
A produces B here. 
A is cause of  B 
here. 
A is cause of  B in 
this patient. 
Overall figure for the thesis 
Evidence of  mechanisms becomes evidence of  both difference making 
and production. 
Language of  correlation is substituted with language of  difference 
making. 
Grading correlation evidence becomes grading evidence of  difference 
making from population studies. 
Graded evidence of  mechanisms from laboratory studies is used for the 
claim that A is making a difference to B here. 
Graded evidence of  difference making from population studies is used for 
the claim that A produces B here. 
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A is making a difference 
to B here. 
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A is cause of  B 
here. 
A is cause of  B in 
this patient. 
Chapter 1 
Chapter 1 introduces the most important features of  IBE, 
describing the role of  explanatory values and the causal 
interpretation of  IBE put forward by Lipton, who 
presents explanatory inferences as guides to the 
confirmation of  causal claims.   
 
Chapter 1 also looks at some particular cases of  
mechanistic evidence in which IBE can be used not just as 
a guide to confirmation, but directly in order to confirm 
causal claims, due to the fact that the explanatory content 
of  evidence is so rich that one can rule out all alternative 
explanations and pick out the right one (Inference to the 
Only Explanation).  
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Chapter 1. General lines of  IBE, and its use as a theory of  confirmation 
 
Introduction 
This chapter proposes to present the most important features of  IBE and its main use as a 
theory of  confirmation. The discussion in this chapter which will offer us the necessary background 
for making the transition in chapter 2 towards the theory of  the quality of  mechanistic evidence, by 
elaborating upon the alternative employment of  IBE in testimony.  
One reason why it is useful to first describe IBE as a theory of  confirmation is that it makes it 
easier to see some of  its most important advantages. These advantages are: being ampliative (i.e., 
amplifying, increasing knowledge), paying heed to the reliability (or weight) of  evidential sources, 
having a close descriptive relationship with what scientists actually do, and a lack of  dependence on 
the numerical expression.8 This sets it apart from the Bayesian theory and makes it amenable to a 
wider variety of  uses. 
 Indeed, this general presentation of  IBE in its theory-confirmation use not only provides us 
the background for the subsequent theme of  the pre-confirmation assessment of  the quality of  
evidence, but it also has an interest in itself. When it comes to what theory of  evidence confirmation 
we should choose for our causal claims in medicine (including here the causal hypotheses derived 
from mechanistic research) the first candidate that comes to mind is the probabilistic theory of  
confirmation, according to which, roughly speaking, evidence most confirms the theory whose 
probability it most raises, and which, in its Bayesian form, has been enormously popular for several 
decades. As with all theories of  evidence confirmation, however, the probabilistic view has its 
advantages and disadvantages. With respect to mechanisms specifically, its most salient advantage in 
general - namely its numerical expression - does not appear as strong as usual, because in 
mechanistic research in medicine, the amount of  data is not as comprehensive as in population 
studies. There is also the related problem that evidence is often expressed in qualitative, rather than 
quantitative terms.9 
Saying all this is not to diminish its importance, though. Bayesianism is still an important 
option, the first option whenever its application is possible, and recent work suggests that its use in 
medical mechanisms can be very extensive and fruitful (Clarke et al. 2014b). But what should be 
done when numbers are missing or are insufficient? And is the probabilistic view the only 
                                                        
8Very recent work by Glass, Douven, Schupbach and Wenmackers aims in addition to construe IBE as a theory of  
confirmationwith a numerical expression; see Glass (2012), Douven and Schupbach (2015), Douven and Schupbach 
(2015b), Douven and Wenmackers (2015), Douven (2016). Since this recent work is still controversial, I will not 
approach it here and will stick with the key features of  IBE that are commonly adopted by IBE theorists.  
9 Earman 1992 has provided a full overview of  the problems faced by the Bayesian approach, all the more insightful 
since it is provided by a Bayesian theorist. 
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standpoint on theory confirmation one could adopt in the intricate area of  mechanism research? 
One response to these (slightly rhetorical) questions is simply that IBE should also be given a 
chance, so to speak. This type of  explanatory inference is best known for its applications in the 
scientific realism debates, but it has also gained important proponents in the general philosophy of  
science as an account of  scientific theory confirmation (e.g., Stathis Psillos, Alexander Bird, and 
Peter Lipton). To a certain extent, it has also been employed in the special sciences, medicine 
included,10 although not with a focus to mechanisms.  
Admittedly, IBE certainly cannot exhaust the richness of  our inferential patterns in science.11 
But I will try to show that it is an insightful and interesting way of  looking at the impact of  
evidence of  mechanisms on the confirmation of  causal claims in medicine, at least in certain 
particular cases of  laboratory research, in which the qualitative side of  the mechanistic evidence is 
prevailing (as can be seen from some examples from the history of  atherosclerosis. 
As for the other cases, in which not just the qualitatively rich evidence of  mechanisms is in 
place, but also other types of  evidence (in particular, the evidence from controlled studies at 
population level) IBE should not be viewed as a rival of  the probabilistic (Bayesian) view in the 
realm of  theory confirmation, but rather a friendly companion, whenever they might cross paths 
(Lipton 2004, pp. 107-117). IBE is supposed to be consistent with the probabilistic assessments, to 
apply, as I said, where the probabilistic results are missing or insufficient, to complement them when 
they are present, and to bring in some advantages of  its own. But the treatment of  this more 
complicated case of  the complementarity between IBE and Bayesianism will have to wait until 
chapter 6. 
The present chapter will present in §1 the general limes of  using IBE on its own as a theory of  
confirmation, and will show in §2 how this confirmation use can be applied to mechanistic evidence 
and mechanistic hypotheses.  
 
§ 1 General lines of  IBE 
 
IBE is an inferential method that, as its name immediately suggests, takes us from an 
explanandum (a phenomenon to be explained) to the truth of  the explanans (the explanation) 
                                                        
10 6HPPHOZHLV·GLVFRYHU\RI WKHFDXVHVRI SXHUSHUDOIHYHUKDVEHHQDIDYRULWHH[DPSOHIRUERWK/LSWRQ(2004) and Bird 
(2010). Bird has also provided an analysis of  Bradford-+LOO·VFULWHULDLQWHUPVRI KLVRZQEUDQGRI ,%(LQ Bird (2011). 
11 ,Q/LSWRQ·VZRUGV ¶7KHVHQVLEOHPRGHVW\FRQVLVWV LQPDNLQJQRFODLPWKDW,QIHUHQFHWRWKH%HVW([SODQDWLRQLVWKH
foundation of  every aspect of  non-demonstrative inference.... It is glory enough to show that explanatory 
considerations are an important guide to inference. Consequently, there is no need to argue heroically for a perfect 
match between the explanatory and the inferential virtues. Similarly, in the third stage there is no need to argue that 
H[SODQDWRU\FRQVLGHUDWLRQVDUHRXURQO\JXLGHWRLQIHUHQFHMXVWWKDWWKH\DUHDVLJQLILFDQWJXLGHDQLPSRUWDQWKHXULVWLF·
(Lipton, 2004, p. 121).  
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where the latter is in the best position to account for former. As such, IBE occupies a middle 
ground between deduction and induction as far as the logic of  inference, broadly speaking, is 
concerned. Analogously, it also occupies a middle ground in the more restricted area of  scientific 
confirmation and explanation, between the hypothetico-deductive model of  scientific confirmation 
and the covering law-model of  explanation (Hempel [1948], (1970).  
Let us give an easy example. On the side of  the elementary logic of  inference, with the famous 
¶(OHPHQWDU\ P\ GHDU :DWVRQ· 6KHUORFN +ROPHV ZRXOG UHDGLO\ FRQYLQFH KLV FRPSDQLRQ WKDW KLV
reasoning was based on deduction only. Brilliant as his inferences certainly are, what his reasoning 
exemplifies is not deduction but IBE - inference to the best explanation. In most of  the cases 
solved by Holmes, the possibility that someone else committed the murders is not completely ruled 
out. But this possibility is shown to be highly implausibOHVLQFH$UWKXU&RQDQ'R\OH·VKHURZRXOG
always cling on the relevant evidence and choose the hypothesis that best explains the facts (Lipton, 
2004, p. 116, Lipton, 2000, p. 186).  
Interestingly, on the other end of  the logical spectrum of  inference, even induction, when 
successful, can be shown to be a limit case of  IBE. In our inductive practices, we generalise from 
the observed instances because we think that the ensuing generalisation, taken as a law or having 
some sort of  nomic appeal, will explain the presence of  such and such traits and interactions in the 
observed instances (Harman, 1965, pp. 90-91, Psillos 2002, p. 620). From this perspective, IBE is 
inter-twined with how our scientific hypotheses are generated and confirmed, and we can see this 
more clearly if  we compare IBE with two of  the grand models of  confirmation and explanation 
from the philosophy of  science.  
+HPSHO·V K\SRWKHWLFR-deductive model of  confirmation would have it that we test our 
hypotheses by means of  their predictions (that deductively follow from the hypotheses under test), 
where we are not offered any insight into how these hypotheses are devised, and, when an instance 
appears to disconfirm a theory, there is hardly any way to distinguish whether it is the core-theory or 
the auxiliary assumptions that should be dismissed. On the other hand, in the covering law model 
of  explanation, providing an explanation is a subsequent step to the acquiring and confirming of  
laws, a step provided just to account for the epistemic dimension of  understanding (Psillos, 2002, 
pp. 612-613, Lipton 2004, pp. 67, 82-83). 
By contrast, in the framework of  IBE, the act of  explanation is already part and parcel of  
devising and confirming hypotheses (Lipton, 2004) and understanding is inextricably linked to the 
way we choose among competing theories. Such IBE practices have been shown to make up a huge 
part of  the inferences scientists actually draw; and in medicine, recent work has shown as well its 




Importantly, IBE takes into account the quality of  the evidence in favor of  some hypothesis or 
another ² whether, for instance, the samples used in drawing a generalisation are biased or not.12 
One way to this more clearly, is to go back to the founding article of  Gilbert Harman from 1965. It 
was Harman who first explored the apparent contrast between simple, enumerative induction, on 
the one hand, and those cases of  explanatory inference, typified by the Sherlock Holmes-ian 
FRQFOXVLRQV ¶WKH EXWOHU GLG LW· LQ ZKLFK RQH LQIHUV - from the premise that a given hypothesis 
ZRXOG SURYLGH D ¶EHWWHU· H[SODQDWLRQ IRU WKH HYLGHQFH WKDQ ZRXOG DQ\ RWKHU K\SRWKHVLV - the 
conclusion that the given hypothesis is true (Harman 1965, p. 89). 
It was still Harman who argued that those cases of  enumerative induction that are warranted 
are (masked) instances of  IBE - where, and this is the point I wanted to insist upon - such 
inferences take into account the reliability or quality of  the sources of  evidence. Taken the 
HQXPHUDWLYH LQGXFWLRQ IURP ¶DOO REVHUYHG $V DUH %V· WR ¶DOO $V DUH %V· DQG DVVXPH WKDW ZH DUH
dealing with projectable predicates. Now, one necessary condition for such an inference to have 
warrant is that we should have no reason to believe, for instance, that the analysed sample has been 
biased in the As and Bs it contains. The masked IBE that underlines cases of  warranted 
enumerative induction is able to do so precisely because it takes into account how reliable (or, of  
ZKDWTXDOLW\WKHHYLGHQFHLV:KHQDFFHSWLQJRQH[SODQDWRU\JURXQGVWKDW¶DOO$VDUH%V·RQHWDNHV
into account how reliable our samples of  As and Bs are, because one thinks that this winning 
K\SRWKHVLV ¶DOO $V DUH %V· H[SODLQV WKH HYLGHQFH WKDW ¶DOO REVHUYHG $V DUH %V· EHWWHU WKDQ WKH
K\SRWKHVHVWKDWVD\¶QRWDOO$VDUH%V·RUPRUHGLUHFWO\¶VRPH$VDUH%VDQGWKHVDPSOHKDVEHHQ
ELDVHG· +DUPDQ  SS -91). IBEs are never adequately drawn without taking into account 
what we know, or what we hold as true, with respect to the quality RI  WKH HYLGHQFH ,Q 3VLOORV·V
words, they always imply and are supported by claims about reliability or quality. This aspect of  IBE 
LVVRLPSRUWDQWIRUWKHSUHVHQWWKHVLVWKDW3VLOORV·H[SRVLWLRQ is worth quoting here.  
 
¶7KH EDVLF LGHD LV WKDW JRRG LQGXFWLYH UHDVRQLQJ LQYROYHV FRPSDULVRQ RI  DOWHUQDWLYH SRWHQWLDOO\ H[SODQDWRU\
hypotheses. In a typical case, where the reasoning starts from the premise that 'All As in the sample are B', there are (at 
least) two possible ways in which the reasoning can go. The first is to withhold drawing the conclusion that 'All As are 
B', even if  the relevant predicates are projectable, based on the claim that the observed correlation in the sample is due 
to the fact that the sample is biased. The second is to draw the conclusion that 'All As are B' based on the claim that 
that the observed correlation is due to the fact that there is a nomological connection between being A and being B 
such that All As are B. This second way to reason implies (and is supported by) the claim that the observed sample is not biased. What is 
important in any case is that which way the reasoning should go depends on explanatory considerations. Insofar as the conclusion 'All As are 
B' is accepted, it is accepted on the basis it offers a better explanation of  the observed frequencies of  As which are B in the sample, in 
contrast to the (alternative potential) explanation that someone (or something) has biased the sample. And insofar as the generalisation 
to the whole population is not accepted, this judgement will be based on providing reasons that the biased sample 
hypothesis offers a better explanation of  the observed correlations in the sample. Differently put, EI [enumerative 
induction] is an extreme case of  IBE in that a) the best explanation has the form of  a nomological generalisation of  the 
                                                        
12 Psillos, 2002, p. 621. 
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data in the sample to the whole relevant population and b) the nomological generalisation is accepted, if  at all, on the 
basis that it offers the beVWH[SODQDWLRQRI WKHREVHUYHGFRUUHODWLRQVRQWKHVDPSOH·3VLOORVSSLWDOLFV
added). 
 
How we come to assess an evidential source as reliable or not might well involve IBE as well, 
but it is very important to note that there are two separate issues here. One issue is how we come to 
confirm a certain hypothesis based on evidence, and whether one takes into account what we know 
of  the quality of  the respective evidence. A different issue is how we come to know how reliable the 
evidence is and how we assess the quality of  evidence. An IBE theorist can always hold that the 
quality of  evidence (no matter how it is assessed by scientists or lay people) is taken into account in 
the inferences for confirmation of  scientific (or lay) hypotheses, without being obliged to furnish in 
addition any argument as to how the quality of  evidence is evaluated, as such.13 
)RUQRZLWVKRXOGEHQRWHGWKDW+DUPDQ·VLQLWLDODFFRXQWRI ,%(ZDVERWKWRRVWURQJDQGWRR
weak. Too strong because, for obvious reasons of  fallibility, one should rather speak of  the probable 
truth of  the best hypothesis (Lipton, 2004); we should aim for truth but a recipe for it is impossible. 
Too weak because he did not say much about what criteria or explanatory values one should employ 
for evaluating the explanatory goodness of  hypotheses. However, the explanatory goodness of  
hypotheses is crucial for picking the right one in the framework of  IBE, much of  the subsequent 
work has been devoted to spelling out what these criteria or explanatory values are. 
The core explanatory values that are currently accepted in the IBE literature say that we should 
choose the theory that best fits with the relevant background knowledge (theoretical unity), that 
explains more evidence or the total of  it (scope), makes use of  fewer assumptions and theoretical 
entities (simplicity), and articulates a mechanism when explaining (individualisation). Here is how 
these values are laid down by Stathis Psillos: 
 
Theoretical Unity: Suppose that there are two potentially explanatory hypotheses H1 and H2 but the relevant 
background knowledge favours H1 over H2. Unless there are specific reasons to challenge the background knowledge, 
H1 should be accepted as the best explanation.  
Scope: Suppose that only one explanatory hypothesis H explains all data to be explained. That is, all other competing 
explanatory hypotheses fail to explain some of  the data, although they are not refuted by them. H should be accepted as 
the best explanation.  
Simplicity: Suppose that two composite explanatory hypotheses H1 and H2 explain all data. Suppose also that H1 uses 
fewer assumptions than H2. In particular, suppose that the set of  hypotheses that H1 employs to explain the data is a 
proper subset of  the hypotheses that H2 employs. Then H1 is to be preferred as a better explanation.  
Individualisation: Suppose that H1 offers a more precise explanation of  the phenomena than H2, in particular an 
explanation that articulates some causal-nomological mechanism by means of  which the phenomena are explained. 
Then H1 is to be preferred as a better explanation.14 
                                                        
13 Harman has also argued that how one judges various sources of  evidence as to their reliability (or quality), involves, at 
least in part, inferences to the best explanation, where such inferences point to the truth of  the evidence being 
furnished or provided; see Harman (1965, pp. 93-94). I will look into this aspect in chapter 2.  
14 Psillos, 2002 uses in fact different denominations for the above values (namely consilience, completeness, parsimony and 
precision) and adds two more, namely importance(doing justice to the most important parts of  the evidence) and unification 




There seem to be, however, two problems with the use of  explanatory values in order to 
adjudicate which theory is more explanatory than another, namely the problem of  arbitrariness and 
the problem of  vagueness. First, there is the worry about the arbitrariness of  the these values: why 
should nature and our theories of  it be simple, theoretically unified, individuating, etc.? Despite all 
of  the ink spilled on the subject in tackling this first problem, I can confine myself  here to the 
remark that this is simply what science does and aims at, and why contemporary science is more 
successful than, say, ancient science$Q\RQHFRPSDULQJRQHRI *DOHQ·VWKHUDSHXWLFJXLGHOLQHVRUDQ\
of  the Hippocratic treatises with a contemporary medical textbook will have to acknowledge that 
the modern approach and the medical knowledge thereby involved are simpler and more 
individualised, have greater scope and greater theoretical unity, and accordingly, explain medical 
phenomena better than the ancient counterparts. Surely, for instance, the current classification of  
pulmonary diseases in terms of  different pathogenic factors and morpho-pathological abnormalities 
does more to the systematisation of  these phenomena than the classifications employed by the 
Galenic or Hippocratic schools in the background of  their humoral theories.15 Indeed, being 
actually descriptive of  the advance and current practice of  scientific research is one apparent feature 
of  IBE to which I shall return.16 
 The second problem is more serious because it is easy to see that in spite of  their elegant 
presentation provided by authors like Psillos or Lipton, how these values should be applied remains 
somewhat vague. In fact, they do not seem to go much beyond the suggestions for explanatory 
relevance that Harman gestured at in his (1965) article, declining to say more about it (Harman, 
1965, p. 89). 
In turn, there are two ways of  escaping this problem of  vagueness. One is nicely explained by 
Psillos - IBE is only vague when one tries to define it in an abstract way, away from the real-life 
situations in which it is applied (Psillos, 2007, pp. 441-447). For instance, not much can be said in 
general about the background knowledge that researchers possess in every particular science. This 
background knowledge becomes evident, however (and intimidatingly so for the outsider) when 
real-life examples of  inference are brought forward from, say, quantum mechanics or medical 
microbiology. Similarly in the case of  IBE and its applications, what is really important to be 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
species of  (what was called above) scope; although important in themselves, these two values are not especially relevant 
for the present thesis (for which the set of  core-values listed above suffices), and I will leave them aside.  
15 For a presentation of  Galenic and Hippocratic views on the pulmonary pathology (and physiology), as well as the 
background humoral theory, see Debru (1996), Nutton (2013), and Jouanna (1992).  
16 In addition to this meta-induction argument from the success and progress of  science, value epistemology (including 
its neo-Aristotelian tenet) has offered plausible ways of  integrating these values in a normative framework (Wilkenfeld, 
2014). I will offer in chapter 7 another (more speculative) justification for the use of  these values in inference, based on 
DGLVFXVVLRQRI /HZLV·DSSURDFKWRVFLHQWLILFODws.  
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explained, what methodologies are reliable and at what point they should be used, how to test, say, 
the strength of  a mechanism or reach a sufficient degree of  precision in its description in order to 
respect the value of  individuation, etc., are all features that can remain vague on a general 
presentation but gain content when viewed from the inside of  a scientific field,  from the point of  
view of  its tacit rules and practices. These rules and practices might differ in articulation from one 
science to another. This does not mean that they cannot in principle be spelled out, at least in part, 
and that one should not aim at spelling them out. An IBE theorist should try to do it, but inside a 
given science, by making explicit, at least in part, what is more or less tacit in a specific field.  
7KH RWKHU ZD\ RI  HVFDSLQJ WKH SUREOHP RI  YDJXHQHVV DULVHV IURP 3HWHU /LSWRQ·V ZRUN RQ
contrastive H[SODQDWLRQ ZKLFK GUDZLQJ RQ 0LOO·V IDPRXV FDXVDO PHWKRGV KDV LQtroduced specific 
causation material into our explanatory reasoning. Lipton started from the insight that when seeking 
to explain a certain situation, we are comparing it with a foil case that resembles it as much as 
possible, with the difference that the explanandum does not show up. The explanation is 
subsequently chosen by looking at the background factors that are present (as causes) in the 
situation to be explained (as effect), and are absent in the foil. Naturally, hypotheses that fail to 
account for these background factors are eliminated. This feature of  contrastivity is ingrained in our 
explanatory practices. As mentioned, Lipton argued that the reasoning behind such practices 
DSSHDOVWR0LOO·VPHWKRGVIRUGLVFRYHULQJFDXVDOUHODWLRQVLQSDUWLFXODU, the Method of  Difference). 
Here is how the Methods were laid out by Mill in his System of  Logic 
 
a) Direct method of  Agreement: If  two or more instances of  the phenomenon under investigation have only one 
circumstance in common, the circumstance in which alone all the instances agree, is the cause (or effect) of  the given 
phenomenon 
b) Method of  Difference: If  an instance in which the phenomenon under investigation occurs, and an instance in 
which it does not occur, have every circumstance save one in common, that one occurring only in the former; the 
circumstance in which alone the two instances differ, is the effect, or cause, or a necessary part of  the cause, of  the 
phenomenon.  
c) Joint Method of  Agreement and Difference: If  two or more instances in which the phenomenon occurs have only 
one circumstance in common, while two or more instances in which it does not occur have nothing in common save the 
absence of  that circumstance; the circumstance in which alone the two sets of  instances differ, is the effect, or cause, or 
a necessary part of  the cause, of  the phenomenon.  
d) Method of  Residue: Subduct from any phenomenon such part as is known by previous inductions to be the effect 
of  certain antecedents, and the residue of  the phenomenon is the effect of  the remaining antecedents.  
e) Method of  concomitant variation: Whatever phenomenon varies in any manner whenever another phenomenon 
varies in some particular manner, is either a cause or an effect of  that phenomenon, or is connected with it through 
some fact of  causation.(Mill, 2002 [1843], p. 455) 
 
This contrastive type of  causal explanation - which works by circumscribing causal factors whose 
presence or absence in the background do or would make a difference to the explanandum in 
question (in contrast to the foil situation), and thus eliminating spurious hypotheses - has helped 
enormously to put flesh on the bones of  IBE because it has enriched the set of  criteria based on 
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explanatory virtues with specifically causal criteria.17 
The sceptic reader might ZRUU\ZK\DIWHUDOOGLG/LSWRQDSSHDOSUHFLVHO\WR0LOO·VPHWKRGVDQG
whether the latter should be considered so significant for our inferential practices. But the worry 
ZRXOGEHXQMXVWLILHG0LOO·VPHWKRGVDUHEDVLF LQWXLWLRQVDERXWFDXVDOGLVFRYHU\DQGFonfirmation, 
which can be detected in the back of  most contemporary accounts of  causation, be they 
manipulative, counterfactual, probabilistic, etc., including the various forms of  Humean and anti-
Humean accounts.18 Moreover, the consequence of  the extremely wide application of  these 
methods³a consequence which, cautiously, Lipton never spells out, but which is quite plausible and 
will be articulated further in the following chapter (starting from chapter 3) ³is that the general 
DSSHDO RI  0LOO·V PHWKRGV DQG of  the explanations associated to them) comes from the fact that 
difference-making is intimately related to causal relations, at least in the medical and biological area, 
including here the mechanistic causation. 
Speaking just in terms of  plausibility, one only needs to consider the literature offering 
perfectly coherent accounts of  causation that are universal in scope and include difference-making 
as a necessary condition of  cause-HIIHFW UHODWLRQV VXFK DV $OH[DQGHU %LUG·V DFFRXQW RI  FDXVDO
powers.19 On the other hand, Lipton rightly notes that there is more to causation than just 
difference-PDNLQJ DQG 0LOO·V PHWKRGV DOWKRXJK WKH ODWWHU DUH DQ LPSRUWDQW SDUW RI  LW ZKLFK
explains in part his reservation as to the general applicability of  IBE to any sort of  causal context. 
While explanatory considerations are relevant, they cannot represent the whole story in our 
inferential patterns. Moreover, given that IBE does not have a numerical, quantitative expression 
and is predominantly concerned with the qualitative aspects of  evidence, it is not sufficiently fine-
grained, in general, to really draw confirmation conclusions in complicated cases of  hypothesis choice.    
Another way to express the same idea would be to say that, in general, explanatory 
considerations are simply a guide to inferential confirmation. Or, in terms of  a distinction Lipton also 
introduces, the inference to the loveliest explanation (i.e., the inference that pays full heed to 
explanatory considerations) should be a guide to the inference to the likeliest explanation (i.e., to the 
ultimate, warranted explanation)20. Apparently, Lipton was close to identifying inference to the 
Likeliest Explanation with a Bayesian inference that would take into account explanatory 
considerations (i.e. would be guided by the inference to the Loveliest Explanation) in the sense that 
                                                        
17 See, for instance, Lipton (1993, pp. 39-40, 42-43; see also Bird (2007), Bird (2010), Bird (2011) and Psillos (2000), 
Psillos (2002), Psillos (2007). $VLGH IURP 0LOO·V PHWKRGV 3VLOORV DQG %LUG DOVR GLVFXVV WKH QRPRORJLFDO VLGH RI  WKH
explanation in question, and Bird has emphasized the eliminative aspect of  IBE.  
18 $FRPSUHKHQVLYHRYHUYLHZRI 0LOO·VPHWKRGVDQGWKHLUVLJQLILFDQFHFDQEHIRXQGLQ&DUWZULJKW (1989). 
19 See Bird (2005) Bird (2007), especially his statements on the difference between the methodology of  discovering 
causes and the metaphysics behind causation. 
20Lipton (2004, p. 115); see also the exchange of  articles and replies between Lipton and Salmon, in particular Salmon 
(2001) and Lipton (2001) 
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these explanatory considerations would have a role in the assignment of  priors and likelihoods, and 
also in the selection of  the relevant evidence (Lipton, 2004, pp.106-117).21/LSWRQ·V insight seems 
particularly relevant. The reason is that in such a joint use of  IBE and of  the Bayesian theory, IBE 
could draw on the numerical, quantitative expression afforded by Bayesian probabilities and solve 
the problem of  making fine-grained differentiations between hypotheses, which was noted above. 
We will come back to this insight in chapters 6 and 7. 
Up until chapter 6, I will confine myself  to underlying the descriptive accuracy of  IBE for 
scientific practice, and will mostly VWLFN ZLWK /LSWRQ·V assessment of  IBE as a guide to scientific 
inference. Moreover, up until chapter 3, I will leave aside the possible explicit articulation of  
mechanistic causation in terms of  difference making, and will use the non-committal, general 
definition of  mechanism provided by Phyllis Illari and Jon Williamson (2012) and also employed by 
Clarke et al. ZKLFK VD\V WKDW ¶D PHFKDQLVP IRU D SKHQRPHQRQ FRQVLVWV RI  HQWLWLHV DQG DFWLYLWLHV
RUJDQL]HG LQ VXFKDZD\ WKDW WKH\DUH UHVSRQVLEOH IRU WKHSKHQRPHQRQ· ,OODUL DQG Williamson, p. 
120). However, the reader should bear in mind that there is a separate argument concerning the 
metaphysics of  causation and the definition of  mechanisms which includes difference making, and which 
I will defend in chapters 3, 4 and 5; that approach to mechanisms should add further support to the 
conclusions of  the first two chapters. 
There is one last important aspect of  IBE which needs to be covered in this introductory 
chapter. We have noted above, in connection with the guiding use of  IBE, that due to its 
predominantly qualitative conclusions, this inferential method is not in general sufficient to really 
confirm hypotheses. However, there are some rare instances in which the abundant nature of  
evidence allows IBE to pick out the right hypotheses, because it is able, on grounds of  the such 
explanatorily rich evidence, to rule out all alternative explanations; it can then rightly be called 
¶,QIHUHQFHWRWKH2QO\([SODQDWLRQ·%LUG:HZLOOORRNLQWKHQH[WVHFWLRQDWVRPHH[DPSOH
of  it from mechanistic research, since it illustrates at its best KRZ0LOO·VPHWKRGV FDQ be used in 
conjunction with explanatory reasoning. 
 
§ 2. IBE-based confirmation applied to mechanistic hypotheses 
 
I now return to the claim that IBE is actually descriptive of  the way science works, which I 
previously mentioned in relation to the general values of  explanatory goodness (theoretical unity, 
scope, simplicity and individuation) DQG WR /LSWRQ·V FDXVDO LQWHUSUHWDWLRQ RI  ,%( XVLQJ 0LOO·V
methods.  
                                                        
21 The collaboration of  IBE with the Bayesian theory is a theme to which we shall return in the final two chapters of  
this thesis.  
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Indeed, much resHDUFKLQPHGLFLQHSURFHHGVDORQJWKHOLQHVRI 0LOO·VPHWKRGV/LSWRQS
90). Since this is a crucial part of  the attractiveness of  IBE for medical studies, I shall take in the 
following two examples from the history of  atherosclerosis, a great resource for understanding how 
medical research unfolded in modern times, spanning as it does almost a century of  investigations 
that incorporated all the major physio-pathological discoveries of  modern medicine. Since these two 
examples, as well as many of  my other examples from the following chapters, are drawn from these 
investigations, it is useful to mention briefly the milestones of  this tremendous research into the 
causes of  atherosclerosis.  
The initial hypotheses taken into account at the turn of  the century were that the 
atherosclerotic modifications of  arteries would be due to protein toxicity or just amount to 
senescent modifications. The hypothesis regarding the pathogenic character of  cholesterol  -which 
had already been advanced in the 20s by Nikolai Anitschkow - was not taken into serious 
consideration until the 50s, when the full spectrum of  lipoproteins was described, which was 
followed in the 60s by the identification of  their low-density fraction (LDL) as the main carrier of  
cholesterol. In turn, the link between the cellular uptake of  LDL and the LDL receptor was 
hypothesized and documented in the 70s and 80s, when the presence of  foam cells inside the 
atherosclerotic lesions was explained in terms of  macrophages taking up oxidized LDL via the 
fDPRXV¶VFDYHQJHU·UHFHSWRU 
 The taking into consideration of  the macrophages/monocytes, as parts of  the immune 
system, was going hand in hand with a complementary hypothesis (detailing the mechanism of  the 
pathogenic action of  cholesterol - WKH ¶UHVSRQVH WR LQMXU\· K\SRWKHVLV 7KLV K\SRWKHVLV WRRN WKH
pathogenic effects of  cholesterol to be augmented by the inflammation produced locally in the 
arteries. The hypothesis was further strengthened by a series of  discoveries of  inflammation-related 
receptors (too numerous to quote here). Suffice to say that the grand picture emerging from all this 
research - which is nowadays accepted but is still considered incomplete - is that the initial step of  
atherosclerosis consists in endothelial injury, followed by the accumulation of  cholesterol in the 
walls of  arteries and the invasion of  monocytes turning into foam cells, coupled with proliferation 
of  smooth muscle cells and local thrombus formation (Steinberg, 2007).  
Now, my first, simplest example comes from the early history of  atherosclerosis. As I said, 
around the turn of  the century, one of  the putative hypotheses for the atherosclerotic modifications 
of  arteries was that they were due to protein toxicity. Indeed, initial experiments on rabbits were 
started in order to check this protein toxicity path. However, the diet administered during the 
experiments was later changed to include only the lipid component (Kritchevsky, 1995). The reason 
for the change in experimental diet was simply that the proteins as such were not making any difference 
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to the atherosclerotic lesions. Accordingly, the protein hypothesis was ruled out, and the explanatory 
grounds are easy to read. 7KHIDLOXUHRI 0LOO·VPHWKRGRI GLIIHUHQFHIRUWKHSURWHLQGLHWOHDGVWRWKH
elimination of  the protein toxicity hypothesis, as not being able to explain the atherosclerotic 
lesions. This LVDVLPSOHEXWLQVLJKWIXOH[DPSOHRI WKHXVHRI 0LOO·VPHWKRGRI GLIIHUHQFH, and of  
the eliminative dimension of  IBE.  
  We can look now at a second, slightly more complicated one, which comes from the process 
of  discovery of  the LDL receptor.  The discovery of  the LDL receptor came about through 
research done into familial hypercholesterolemia (FH), and the precise modifications induced by the 
genetic disorder underlying it. Beginning in 1972, Joseph Goldstein and Michael Brown, two 
scientists trained in enzyme biochemistry, initiated a series of  experiments with the working 
hypothesis that the high levels of  cholesterol in FH might be due to a genetic disorder of  HMG-
CoA reductase - an enzyme with a rate-limiting effect in the synthesis of  cholesterol (Steinberg, 
2005). They used the cell culture technique and employed skin fibroblasts, since the use of  human 
liver cells was very difficult (given the risks associated to liver biopsies). 
Their findings showed that in normal cells, in the presence of  serum, the cholesterol synthesis 
was low, whereas in the absence of  serum, when incubated in culture medium overnight, synthesis 
increased almost ten-fold. The addition of  LDL to the culture medium significantly reduced the 
synthesis. On the other hand, in FH-cells, both in the presence and in the absence of  serum, the 
cholesterol synthesis had a high rate, and the addition of  LDL showed no inhibitory effects (the activity of  
the reductase enzyme being 50 to 100-fold above normal). This seemed to lend further support to 
the hypothesis that feedback control by lipoproteins/cholesterol transported in the LDL-form was 
defective in the FH cells due to a genetic defect of  the HMG-CoA reductase. However, this 
hypothesis was dismissed by the next experiment. Here is how Goldstein and Brown themselves 
describe the turning point of  their research. 
 
The key to the receptor mechanism emerged in 1973 from studies of  cells from patients with homozygous FH 8. When 
grown in serum containing lipoproteins, the homozygous FH cells had HMG CoA reductase activities that were 50 to 
100-fold above normal. This activity did not increase significantly when the lipoproteins were removed from the serum, 
and there was no suppression when LDL was added back. The simplest interpretation of  these results was that FH 
homozygotes have a defect in the gene encoding HMG CoA reductase that renders the enzyme resistant to feedback 
regulation by LDL-derived cholesterol. This working hypothesis was immediately disproved by our next experiment. We 
delivered cholesterol in ethanol instead of  in LDL. When mixed with albumin containing solutions, cholesterol forms a 
quasi-soluble emulsion that enters cells by adsorption to the plasma membrane. When cholesterol was added in this 
form, the HMG CoA reductase activities of  normal and FH homozygote fibroblasts were equally suppressed. Clearly, 
the defect in the FH homozygote cells must reside in their ability to extract cholesterol from the lipoprotein, and not in 
the ability of  the cholesterol, once extracted by the cells, to act. But how do normal cells extract the cholesterol of  
LDL? The high affinity action of  LDL suggested that a cell surface receptor was involved. (Brown and Goldstein 2009, 
p. 433) 
 
This crucial experiment showed that the presence of  cholesterol not in the LDL-transported 
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form does have an inhibiting effect on these cells, which meant in turn that the feedback response to 
cholesterol could be affected inside the cells and that the activity of  the reductase enzyme could be 
down-regulated. The implication was that, when offered as part of  LDL, cholesterol simply does 
not get into cells, indicating a missing receptor, and they managed to clone the cell in the following 
years, receiving the Nobel Prize in 1985.  
$JDLQWKHWDFLWXVHRI 0LOO·VPHWKRGVLVFOHDUO\YLVLEOHLQWKHLUH[SHULPHQWV)RULQVWDQFHWKH
method of  difference is saliently in place in the experiments comparing the rates of  activity of  the 
enzyme when LDLs are present or absent in serum and the culture medium of  fibroblasts (firstly, in 
normal cells, and secondly, in FH-cells). When cholesterol per se was added in the serum of  FH-
fibroblasts and the activity of  the enzyme was finally decreased, the two scientists applied the 
method of  agreement to test the hypothesis that there is a genetic defect impeding the feedback 
down-regulation of  the enzyme in question by cholesterol. If  such a genetic defect had been in 
place, they reasoned, it should have manifested itself  across different situations, including the 
situation in which cholesterol is directly adsorbed into the cell, in a quasi-soluble emulsion with 
ethanol and albumin-containing solutions.  
Furthermore, the reliability of  the sources of  evidence was obviously taken into account in the 
respective explanatory inference. To put it simply, the two scientists would not have used unreliable 
evidence, and their findings would not have been accepted had they based their experiments on 
unreliable materials or methods. They used the cell culture technique, which had been in place, with 
encouraging results, for almost two decades. Given the impossibility of  working on human liver 
cells, they turned to skin fibroblasts. Among the reasons for choosing skin fibroblasts was the fact 
that the patients under study were suffering from a homozygous genetic disorder, and several 
metabolic diseases (such as galactosemia and the Lesch-Nyhan syndrome) with a similar 
homozygous genetic background had been elucidated by working with skin fibroblasts. Doubtless, 
numerous other reliability conditions were involved in the laboratory research, conditions specific 
for this branch of  biological and medical science, and which could not be (easily) captured by some 
sort of  algorithm or context free protocol. We need not worry here about how precisely they 
assessed the reliability of  evidence. As mentioned in the previous section, taking into account the 
quality of  evidence when inferring causes or drawing best explanations, on the one hand, and 
providing reasons why a certain source of  evidence is reliable or not, on the other hand, are distinct 
issues, to which I will look in the next chapter.  
Summing up, in the discovery of  the LDL receptor, there were two candidate hypotheses to 




(1) The high production of  cholesterol (in patients with familial hypercholesterolemia (FH) is due to a gene defect (in 
the gene encoding HMG CoA reductase) that makes cells resistant to feedback regulation by LDL cholesterol (more 
precisely, that renders the HMG CoA reductase resistant to feedback regulation by LDL-derived cholesterol). 
(2) The high production of  cholesterol (in patients with familial hypercholesterolemia (FH) is due to the lack of  a 
receptor (for the LDL cholesterol) that makes cells resistant to feedback regulation for the reason that LDL cholesterol 
cannot get into the cells. 
 
+\SRWKHVLV ZDVGLVPLVVHGDV LWGLGQRWSDVV WKH WHVWRI 0LOO·VPHWKRGRI DJUHHPHQWDQG
method of  difference, and hypothesis (2) was accepted in an explanatory inferential process that also 
took into account the reliability of  evidence, and which was further confirmed by the cloning of  the 
receptor.  
Such examples show convincingly how IBE proceeds to confirmation by eliminating 
alternative hypotheses in laboratory research, on a microstructural level. Nevertheless, there are 
more extensive uses of  IBE to which I turn in the next chapter.  
 
Conclusion chapter 1 
In this chapter I have laid down the main features of  IBE and have described its use as a 
theory of  confirmation, providing examples from medical mechanistic research. This chapter has 
provided the necessary background that will allow us to make the transition in chapter 2 towards the 
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Grading laboratory 
studies evidence of  
mechanisms 
A is making a 
difference to B here. 
A produces B 
here. 
A is cause of  B 
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Chapter 2 
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 It shows that the testimonial use of  
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  I have presented in the first chapter the use of  IBE as a guide to confirmation for certain 
cases of  mechanistic medical research. There are, however, more uses of  IBE. More precisely, IBE 
can be used as an epistemological theory of  testimony and, importantly, as a means of  categorising 
and justifying the sources of  evidence. In short, beside the use as a theory of  confirmation, IBE can 
be employed as an epistemological theory for the quality or weight of  evidence. Important traces of  
WKLVXVHFDQEHIRXQGLQ/LSWRQ·VLQHYLWDEO\ULFKDQGLQVSLULQJWUHDWPHQWRI ,%(PRUH precisely in 
his discussion of  how IBE should be used alongside the Bayesian theory of  confirmation, and also 
in his treatment of  how it can be put to work in the epistemology of  testimony (Lipton, 2004, pp. 
103-126).22 
Based on these alternative uses, I will show that IBE can justifythe criteria of  grading quality of  
mechanistic evidence that have been recently provided by Clarke et al. in their (2014) contribution to 
how evidence of  mechanisms is to be construed alongside population studies.  
As mentioned in the Introduction to this thesis, the criteria proposed by Clarke et al.take into 
account important elements such as the robustness of  mechanisms, the proportion of  elements 
found, the research groups, and the methodologies involved in mechanistic research; and they 
provide a perfect illustration for why we need to look into the quality of  evidence. The central idea 
behind putting forward such criteria of  such criteria is that prior to pursuing confirmation studies, one 
needs a sort of  hierarchy that wouOGSURYLGH ¶UXOHVRI  WKXPE·GLIIHUHQWLDWLQJEHWZHHQ ¶SRRU· DQG
¶TXDOLW\·HYLGHQFHDVZHOODVGHJUHHVLQ-between. A theory of  the quality of  evidence should be able 
WRSURYLGHVXFK¶UXOHVRI WKXPE·HYHQZKHQRUHVSHFLDOO\LQWKHFLUFXPVWDQFHVLQZKLFKZH do not 
have numerical expressions of  the probabilistic dependence between the evidence and the 
                                                        
22 7R UHFDOO IURP WKH SUHYLRXV FKDSWHU /LSWRQ GLVWLQJXLVKHV EHWZHHQ ZKDW KH FDOOV ¶,QIHUHQFH WR WKH /LNHOLHVW
([SODQDWLRQ·DQG¶,QIHUHQFHWRWKH/RYHOLHVW([SODQDWLRQ·5RXJKO\VSHDNLQJ¶,QIHUHQFHWRWKH/LNHOLHVW([SODQDWLRQ·LV
concerned with confirmation, and Lipton thought it could be identified with a Bayesian inference backed up by 
H[SODQDWRU\FRQVLGHUDWLRQ2Q WKHRWKHUKDQG ¶,QIHUHQFH WR WKH/RYHOLHVW([SODQDWLRQ· FRQVWLWXWHV WKHSURSHUXVHRI 
IBE in finding the relevant evidence, in pointing to the most fruitful and promising hypotheses, in a preliminary stage, 
before one reaches, or takes into account, the level of  confirmation. Hence, IBE as Inference to the Loveliest 
Explanation could be used, in collaboration with a Bayesian approach, to approximate the prior probabilities of  
hypotheses to be confirmed (see Lipton, 2001, p. 22, and more recently, McCain and Poston, 2014). In a sense, my 
enquiry in the present chapter could be portrayed as an attempt to refine the use the Inference to the Loveliest 
Explanation as a theory for relevant evidence, and for grading the quality of  relevant evidence. However, for the 
purpose of  clarity of  exposition, I will rather SXUVXHWKHZD\RSHQHGE\/LSWRQ·VZRUNRQWHVWLPRQ\VLQFH LWRIIHUVD
more direct access to the level of  evidence and makes it easier to keep apart the concepts of  confirmation and that of  
the pre-confirmation assessment of  the quality of  evidence.       
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hypotheses at stake, or of  the probability attached to evidence itself.23It should be said that 
organizing in this way the available evidence does not neglect the truism that any evidence is fallible; 
but it is a necessary, preliminary step before proceeding to the confirmation stage. In Clarke et al 
words: 
 
 ¶In the paper up to this point, we have made the case that evidence of  mechanisms can usefully supplement evidence 
of  correlation. Of  course, all evidence and all conclusions reached in medicine are fallible. Evidence of  correlation is 
fallible; evidence of  mechanisms is fallible; and conclusions drawn from that evidence are fallible. That is the nature of  
any science. We focus here on the important point that we can get varying quality of  evidence of  mechanisms, just as 
we can get varying quality of  evidence of  correlation. We have been pressing the point that this kind of  variation in 
quality of  evidence of  mechanisms needs a great deal more attention³indeed, it needs just as much attention as quality 
of  evidence of  correlation. Here we make a very preliminary attempt to lay out some ways in which evidence of  
mechanisms may be graded. We acknowledge that much PRUHZRUNZLOOQHHGWREHGRQHLQWKLVUHJDUGµ&ODUNHHWDO
2014, p. 358) 
 
Obviously, more work needs to be done, in particular with regard to the criterion of  robustness. 
But first of  all, by and large, one needs to make sureto get this preliminary, pre-confirmation 
stepright. The protocols of  Evidence Based Medicine (EBM) abound in various hierarchies of  
medical evidence, but, according to Clarke et al., they fail to properly take into account the evidence 
of  mechanisms, alongside evidence from population studies, as Russo and Williamson have 
maintained in formulating the Russo-Williamson thesis (RWT).24 I agree with RWT and I will 
defend it against criticism in the next chapter, in which I will also look at the problem of  combining 
population studies with mechanistic evidence. The preliminary question I seek to respond in the 
present chapter is: did Clarke et al. get their criteria for quality of  mechanistic evidence right?25 
I think they did, and I provide here a justification of  these criteria in the framework of  IBE. 
7KH PDLQ DUJXPHQW RI  WKLV FKDSWHU ZLOO EH WKDW/LSWRQ·V IUDPHZRUN RI  WHVWLPRQLDO XVHV RI  ,%(
when properly augmented and clarified, can be extended to deal with other sources of  evidence 
beyond testimony as such, and thus provide a pattern of  justificatory inference that perfectly 
underlies and maps the criteria of  mechanistic evidence in question.   
The plan for this chapter is as follows. §1 will explain the difference between the use of  IBE as 
a theory of  confirmation, and its pre-confirmation use as a means of  evaluating the quality of  
evidence. §2 will look at the specific use of  evaluating the quality of  evidence, treating the case of  
testimony, and focusing on the model of  testimonial application of  IBE provided in Lipton (2007). §3 
                                                        
23 It is for this reason that I think IBE is an interesting path to investigate, even if, given the tremendous popularity of  
Bayesianism (as a theory of  confirmation) one would prima facie consider it also as a candidate for assessing the quality 
of  evidence. We have in fact at disposal sophisticated Bayesian accounts of  testimony, (e.g. Bovens and Hartmann, 
2003) and I will mention in footnotes the conceptual support that my approach to IBE could gather from the Bayesian 
perspective 
24 See for instance, the Oxford criteria of  the levels of  medical evidence, in which the evidence of  mechanisms is placed 
on the bottom of  the scale. http://www.cebm.net/oxford-centre-evidence-based-medicine-levels-evidence-march-
2009/ 
25 Of  course, one can discuss the latter question without going into the former.  
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will deal with IBE and the quality of  the sources of  evidence, taking into account different aspects of  
evidence ranging from the methodology of  research, to the number of  different research teams 
having the same research objective. It will accordingly show how IBE can be the epistemological 
underpinning for the criteria of  mechanistic evidence provided in Clarke et al. 2014.  
 
§1 Inference to the Best Explanation ² confirmation versus pre-confirmation 
assessment of  the quality of  evidence 
 
As a quick reminder from the previous chapter, IBE is a method of  inference that, as its name 
immediately suggests, takes us from an explanandum to the truth of  the explanans that is in the best 
position to account for the phenomenon to be explained. The explanatory power of  various 
hypotheses is to be cashed out, on the one hand, in virtue of  explanatory virtues. These are i. 
simplicity, ii. theoretic unity, iii. scope, and iv. individualisation - which correspond accordingly to, i. 
fewer assumptions being used, ii. congruence with previous theories, iii. doing justice to a large area 
of  the phenomena in question, and iv. providing a mechanism or some fine grained description for 
the processes at stake (Psillos, 2002, pp. 615-616). On the other hand, as Peter Lipton has shown, 
RQHFDQDOVRXVHFHUWDLQFDXVDOFULWHULDVXFKDV0LOO·VPHWKRGVRUSULQFLSOHVIRUDGMXGLFDWLQJDPRQJ
candidate causal factors, among which of  prime importance are the principles of  i. Agreement, ii. 
Difference, and iii. Concomitant variation. These principle say, respectively, i. that in varying 
contexts and backgrounds with the same effect displayed, what is common to these varying contexts 
is indicative of  a cause, ii. that in similar contexts with different effects displayed what differs in the 
context or background is indicative of  the cause, and iii. that factors in the background that are 
shown to co-vary with the effects displayed are indicative of  the cause.  
Importantly, I have shown in the previous chapter that IBE takes into account the qualityor 
weight of  the evidence in favor of  some hypothesis or another ² whether, for instance, the testimony 
involved in a special science testimony is trustworthy, or, say, the samples used in drawing a 
generalisation are biased or not (Psillos, 2002, p, 621). Now, let us stick to the last feature just 
mentioned ² quality or weight of  evidence. That IBE takes into account the quality of  evidence, when 
confirming or devising hypotheses is one thing; how exactly the quality of  evidence is ascertained, is 
another thing. An IBE theorist can always hold that the quality of  evidence (no matter how it is 
arrived at by scientists or lay people) is taken into account in the inferences for confirmation of  
scientific hypotheses, without being obliged to furnish in addition any statement as to how its 
quality is evaluated, as such. But in fact, IBE has resources to deal also with how the quality of  




Actually, when laying out the foundation of  IBE as a general theory of  inference in his seminal 
1965 article, Gilbert Harman has also proposed a preliminary framework for the application of  IBE 
in the case of  testimony. Harman was contrasting testimonial explanatory inference with simple 
inductive reasoning, which, in a Humean manner, would infer the truth of  particular instances of  
testimony from the correlation between past instances of  testimonial acts coming from a similar 
type of  person about a similar subject matter, provided in a certain manner, on the one hand, and 
actual states of  affairs, on the other (which is, in fact, a (crude) form of  the Humean reductionist 
approach to testimony, as we shall see later). According to Harman, such Humean inferences could 
not justify why is it that we cannot gain knowledge from testimony even if  a true report is believed, 
in those contexts in which the truth of  such a report is based on accidental features such as a 
misprint (for a written testimony) or a slip of  the tongue (for an oral report).  
 
[if] in the first example we think of  ourselves as using enumerative induction, then it seems in principle possible to state 
all the relevant evidence in statements about the correlation between (on the one hand) testimony of  a certain type of  
person about a certain subject matter, where this testimony is given in a certain manner, and (on the other hand) the 
truth of  that testimony. Our inference appears to be completely described by saying that we infer from the correlation 
between testimony and truth in the past to the correlation in the present case. But, as we have seen, this is not a 
satisfactory account of  the inference which actually does back up our knowledge, since this account cannot explain the 
essential relevance of  whether oUQRWWKHUHLVDVOLSRI WKHWRQJXHRUDPLVSULQWµ+DUPDQSS-94) 
 
+DUPDQ·V DUJXPHQW ZDV WKDW WKH HSLVWHPLF ZDUUDQW IRU WHVWLPRQLDO NQRZOHGJH LQ VXFK FDVHV
cannot be offered on merely Humean grounds. One needs explanatory inferences that draw on 
various contextual elements (such as, for instance, the absence of  a slip of  the tongue or typewriter) 
- which are out of  place in a strictly enumerative, Humean induction, but are essential in an 
abductive framework which seeks to find the best explanation for why a testimony was put forth in 
the first place. Why is it that the absence or presence of  a slip of  the tongue or 
typewriter/keyboard, is essentially important for the truth of  a certain testimonial evidence? 
Because it is crucially involved in answering a different question - why is it that a speaker has stated 
VXFKDQGVXFKDOOHJHGIDFWV"$QGLQUHVSRQGLQJURXJKO\VSHDNLQJ¶EHFDXVHWKHVHDUHWKHIDFWVDQG
VKHLVWHOOLQJWKHWUXWKDQGKHUWHVWLPRQ\LVWUXH·ZHWDNHLQWRDFFRXQWDPRQJVWRWKHU aspects, the 
lack of  a slip of  the tongue (and not, say, how the person in question was dressed), and we offer an 
explanation as to the very enunciation of  the testimony. 
+DUPDQ·VLQGLFDWLRQVWKDW,%(FRXOGDOVREHXVHGWRGLVFXVVTXDOLW\RI HYLGHQFHDVVuch, has 
RSHQHG WKH ZD\ WR PRUH HODERUDWH IRUPXODWLRQV WKH PRVW LPSRUWDQW EHLQJ 3HWHU /LSWRQ·V
explanatory account of  testimony, to which I turn next. Indeed, Lipton has delineated a so-called 
¶7HVWLPRQLDO,QIHUHQFHWRWKH%HVW([SODQDWLRQ·KHQFHIRUWK7,BE) as an application of  IBE to the 
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issue of  testimony. According to Lipton, TIBE says that we infer the truth of  the testimony in 
those cases where the truth best explains the utterance of  the expression of  the testimony by other 
means, and we reject testimony when its falseness is the best explanation for the respective 
utterance (whereas IBE says that we infer the truth of  the hypothesis that best explains the facts 
under scrutiny). 
 
´7,%(DSSOLHVWKHJHQHUDO,%(VFKHPHRI LQIHUHQFHWRWKHSDUWLFXODUWDVk of  assessing testimony. It is a distinctively a 
form of  IBE, because it has it that testimonial inference is an inference to the best explanation of  the relevant evidence. 
And it is distinctive from other forms of  IBE, because it takes the central datum to be explained not to be some natural 
phenomenon such as red-shift of  galactic light, but rather the fact that the speaker said what she did. It is an abductive 
inference from the fact of  utterance to the fact uttered. The governing idea of  TIBE is that when we are in evaluative 
mode, we infer that what we are told is true when its truth is part of  the best explanation of  the fact that the speaker 
said it..... the best criterion for the assessment of  testimony is whether or not the production of  the testimony is best 
explained by an account which implies its truth [...] TIBE also accounts for the diversity of  factors that enter into 
testimonial inferences,. including facts about speakers, the content of  what they say and the manner and context in 
which they VD\LW>@WKHHYLGHQFHRQZKLFKZHEDVHRXUGHFLVLRQZKHWKHUWREHOLHYHZKDWZHDUHWROGLVKLJKO\GLYHUVHµ
(Lipton, 2007, pp. 243-245) 
 
We have seen in §1 of  the previous chapter that IBE adopts a middle way among various 
theories of  inference, confirmation and explanation. Analogously, in the context of  the larger 
epistemological discussions on testimony in the literature, TIBE adopts a nuanced, middle way view 
between two great families of  approaches to testimony, usually taken to originate from Hume and 
Reid, namely the reductionist and the non-reductionist approaches.26 Just to give a brief  overview, 
according to the former, testimony is to be reduced to other types of  evidence (perceptive, 
memory-derived) and is to be justified by inferential processes that account for the truth of  
testimony (or for the testimonial beliefs being justified or amounting to testimonial knowledge) on 
grounds that are dependent on the content of  the testimonial report as such and the potential 
reliability of  the speaker (e.g. sincerity and competence of  the testifier, previous similar testimonies 
that were shown to be true, various types of  track-UHFRUGVHWFLQOLQHPRUHRUOHVVZLWK+XPH·V
LQMXQFWLRQWKDWRXUHSLVWHPLFZDUUDQWIRUWHVWLPRQ\LVGHULYHGIURP¶RXUREservation of  the veracity 
RI KXPDQWHVWLPRQ\DQGRI  WKHXVXDOFRQIRUPLW\RI  IDFWV WR WKH UHSRUWVRI ZLWQHVVHV·27 On the 
other hand, non-reductionist approaches advocate a default direct acceptance of  the testimony 
(justified by various pragmatic, social and ethical principles) provided there are no defeaters, i.e. 
                                                        
26 *HOIHUW  /LSWRQ  )URP D GLIIHUHQW SHUVSHFWLYH WKDQ /LSWRQ·V /DFNH\  DQG /DFNH\  DOVR
advocates a middle way between the reductionist and non-reductionist approaches; as the title of  her (2006) article 
FRORUIXOO\ VD\V ¶,W 7DNHV 7ZR WR 7DQJR· *UDKDP  DFFHSWV WKDW UHGXFWLRQLVP DQG QRQ-reductionism are not 
incompatible positions, but does not go on the way of  seeing a fruitful collaboration between assumptions belonging to 
both parties, arguing instead that justification of  testimonial beliefs can be overdetermined.  
27 Hume 1977 [1748], 74. There are important differences within the camp of  reductionism (e.g., general vs. local 




provided one has no reasons to doubt the credibility of  the author of  testimony.28 
And here is the middle way adopted by TIBE. Like the non-reductionist approach, TIBE 
accepts that our default stance might well be direct acceptance. But it is also underlined that in 
trigger cases, where doubt shows up, or doubt should exist (as for instance in scientific contexts) an 
explanatory inferential process takes place or should take place. This inferential process takes into 
account the content of  testimony, but also the manner and context of  the testimonial report,29 the 
reliability and track record of  the speaker,30 etc. In other words, in such trigger cases, like the 
reductionist approach, TIBE places an accent on our inferential practices, and seeks to bring into 
focus the content of  testimony,Q/LSWRQ·VZRUGV¶7KHVHVRUWVRI DFFRXQW>QRQ-reductionist ones] 
make credibility remarkably independent of  the content of  the testimony. What counts is who says 
it, not what is said.[...] In any event, it is clear that the decision whether to believe someone depends 
not just on who they are but also on what they say and how what they say fits with what the 
audience already accepts. The central question about testimony is not just whom to trust, but what to 
EHOLHYH· (Lipton, 1998, p. 14, italics added). Explanatory inferences to the best explanation are 
required to account precisely for this content, but also to take into account the other aspects related 
to testimony (the track record of  the previous such assertions and the reliability of  the speaker), 
albeit in a secondary way. 
Truth then, should figure in the explanation of  the testimonial utterance or expression in those 
cases in which testimony is accepted, believed, or counts as testimonial knowledge. What sort of  
truth figures in the respective explanation can also vary. It can be the first-order truth of  the belief  
expressed in the testimony of  the speaker (It is true that it is raining outside) or the second order 
truth referring to the veridical nature of  the report (it is true that the speaker believes that it is 
raining outside). One can move from the second-order truth to the first-order one by using also 
TIBE (it is true that it is raining outside because it is the best explanation why the speaker believes 
that it is raining outside).31 
 
§2. TIBE applied to medical testimony 
 
                                                        
28 See for instance Adler, 2012, Audi, 1997, Perrine 2014.  
29´:KDWLVWREHH[SODLQHGLVRIWHQQRW just that the speaker said what she said, but that she said it, and that she said it in 
WKHZD\WKDWVKHGLGIRUH[DPSOHLQDZD\RI H[DJJHUDWHGHDUQHVWQHVVµ/LSWRQS 
30 ´7KHUHZLOODOVREHHYLGHQFHWKDWKDVQRWKLQJWRGRZLWKHLWKHUWKHVSHDker or her present utterance. Thus the fact that 
VKHKDVEHHQVRUHOLDEOHRQWKHVHPDWWHUVLQWKHSDVWHQFRXUDJHVPHWRWUXVWKHUWKLVWLPHµ/LSWRQS 
31+DUPDQS2QHRI /DFNH\·VPRVWLPSRUWDQWFRQWULEXWLRQVLVWKDWWHVWLPRQLDOLQIHUHnce could well go direct 
to (what I have called) first order truth, without going through (what I have called) second order truth; this is, I think, 
consistent with an explanatory framework; see Lackey (2008). However, I am inclined to doubt that in the scientific 
contexts with which this chapter is concerned, one could really dispense with the second-order truth as to the author of  




mechanistic claims included. Here is one medical example in which the main dimensions of  TIBE 
are put to work - the clinical report of  the usefulness of  beta-blockers for improving cardiac failure 
from Waagstein et al. 1975, which was very important in the prestigious history of  beta-blockers, 
and played a role in the revolutionary idea that they can be used in patients with low cardiac index.  
Waagstein et al. reported that beta-blockers (alprenolol and proctolol) administered to a group of  
seven patients with cardiac failure (the basic diagnosis being congestive cardiomyopathy)32 in order 
to control the cardiac rhythm, also improved their condition (better physical working capacity, 
reduced heart size, better ventricular function; Waagstein, et al. 1975). It is not a purely mechanistic 
report but is embedded in mechanistic evidence - as should be clear by looking at all the 
investigations pointed out in the report, as well as the relation to animal experimentation, described 
below.   
What form would TIBE take in this case? In the most schematic form, it would be an 
inference from Waagstein et al·VUHSRUW to the truth of  the evidential claim that the administration of  
beta blockers was followed by the improvement the cardiac index of  the respective patients, where 
this being true is the best explanation for the fact that the report has been put forward. But it is 
important to see beyond this schematic form to the details, which add flesh to the bones of  the 
inference.  
  TIBE would take into account the content of  the report, in a primary way, but also the 
manner and context of  the report, and the track records of  the authors. As to the content of  the 
report as such, its plausibility derives from congruence or coherence with previous knowledge 
current at the time - previous knowledge to which WaagsteiQ·V JURXS LWVHOI  KDG FRQWULEXWHG ,Q
:DDJVWHLQ·VJURXSKDGVKRZHGWKDWFKURQLFDGPLQLVWUDWLRQRI QRUDGUHQDOLQHFRXOGSURGXFHD
cardiomyopathic condition in rats; in 1971 the same group had successfully introduced intravenous 
treatment with beta-blockers in the acute phase of  transmural myocardial infarction, a state also 
associated with high sympathetic stimulation (cf. Waagstein 2002). Hence, there were reasons of  
minimal plausibility around the date of  the report based on previous knowledge, even if  the full 
justification for the revolutionary treatment for cardiac insufficiency with beta-blockers was still in 
the making, and the general physiopathological understanding of  cardiac insufficiency did not lent 
support to this treatment at the time. That is to say, even if  one had doubted the direct causal 
relation between the beta blockers and the improved cardiac index, one could have conceded that 
the improved cardiac index could have arrived anyway, as an indirect result of  the control of  cardiac 
                                                        
32 &DUGLRPLRSDWK\ EHLQJ D FRQGLWLRQ LQ ZKLFK WKH KHDUW·V FDSDFLW\ WR FRQWUDFt is reduced, due to damage in the 
myocardium produced by toxic, metabolic, or infectious agents. It could also be idiopathic. The most common form of  




Parenthetically, we would not want our theory of  testimony to rule out conceding the truth of  
a report which bears witness to unusual findings, especially in a scientific context, in which such 
unusual findings may trigger important new discoveries or pathways of  research. One would want 
however that these unusual findings have a minimal coherence with the background knowledge of  
WKHVFLHQFHLQTXHVWLRQ,QRXUH[DPSOHDV,VDLGDERYHRQHFRXOGFRQFHGHWKHWUXWKRI :DDJVWHLQ·V
report, even if  it concerned a new path of  research in the domain of  cardiac failure, since the 
findings of  Waagstein were correlations that could have meant either that this new paths of  research 
is promising, or that the correlations were accidental from the point of  view of  the direct efficacy 
of  beta-blockers.  
The manner and context of  the report, not related to the testimonial content as such, but still 
important, would also contribute to TIBE. The report was published in a high-profile journal 
(British Heart Journal), using the methodology and manner of  description of  scientific clinical reports 
in medicine. Detailed description of  each case, with description of  the investigations performed 
before and after the treatment (phonocardiogram, carotid pulse curve, apex cardiogram, and 
echocardiogram). Finally the judgment on reliability framed in terms of  TIBE would also take into 
account the track-record of  the authors of  report; they were well-respected clinical practitioners, 
DQGLWLVZRUWKDGGLQJWKDW:DDJVWHLQ·VJURXSKDGEHen working in cardiology research for a number 
of  years, with recognized results.  
In the framework of  TIBE, one would thus infer the truth of  the 1975 report by Waagstein et 
al., based on both dependent, directly testimonial content and independent elements, taking into 
account the track record and, overall, being open to the diversity of  evidence that can be used for 
the truth of  evidence, as it were. We have thus a quite straightforward application of  TIBE to 
medical reports. However, two observations are in place here.  
For one, it should be said that the results of  applying TIBE to medical-oriented testimonies 
should not be overvalued, in the sense of  charging the content of  such medical reports with too 
much conceptual load; for another, neither should such results be considered simplistic translations 
of  current talk in the epistemology of  testimony for medical context. As for the first observation, I 
mean to say that there are two ways in which the application of  TIBE to medical reports can be 
conceived, depending on how content-loaded the report is considered to be. If, as I have assumed 
above, the report is taken to contain strictly the observation of  correlations (without the added causal 
conclusion that such and such drugs brought about such and such effects), then TIBE on its own 
suffices to infer the truth of  the report. If, on the other hand, the report is taken necessarily to 
include the causal dimension, then in order to infer the truth of  the report one would need first 
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TIBE to infer the truth of  the observed correlation, and then standard IBE to infer the efficacy, i.e. 
the causal dimension embedded in the report (and of  course, the report in question would not be 
sufficient on its own). The latter would move us however from the realm of  IBE or TIBE as 
applied to the quality of  evidence, to the realm of  IBE as a confirmation theory, which, as I 
mentioned in the introduction to this paper, are two separate (though connected) realms.  
As for the second observation, it should be said that the application of  TIBE to medical 
contexts in not, unfortunately, just a general epistemological discussion with no relevance for the 
actual medical practice. Just as an example, in around the same period as Waagstein et al. were 
publishing their results, a scandal sparked in the same cardiology circles with respect to a series of  
papers co-authored by a Harvard researcher, John Darsee. The suspicion arouse from the manner of  
reporting (there were simply too many papers published in a short amount of  time) and content 
flagrant discrepancies (observed when comparing the data of  a multi-center study), and subsequent 
investigation found laboratory meddling with results (see Relman, 1983 and also Wilmshurst, 2007, 
who gives other examples of  dishonest medical practice in publishing, and also discusses the 
influence of  pharmaceutical companies in the entire process). For the sake of  enriching the context 
of  the examples I am using here, one can add that among the papers written by Darsee that were 
subsequently retracted figured two publications on cardiomyopathy (Darsee, 1983), and that Darsee 
was part of  a research group founded by Eugene Braunwald - an (already) legendary cardiologist 
who had actually discovered hypertrophic cardiomyopathy, but who, on the issue of  using beta-
blockers in heart failure, was not on the same side as Waagstein et. al., for reasons hinging on 
theoretical assumptions about the mechanism of  heart physiology and heart failure.  
 I will come back to the more theoretical bone of  contention between Waagstein and 
Braunwald in the next section, because, as I believe, IBE can play a role in the evaluation of  the 
quality of  evidence that goes beyond the testimonial aspects discussed above. More precisely, I 
would like to argue that there is a sense in which TIBE provides a pattern of  criteria and values to 
evaluate quality of  evidence in general - not restricted, that is to say, to testimony properly speaking, 
but taking into account various other sources of  evidence. In other words, beyond the testimonial 
aspect (which of  course remains an inextricable part of  the act of  offering evidence in science) the 
pattern provided by TIBE could be used to assess the quality of  evidence provided from various 
sources in a more in-depth manner, absorbing and doing justice to more causal information, but 
without thereby turning TIBE (or the pattern of  it) into a theory of  confirmation.  
However, in order to see what this pattern looks like, we will have to make more visible the 
roots of  TIBE in the initial account of  Inference to the Best Explanation provided by Peter Lipton. 
It is what I will do in the first part of  the next section, showing then in the second part the 
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immediate relevance of  this pattern to the set of  criteria for quality of  mechanistic evidence 
provided in Clarke et al. 2014.   
 
§3. The TIBE pattern and other sources of  evidence 
 
There is indeed room to make TIBE look more similar to IBE, in the sense in which, the 
explanatory inferences of  IBE are at the moment better defined and circumscribed than the 
inferences of  TIBE. As I have pointed out in §1, the inferences to the best explanation appeal to 
certain criteria and values in order to reach what is the best among the available explanation. We are 
speaking here of  the classical explanatory values employed by all IBE-theorists, namely simplicity, 
theoretic unity, scope, and individualisation, on the one hand, and the causal criteria that Lipton 
KLPVHOI KDGDGGHGLQRUGHUWRPDNH,%(LQIHUHQFHVPRUHSUHFLVHQDPHO\0LOO·VFULWHULDLQSDUWLFXODU
the MetKRG RI  'LIIHUHQFH DQG WKH 0HWKRG RI  $JUHHPHQW /LSWRQ·V EDVLF LQVLJKW ZDV WKDW PRVW
often, when looking for an explanation, we are following the track of  inferring the cause from the 
manifest effect. Hence, Lipton convincingly showed, the basic causal criteria used in everyday 
practice in order to track the sources of  causation, could also be used, in conjunction with the 
classical explanatory values, in order to track the best explanation.  
Now, it is important to see that this causal vein is also present, or could meaningfully be 
envisaged, in the testimonial case. That is because one can say that in TIBE, what one does is to 
infer from the utterance or expression of  the testimony as effect to the truth of  the belief  of  the 
speaker as a cause.33Obviously, oQHQHHGQRW WKLQNKHUHRI  ¶WUXWK· DV VRPHVRUWRI  VWUDQJHHQWLW\
postulated in order to account, out of  the blue, for a causal factor mysteriously acting in the 
background of  our acts of  testimony. One just needs to think that, according to Lipton, one infers, 
from the testimony, an explanation within which the truth (or falsity) of  the testimony plays a part, 
and that this whole process can be interpreted in a causal key, at least for heuristic purposes.34 
If  one accepts the interpretative lenses according to which in TIBE are inferring causes from 
effects through an explanatory chain, as in IBE à la /LSWRQ WKHQ WKH UHFLSH RI  ¶H[SODQDWRU\
YDOXHVFDXVDOFULWHULD·VKRXOGGRVRPHZRUNLQPDNLQJWKHWHVWLPRQLDOLQIHUHQFHVPRUHSUHFLVHDQG
                                                        
33 The idea that truth can be a cause might sound unusual but it has been propounded before - famously by Aristotle, 
who declares, when reviewing the philosophical positions of  his predecessors, that, in spite of  their overall errors, some 
had to acknowledge certain SURSHU PHWDSK\VLFDO VWDWHPHQWV ¶EHLQJ IRUFHG E\ WKH WUXWK - 
ਫ਼ưૃơ੝ƴોƲƴોƲਕƫƧƨƥƟơƲਕƭơƣƪơƦƼƬƥƭƯƩ·Met A, 984b9-10). Truth means here for Aristotle certain states of  affairs that his 
predecessors could not ignore.  
34 A causal interpretation of  testimony is provided, from a different, Bayesian perspective, in Bovens and Hartmann 
(2003). It should not be forgotten that Hume formulated the position that stands in the background of  the reductionist 
approach as a particular case of  his general reasoning concerning causation ¶7KH UHDVRQ ZK\ ZH SODFH DQ\ FUHGLW LQ




well circumscribed. On the one hand, some of  the general explanatory virtues could be employed in 
order to circumscribe the conditions under which the content of  testimonial reports points towards 
its truth. The thought here is that the more detailed, simple and coherent with previous knowledge 
the reports in question are, the more likely they are to be true. Lipton hinted towards using 
coherence in this role,35 and the usefulness of  simplicity and detail is easy to see (compare, as to 
simplicity i.e. fewer assumptions being adoSWHG¶P\QHLJKERUVDLGWKDWKHGUHDPHGODVWQLJKWWKDWLW
ZDVUDLQLQJLQ&DQWHUEXU\DQGKLVGUHDPVQHYHUIDOODVWUD\·ZLWK¶ODVWQLJKWLWUDLQHGLQ&DQWHUEXU\·
DQGDVWRLQGLYLGXDWLRQLHPRUHGHWDLOEHLQJSURYLGHGFRPSDUH¶\HVWHUGD\DWSPLWUDLQed for 50 
PLQXWHVLQ&DQWHUEXU\·ZLWK¶\HVWHUGD\LWUDLQHGLQ&DQWHUEXU\· 
$VWRWKHUROHRI FDXVDOWDONLQHOXFLGDWLQJWKHH[SODQDWRU\LQIHUHQFHV LW LV LQSDUWLFXODU0LOO·V
Method of  Agreement - if  two or more instances of  the phenomenon under investigation have 
only one circumstance in common, the circumstance in which alone all the instances agree, is the 
cause of  the given phenomenon - that could make it more clear how factors other than the content 
of  the testimonial report influence the tracking of  truth. What is the explanatory inference that can 
be drawn, given several testimonies provided by different persons, in different circumstances, but 
with the same content, relating the same fact or event?36 On grounds of  the method of  agreement, 
one would infer the that the respective content is true, i.e. that the respective fact or event was the 
case. Again, Lipton hinted towards the use of  the method of  agreement, for different testimonial 
sources; the method of  agreement applies also, from a certain point of  view, the explanatory virtue 
of  coherence  
 
´>«@LQFRPSDWLELOLW\EHWZHHQZKDWWKHVSHDNHUVD\VDQGVRPHRI WKHKHDUHU·VGHHSO\KHOGEHOLHIVLVRIWHQDUHDVRQIRU
rejecting the testimony.  Yet, here there is no obvious explanatory link to the fact of  utterance. Similar remarks apply to 
FDVHV >@RI FRQWUDGLFWLRQVEHWZHHQGLIIHUHQWVSHDNHUV· WHVWLPRQ\ ,I RXUVSHDNHU LVFRQWUDGLFWHGE\DQRWKHUVSHDNHU·V
WHVWLPRQ\WKLVSURYLGHVUHDVRQQRWWREHOLHYHEXWWKHVHFRQGVSHDNHU·VWHVWLPRQ\PD\EHDUQRH[SOanatory relation to 
WKHILUVWVSHDNHU·VWHVWLPRQ\%XWKHUHWRWKHGHIHQGHURI 7,%(KDVVRPHNLQGRI UHSO\VLQFHVKHFDQVD\WKDWQHJDWLYH
evidence, whether from background or from contradictory testimony, will be registered by making a truth-entailing 
exSODQDWLRQOHVVDWWUDFWLYHDQGVROHVVOLNHO\WREHLQIHUUHGµ(Lipton, 2007, p. 251)37 
 
This is then the properly augmented pattern of  TIBE that could in general be applied to other 
                                                        
35 $´QGFOHDUO\WKHGHFLVLRQZKHWKHUWREHOLHYHZKDWRQHLVWROGZLOOKDYHVRPHGHSHQGHQFHRQWKHSULRUSUREDELOLW\RQH
DVVLJQHGWRZKDWLVDVVHUWHGZKLFKFDQLWVHOI EHEDVHGRQDOOVRUWVRI HYLGHQFHµ/LSWRQS&RKHUHQFHILJXUHV
also at the center of  the Bayesian account developed in Bovens and Hartmann (2003), even though the authors argue 
that there can be no definitive measure of  it.  
36. The same point is made in Lipton (1998), p. 27. 
37The explanatory values could also apply to inferences which take into account features other than the content of  the 
testimony itself. Take the Humean track-histories, according to which the truth of  a testimony is to be inferred by 
induction from previous correspondences between similar testimonial reports and actual states of  affairs (or, when it 
comes to a single speaker, from previous testimonial reports, on any subject, show to correspond to facts). If  Harman 
and Psillos are right and the successful or warranted inductions are limit cases of  inferences to the best explanation 
guided by the explanatory values hinted at by Harman and developed by Psillos, then track-history justifications, which 
are compatible with TIBE, can also be shown to rest on such explanatory values. 
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sources of  evidence, related to testimony but not directly testimonial. It is a pattern in which one 
chooses the explanation for the very existence of  evidence - EDVHG RQ D FRPELQDWLRQ RI  0LOO·V
Methods and the explanatory values of  coherence, simplicity and individualisation - inferring from 
the very existence of  evidence (coming out of  an evidential source) its reliability or non-reliability, 
broadly speaking, and also the quality or weight of  the evidence as such in terms of  its intrinsic 
content. More specifically speaking, the consequence of  applying this pattern is that one can 
justifiably grade the quality of  evidence overall (including both the content and the reliability of  
HYLGHQWLDOVRXUFHVLQSURSRUWLRQWRWKHGHJUHHWRZKLFKWKHUHVSHFWLYHH[SODQDWRU\YDOXHVDQG0LOO·V
Methods are satisfied. Finally, since grading is involved, we might want to interpret the TIBE 
pattern in a yet closer way in relation to Lipton-style IBE, in the sense in which Lipton, in 
contradistinction to other IBE theorists like Bird or Psillos, sees the IBE inferences as pointing to 
the probable truth of  the best explanation, instead of  the truth of  it tout court. ¶%XW,QIHUHQFHWRWKH
Best Explanation cannot then be understood as inference to the best actual explanation. Such a 
model would make us too good at inference, since it would make all our LQIHUHQFHVWUXH· /LSWRQ
2004, p. 58)38 
Let us now look again at the criteria for grading evidence of  mechanisms provided in Clarke et 
al. (2014). These criteria take into account traits such as independent methods, different research 
groups, proportion of  features found, knowledge of  analogous mechanisms, and robustness, 
defined in terms of  being reproducible across a wide range of  conditions. Each of  these traits plays 
a role in terms of  pluses and minuses, in the evaluation of  the quality of  evidence for mechanisms.  
 
Pluses Minuses 
Each independent method that confirms a 
feature  
Each independent method that fails to confirm³or, 
worse, disconfirms³a feature  
Each independent research group that 
confirms a feature  
Each independent research group that fails to confirm³
or, worse, disconfirms³a feature  
Larger proportion of  features found Smaller proportion of  features found 
Analogous mechanisms known The analogy is a weak one, or, worse, analogous situations 
exhibit no such mechanism 
Robust, reproducible across a wide range of  
conditions 
Fragile, not reproducible in slightly varying conditions 
 
Mutatis mutandis, the pattern I have outlined above applies perfectly to the criteria laid out by 
Clarke et al., providing an epistemological underpinning and a justification for them. The criteria in 
                                                        
38$PRQJRWKHUVWKLVZDV/LSWRQ·VZD\RI UHVSRQGLQJWRYDQ)UDDVVHQ·VFKDUJHRI ¶WKHEDGORW·*HOIHUWKDVDOUHDG\PDGH
the move from truth to probable truth in his own, slightly twisted version of  TIBE, in which the default stance of  
testimonial acceptance is justified on abductive grounds, and inferences to the best explanation are used to reject 
testimonies that are probably IDOVH ¶2Q WKH RQH KDQG WKH FRKHUHQFH DQG VXFFHVV RI  RXU WHVWLPRQ\-based projects 
provides general abductive support for a default stance of  testimonial acceptance; on the other hand, we are justified in 
rejecting specific testimonial claims whenever the best explanation of  the instances of  testimony we encounter entails, 




terms of  different research teams coming up with the same mechanistic result, and in terms of  
different methodologies used in order to reach the same result, both appeal to the method of  
agreement and the quality of  evidence can thereby be assessed on explanatory grounds.  
On the other hand, in terms of  content of  evidence as such, the reports that count more 
mechanistic features than others will be ranked higher in a TIBE-like inference on grounds of  the 
explanatory virtue of  individuation. The evidence finding similar mechanisms in analogous 
situations will be ranked higher on grounds of  the explanatory virtue of  coherence. Finally, the 
evidence on mechanisms being reproducible across a wide range of  conditions will be ranked higher 
on grounds of  the explanatory value of  simplicity, since the assumption of  the same mechanism 
working across different situations is simpler than the assumption of  different mechanisms 
functioning across different situations.  
Hence TIBE or TIBE-like reasoning will justify why, say, the mechanistic evidence counting 
two different teams reporting two mechanistic features, using the same research methodology, will be 
graded higher than evidence of  two mechanistic features provided by a single team, but will be 
graded lower than evidence coming from two different teams reporting two mechanistic features 
using different methodologies, and the latter evidence will be lower than evidence coming from two 
different teams reporting three mechanistic features using different methodologies, and so on.   
Coming back to the history of  beta-blockers, out of  which was drawn the example concerning 
the TIBE-interpreted testimony in the previous section, one can recognize this way of  hierarchizing 
the quality of  evidence from how this treatment was evaluated. It should be said that Waagstein et al. 
showed courage in 1975, when trying on the potential benefits of  beta-blockade in this pathological 
cardiac condition, because they were running against the physiopathological models of  cardiac 
failure at the time, reinforced by clinical assessments seemingly agreeing with this model, and by the 
accepted mechanism of  action of  these drugs. Beta-blockers had been synthesized in 1962 
(following the discovery of  the beta receptor of  the sympathetic nervous system in 1948) and were 
XVHGLQLWLDOO\WRUHGXFHVWUHVVLQSDWLHQWVZLWKDQJLQDSHFWRULVIRUDUUK\WKPLDVDQGIURPHDUO\·V
on, as an anti-hypertensive treatment. By blocking the beta-receptor, and accordingly the stimulating 
action of  the sympathetic nervous system, such drugs diminished the need of  oxygen in ischemic 
HSLVRGHV FRQWUROOHG WDFK\FDUGLD DQG UHGXFHG WKHEORRG WHQVLRQ LQ DUWHULHV E\ GLPLQLVKLQJ KHDUW·V
capacity to pump blood (its inotropic capacity). However, in virtue of  precisely this mechanism, 
they were formally contraindicated in heart failure, since one was not supposed to use a drug 
decreasing the pump function when there was already insufficient inotropic activity. As I said, there 
were even clinical assessments that seemed to certify this counter-indication ² animal experiments 
seemed to showed that cardiac failure worsens when the influence of  the sympathetic, adrenergic 
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system is triggered down by adrenergic blockers, beta-blockers included (e.g. Gaffney and 
Braunwald, 1963, Braunwald and Chidsey, 1965, Epstein, Braunwald et al. 1965). In 1965, Eugene 
Braunwald, a legendary researcher, was resuming his findings (in collaboration with Chidsey) as 
follows:  
 
¶7KHDGUHQHUJLFQHUYRXVV\VWHPSODys a particularly prominent role in supporting myocardial function when the latter is 
GHSUHVVHGLQFRQJHVWLYHKHDUWIDLOXUH>«@7KHLPSRUWDQFHRI WKHDXJPHQWHGDFWLYLW\RI WKHDGUHQHUJLFQHUYRXVV\VWHPLQ
maintaining ventricular contractility when the function of  the myocardium is depressed in congestive heart failure is 
shown by the effects of  adrenergic blockade in patients with heart failure. In patients on a metabolic diet guanethidine 
frequently caused sodium and water retention, as well as intensification of  heart failure (Gaffney & Braunwald 1963). 
Recently, we have made similar observations on the aggravation of  congestive heart failure with propranolol (Epstein & 
Braunwald, in preparation). The adrenergic nervous system thus plays an important compensatory role in the circulatory 
adjustments of  patients to congestive heart failure and caution is needed in the use of  anti-adrenergic drugs such as 
UHVHUSLQHJXDQHWKLGLQHDQGSURSUDQROROLQWKHWUHDWPHQWRI SDWLHQWVZLWKOLPLWHGFDUGLDFUHVHUYH««,Qview of  the 
strongly positive inotropic effect exerted by the NA released from these nerves, the adrenergic nervous system may be 
considered to provide potential support to the failing myocardium. However, if  the reduction of  NA stores in some 
instances of  heart failure is associated with a diminished release of  neurotransmitter, as now appears to be the case, 
then this depletion of  NA may be responsible for loss of  the much-needed adrenergic support to the failing heart and 
so intensify the severity of  conJHVWLYHKHDUWIDLOXUH·%UDXQZDOGDQG&KLGVH\-30, italics added) 
 
Exactly the opposite of  the line followed by Waagstein et. al.! Waagstein and his collaborators 
from the university of  Göteborg discovered accidentally in late 1972 the beneficial effect of  beta 
blockers in heart failure, when they administered alprenolol (a non-selective beta blocker) for 
tachycardia to a 59 year-old woman patient presenting acute pulmonary edema owing to dilated 
cardiomyopathy, and this dramatically improved her overall condition (acute cardiac failure) 
(Waagstein, 1975). Waagstein et al. hypothesized that, in chronic cardiac failure as well, by 
administering small doses of  beta-blockers and thereby reducing the metabolism and energy 
consumption of  the heart, the favorable effects would not be outweighed by the loss in the 
inotropic activity (Waagstein 2002, pp. 215-216, 218). The 1975 small trial on patients suffering 
from dilated cardiomyopathy in chronic cardiac failure stage described in the previous section was 
part of  a series of  clinical assessments, that gradually became more and more numerous and 
consistent, leading eventually, almost 15 years later, to a mechanistic shift of  paradigm, from a 
KHPRG\QDPLF PRGHO YLHZLQJ WKH KHDUW DV D SXPS DQG LQWHUSUHWLQJ ¶PHFKDQLFDOO\· LWV SK\VLRORJ\
and physiopathology) to a neuro-hormonal model (viewing the heart as lying at the intersection of  
the nervous and immune system and accordingly influenced by the overexpression of  biologically 
active molecules; Mann and Bristow, 2005). 
Now, 15 years is a long time, and in the decision to accept the beta-blockers treatment, a 
crucial role was played by some late, large-scale population trials that showed it benefits. However, 
if  we compare the mechanistic evidence for the hemodynamic, mechanical model upheld by 
Braunwald, with the mechanistic evidence for the more integrated, metabolism-oriented model upheld 
E\:DDJVWHLQZHFDQXQGHUVWDQGZK\ LQ WKH LQLWLDOSHULRG WKHSURSRVDORI :DDJVWHLQ·VJURXSZDV
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viewed with skepticism, and also why it was finally accepted (or, to put it differently, why in the later 
period it was decided that large scale population trials are worth doing). In the initial period, the 
HYLGHQFH IRU ZKDW ,KDYHFDOOHG%UDXQZDOG·VPRGHOEHQHILWWHG IURP WKH VWURng analogy with the 
mechanical interaction of  a pump and its recipients, which was actually in place ever since Harvey 
had discovered the circulation, and the model was tacitly shared by all research groups working in 
cardiology, cardiac failure included. This model of  mechanism also seemed to possess all (or a 
sizeable part of) the intermediate features, or chains of  interaction ² the receptors and 
neurotransmitters of  the vagal and sympathetic nervous system, as well as the complementing 
effects of  the renine-angiotensine-aldosterone on the volume of  circulating blood, sodium retention 
and vasoconstriction. On the other hand, Waagstein did not have such an analogy, his group was 
alone in doing research on the alternative model, and very few of  the intermediary features or 
chains were known at that initial stage. His model received impetus i) when other teams picked up 
the research (as for instance the research group of  Douglas Mann from the Medical University of  
South Carolina, the group of  Kenneth Margulies from Temple University of  Philadelphia, and 
many others), ii) when more intermediary chains of  the mechanism were discovered (as for instance 
the intracellular deficiency of  cyclic AMP leading to defects in the myocardial contractile elements 
(Feldman et al. 1987), deactivation of  arterial baro-receptors leading to lack of  downregulation of  
the sympathetic effects by the circulating blood volume, arhythmogenesis due to sympathetic 
activation, changes in the density and function of  beta-receptors as well as in the cellular proteins 
connecting them to the effector enzyme adenylyl cyclase, left ventricular remodeling following 
P\RF\WHV·ORVVRI FRQWUDFWLOLW\DQGWKHOLVWFRXOGFRQWLQXHDQGiii) when alternative methodologies 
came to be used (for instance, initially, Waagstein et al. used non-invasive methods (Swedberg, 1993), 
but later were employed invasive techniques such as cardiac catheterization for assessments of  
intraventricular pressure; there were also increasingly varied animal experiments which induced 
cardiac failure using pathologically relevant concentrations of  the neurohormones in question; 
Mann and Bristow, 2005). Much later on, Braunwald would reproach himself  not paying more 
attention to beta-blockers. 
 
¶, NLFN P\VHOI  QRZ IRU QRW WU\LQJ EHta-EORFNHUV :H ZHUH DIUDLG :H ZHUH FRQFHUQHG WKDW LI  ZH EORFNHG WKH ERG\·V
response to heart failure, the heart failure would get worse. In fact, we did studies that showed that beta-blockers could 
worsen heart failure. But the Swedes showed that if  they started at a low dose and slowly increased it, beta blockers 
could be used safely in many patients. And the benefit could be enormous, because the high sympathetic tone that we 
GHPRQVWUDWHGZDVQ·WDSURWHFWLYHUHVSRQVH² it was actually part of  the probleP·/HHSS-163). 
 
 But it has to be recognized that in the initial stages the quality of  evidence in favour of  the 
neuro-hormonal model was inferior to that in favour of  the hemodynamic model. And as I have 
argued above, this can be justified in terms of  IBE, more precisely, in terms of  the pattern of  TIBE 
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underlying the Clarke et al. criteria. That is to say, the reason why it took several years before the 
mechanistic evidence accumulated such as to trigger large scale population assessments was that 
several criteria from the Clarke et al. list had to be met, and they had to be met because otherwise 
one could not draw an explanatory inference towards the quality or weight of  the evidence in 
question.  
I end this chapter with two caveats that are important for the scope and effectiveness of  the 
present enquiry. First of  all, note that, by keeping distinct the level of  assessing the quality of  
mechanistic evidence, on the one hand, and the level of  confirming causal claims in medicine, one is 
not obliged to directly draw ultimate causal conclusions from the TIBE-based hierarchization of  the 
quality of  evidence, even if  causal information finds its way the evidence being hierarchized. In 
particular, my argumentation about the use of  a pattern of  inference to the best explanation for 
assessing the quality of  evidence is entirely consistent with the claim advanced by Clarke et al. that 
mechanistic evidence needs to be combined with evidence from population studies in order to 
establish and confirm causal claims (Clarke et al. 2014, pp. 351-356). As I said, the mechanistic 
explorations into beta-blockade I have described above were attended by population studies 
assessing the net effect of  the various mechanisms at stake in such a complex condition as heart 
failure, and played, along with the discovered mechanisms, a crucial role in the decision to 
implement the systematic use of  (small doses) of  these drugs as treatment.39 
The second proviso refers to the fact that I have adopted the neutral definition of  a 
mechanism provided by Illari and Williamson, according to which ¶DPHFKDQLVPIRUDSKHQRPHQRQ
consists of  entities and activities organized in such a way that they are responsible for the 
SKHQRPHQRQ·,OODULDQG:LOOLDPVRQS- a definition that Clarke et al. also adopt in their 
paper. But, as I have adverted in the Introduction to this thesis, there is a stronger construal of  
mechanisms that takes them to imply not just production but also difference-making.40 On this 
strong construal, one would have, on the one hand, a more precise definition of  what a robust or a 
fragile mechanism is (in terms of  the difference-making that a mechanism is supposed to 
enable/produce across varying contexts). On the other hand, one would have a much firmer grip on 
evidence of  mechanisms using the Lipton-style Inference to the Best Explanation, which tracks and 
integrates difference-PDNLQJYLD0LOO·VSULQFLSOHV 
                                                        
39 The mechanism of  cardiac failure and its treatment are still subject to debate. In a recent interview, Braunwald was 
confessing that after several decades of  research into the mechanisms of  cardiac failure, the issues that were confronting 
him in the beginning of  his career are still on the table for the medical community (Landau, 2012). One can say that, on 
the level of  confirmation, one final resolution has not yet been reached. However, these decades of  research have brought 
about quality evidence about numerous sub-mechanisms of  cardiac failure, detailing the neuro-hormonal consequences of  
the adrenergic influences in cardiac failure. Incidentally, this touches upon a point I have been repeated throughout this 
chapter - that aside from the studies of  confirmation, one needs a theory that does justice to the quality of  evidence.  
40 Woodward (2002), Woodward (2011).  
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I will explore this alternative view of  mechanisms in the chapters 3, 4 and 5. Suffice to say here 
in closing the present chapter that - as the most recent population results show - the evidence of  the 
mechanism involved in the beneficial effect of  beta-blockade in cardiac failure point towards a fragile 
mechanism.41 The difference making produced by the administration of  beta-blockers needs to be 
very carefully weighted. One needs to take into account the administered dose, the complex 
pathological background that is specific for a wide range of  different cardiac diseases ending in 
cardiac failure, and the multitude of  sub-mechanisms interacting between them, when the 
adrenergic stimulation of  the myocardial tissue is interfered with. Such a fine-grained assessment of  
difference-making can only result from the careful interplay of  population studies and 
individualized research into sub-mechanisms. But this is indeed the subject of  chapters 3, 4 and 5 
below.   
 
Conclusion chapter 2 
I have explored the uses of  Inference to the Best Explanation as a theory for evaluating the 
quality of  medical evidence, taking the evidence of  mechanisms as a case study. I have shown that 
the testimonial side of  IBE fits clinical reports in medicine, and that, when suitably augmented and 
clarified, IBE can be extended to provide a pattern that justifies explanatory inferences for other 
types of  evidence, allowing the grading of  the quality of  evidence. I have finally shown that such an 
explanatory pattern justifies the set of  criteria of  evaluating mechanistic evidence provided in Clarke 
et al. 2014.  
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Chapter 3 
The central claim of  chapter 3 is that mechanistic 
causation consists in both difference making and 
production, such that, normally, mechanistic evidence 
should give us both evidence of  production and 
evidence of  difference making.  
 
It is argued that this understanding of  mechanistic 
causation is the only one that guarantees ontic causal 
monism. A definition of  mechanisms is accordingly 
provided, and also a revised form of  RWT, together 
with a preliminary discussion of  how the evidential 
interplay between laboratory studies and population 
studies is to take place.  
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The present chapter marks the transition to the second part of  the thesis, in which the ontic 
definitions of  mechanisms are examined. Thus, it will first be useful to briefly take stock of  the 
work done so far in the previous chapters. 
The previous two chapters have looked into how IBE can be used in relation to the 
mechanistic evidence strictly speaking, i.e. the evidence obtained in laboratories, in microstructural 
research (leaving aside the evidence offered by population studies). More precisely, chapter 1 looked 
at the uses of  IBE as a theory of  confirmation for certain particular cases of  mechanistic evidence 
encountered in medical practice. These are cases which offer us enough epistemic warrant, such 
that, in the framework of  IBE, we could eliminate as inadequate rival hypotheses and be guided 
towards the correct one. On the other hand, chapter 2 enquired into the uses of  IBE at the pre-
confirmation stage in which the mechanistic evidence is given a preliminary, quality classification in 
terms of  the (explanatorily justified) criteria of  Clarke et al.  
However, this strict focus on mechanisms adopted in the first two chapters, although 
obviously useful for an enquiry into grading mechanistic evidence, is admittedly a narrow one from 
the global perspective of  establishing causal claims, and accordingly has to be enlarged. Most 
frequently, causal claims in medicine are assessed not only by looking at the mechanistic evidence as 
such, but also by considering the evidence brought about by population studies. This is, of  course, 
common knowledge. The general public, medical practitioners and philosophers of  science are all 
aware of  the desiderata that the program of  Evidence-Based Medicine (EBM) has been putting forward 
for more than two decades. This program aims at a rigorous assessment of  medical hypotheses 
strictly based on evidence. However, the evidence it takes into account is mainly population level 
HYLGHQFHLQSDUWLFXODUWKH¶JROGVWDQGDUG·RI UDQGRPL]HGFOLQLFDOWULDOV7KLVHQWDLOVRI FRXUVHWKDW
evidence of  mechanisms is considered to a much less degree. If  it figures at all in the protocols of  
evaluation of  EBM, it occupies a very low place, below various types of  population level evidence.  
As stated in the Introduction to this thesis, this EBM position has been criticized by 
Federica Russo and Jon Williamson (2007), who have argued that, in order to establish causal claims, 
one needs to take into account both evidence of  mechanisms and evidence of  difference-making 
coming from population studies. This position has come to be known as the Russo-Williamson 
Thesis (RWT) and it has gained numerous proponents (and opponents, it should be said). In fact, 
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the Clarke et al. criteria of  mechanistic evidence which we have looked at in the previous chapter 
issue from research done by a larger group of  philosophers, who have been exploring the 
implications of  RWT.  
I am myself  a proponent of  RWT, and I think this thesis can fruitfully be used, in the 
IUDPHZRUN RI  ,%( LQ RUGHU WR H[WHQG WKH ODWWHU·V DUHD RI  DSSOLFDWLRQ ZHOO LQWR WKH HYLGHQFH RI 
population studies that should complement and fortify evidence of  mechanisms (and vice-versa). 
However, I will argue, RWT has been inadequately associated with an ontic definition of  
mechanisms that is very thin, in the sense of  focusing on production causation and setting aside the 
difference-making of  mechanism components and mechanistic output. This definition is not 
particularly useful for the very purpose RWT was put forward (namely to conceptualise properly the 
interplay between mechanistic evidence and population studies). . As I shall explain later, for one, it 
makes RWT vulnerable to criticism inspired by medical practice (Howick, 2011). For another, it 
misses important features of  the interplay between evidence of  population studies and evidence of  
mechanisms, like the fact that they can reciprocally increase their quality or weight, or that 
mechanistic evidence can individualise and calibrate the assessments on population level. In 
addition, it does not offer sufficient resources to counter a widespread (if  often tacit) ontically 
pluralistic view on causation - i.e. the view that there are distinct types of  causal relations, which is 
at the root of  the EBM program of  favouring evidence of  population studies. Indeed, Russo and 
:LOOLDPVRQ·VKDYHMXVWO\VHQVHGWKHFKallenges posed by ontic causal pluralism in their original (2007) 
contribution, but their attempt to reject it, as I will show, is unsuccessful. 
However, the adoption of  an ontically thin definition of  mechanisms is not just a problem 
of  RWT in its current form. It is a rather general problem of  the philosophical literature, because 
most often mechanistic causation is understood in terms of  production only (Illari and Russo, 2014, 
Craver and Tabery, 2015). Accordingly, the difference making aspect of  causation is left aside ² due, 
among others, to the exaggerated importance accorded to the problems of  pre-emption and of  
causation by absence (Williamson, 2011) which treat cases in which, purportedly, we could have 
production causation without difference-making, and difference-making without production, 
respectively. 
The present chapter will thus make the case that, together with production, difference 
making should be viewed as part of  mechanistic causation, following and developing a suggestion 
put forward in Joffe (2013). This move will open up the way for rejecting the criticism typified by 
+RZLFN·VFRQWULEXWLRQ (which I will do at the end of  the present chapter), to fruitfully apply 
IBE not just to mechanistic evidence as such, but also to the interplay between population studies 
evidence and mechanistic evidence with respect to their quality or weight (chapter 4), and to show 
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how this interplay should have a bearing on the problem of  extrapolation (chapter 5).  
The plan of  the present chapter is as follows. §1 will lay down the reasons for preferring the 
monistic view that mechanistic causation is ontically both productive and difference-making, and will 
indicate how RWT is to be adjusted according to this view. It will then discuss how this monistic 
YLHZUHMHFWVWKHRSSRVLQJYLHZRI FDXVDOSOXUDOLVPDVZHOODVZK\5XVVRDQG:LOOLDPVRQ·VVROXWLRQ
for rejecting the former and embracing the latter fails. §2 will deal with the problem of  pre-emption 
(and also of  absences), appealing most importantly to the work of  Michael Strevens. §3 will look at 
how the revised form of  RWT stands, after having solved the problem of  pre-emption. §4will 
defend RWT (as strengthened by the difference making construal of  mechanisms) against the 
criticism expressed in Howick (2011).  
 
 
§1 Mechanisms, production and difference making 
A strange feature of  mechanistic accounts nowadays is that most of  them (including Illari and 
:LOOLDPVRQ·V ZKLFK LV FXUUHQWO\ DVVRFLDWHG WR 5:7 ZKLOH PHQWLRQLQJ SURGXFWLRQ IXQFWLRQLQJ
responsibility for events, etc. avoid the terminology of  difference-making (in its counterfactual 
guise, or as probabilistic dependency). Here are some well-known examples:  
 
Illari and Williamson (2012) ·DPHFKDQLVPIRUDSKHQRPHQRQFRQVLVWVRI HQWLWLHVDQGDFWLYLWLHVRUJDQL]HGLQVXFKD
way that they are responsible IRUWKHSKHQRPHQRQ·,OODULDQG:LOOLDPVRQSLWDOLFVDGGHG 
Bechtel and Abrahamsen  ¶$ PHFKDQLVP LV D VWUXFWXUH performing a function in virtue of  its component parts, 
component operations, and their organization. The orchestrated functioning of  the mechanism is responsible for one or 
PRUHSKHQRPHQD·LWDOLFVDGGHG 
Glennan (2002) ¶$PHFKDQLVPIRUDEHKDYLRXULVDFRPSOH[V\VWHPWKDWproduces that behaviour by the interaction of  a 
number of  parts, where the interactions between parts can be characterized by direct, invariant, change-relating 
JHQHUDOL]DWLRQV·LWDOLFVDdded) 
Machamer et al. (2000) [the so-FDOOHG0'&DFFRXQW@¶0HFKDQLVPVDUHHQWLWLHVDQGDFWLYLWLHVRUJDQL]HGVXFKWKDWWKH\
are productive of  regular changes from start or set-XSWRILQLVKRUWHUPLQDWLRQFRQGLWLRQV·LWDOLFVDGGHG 
 
That is to say, mechanisms are usually associated with so-called production causation, as 
opposed to difference-making causation. Briefly stated, production causation is typified by 
processes: A causes B by producing B via such and such a process. The details of  what counts as a 
process may differ, but in the case of  biological mechanisms, a process should involve at least the 
participation of  multiple entities with a complex, specific spatio-temporal arrangement (Glennan 
1996, 2005; Bechtel and Abrahamsen 2005; Machamer, Darden, and Craver 2000).  
On the other hand, difference making causation is typified by the dependency between causal 
factors, which, in a simple counterfactual expression, means that A causes B because in the absence 
of  A, B would not have occurred (Hall 2004; Psillos 2004). Again, the details of  what counts as 
dependency between two causal factors may differ. It can be understood in terms of  interventions 
on causes making a difference to effects (Woodward, 2011), as probabilistic dependency between 
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causal factors (Illari, 2011), or as a more complicated counterfactual dependency, for instance of  the 
backtracking type (Broadbent, 2007; Strevens, 2013), which can be complemented by a difference-
making rationale appealing to the famous INUS conditions (Mackie, 1973, Strevens, 2004, 2007), as 
I discuss below.  
The basic intuition behind the various expressions of  difference making is that causation 
LPSOLHV D QRWLRQ RI  ¶PRGDO IRUFH· HYHQ RQ D +XPHDQ LQWHUSUHWDWLRQ RI  LW LQ RUGHU WR EH
distinguished from merely accidental relations between factors (see Bird, 2007). That is why, among 
the probabilistic, interventionist and counterfactual approaches to difference making, it is arguably 
the counterfactual approach which is the fundamental one, and which also underlies the 
interventionist and probabilistic accounts. For instance, most interventionist accounts will appeal to 
VRPHFODXVHRI WKHDSSUR[LPDWHIRUP¶ZHUHRQHWRLQWHUYHQHRQ[WKHQ\ZRXOGEHKDYHVRDQGVR·
Probabilistic accounts, in turn, could be easily read as counterfactual dependencies, where either the 
antecedent or the consequent of  the respective counterfactuals is actualised.42 In turn, putting to 
ZRUN 0DFNLH·V ,186 FRQGLWions to track difference making is very close to appealing to 
backtracking counterfactuals, which infer from the hypothesized absence of  the actual effect the 
hypothesized absence of  the actual cause, or so I will argue. 
One other heuristically useful way to classify the different approaches to difference-making is 
to say that they express the dependency between cause and effect as either the sufficiency of  the cause 
for the effect, or the necessity of  the cause to the effect. The sufficiency is at stake in the 
interventionist accounts wiggling the causes to show variation in the effects, Woodward 2011, or in 
the probabilistic accounts showing the increase in probability of  effects conditional on causes (as 
expressed in the Bayesian framework by likelihoods, which has the probability of  evidence upon 
hypothesis 1 as a limit case). The necessity of  causes for effects is obviously present in the classical 
counterfactual analysis à la Lewis, 1986 (which, informally put follows the rationale - when cause are 
DZD\ VR DUH WKH HIIHFWV ,Q WXUQ WKH EDFNWUDFNLQJ FRXQWHUIDFWXDOV EDVHG RQ 0DFNLH·V ,1US 
conditions express a combination of  necessity and sufficiency. The INUS conditions, as it well 
known, stand for necessary parts of  sufficient conditions for effects, and the corresponding 
backtracking counterfactuals proceed by modus tollens to infer the absence of  a certain INUS 
condition from the hypothesized absence of  the actual effect. 
Importantly, all these various ways of  expressing difference making can be seen as more 
sophisticated expressions of  basic causal intuitions of  experimental research, UHIOHFWHG LQ 0LOO·V
                                                        
42 When probabilities are understood either as propensities, or as credences (such that the corresponding probabilistic 
statements are epistemically imperfect expressions of  deterministic laws). If  counterfactuals could be said to attend 
deterministic laws (which generally express sufficiency, all Fs are Gs, where we have a counterfactual whose antecedent 
is actualized, if  a was an F, it would also be a G) then, as a limit case, the same could be said about the probabilistic 
accounts reflecting our partial ignorance, or expressing probabilistic laws as such.  
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methods, which were discussed in the previous two chapters. However, as I said, in spite of  the 
wealth of  approaches to difference-making and their intuitive appeal, the current definitions of  
mechanisms choose to leave aside difference-making and focus on production. Moreover, this 
approach to mechanistic causation is inevitably attended by a pluralistic approach to evidence, such 
that the evidence of  production is set in contrast to difference-making evidence. The main cited reason 
for this separation between evidence of  production and evidence of  difference, as well as for 
associating mechanisms to production only causation, is the existence of  the problems of  pre-
emption and of  causation by absence. Simply put, pre-emption situations are cases of  (mechanistic) 
production in which the counterfactual approach cannot isolate the causes at stake because other 
causes would have produced the effects anyway. On the other hand, causation by absence applies to 
situations that are cases of  counterfactual causation in which one cannot identify any process 
linking the putative cause with the putative effect.  
Importantly, this pluralistic view of  evidence (on the epistemic side of  discussion) which is also 
embraced by proponents of  RWT (Illari, 2011), has gone hand in hand, tacitly or explicitly, with a 
pluralistic approach of  causation, both on the ontic and conceptual side of  discussion. In its conceptual 
guise, this pluralistic approach says that we possess different concepts of  causation. In its ontic (or 
metaphysical) formulation, the more drastic one, conceptual pluralism says that the multiplicity of  
concepts of  causation reflects the multiplicity of  causal relations as such (de Vreese, 2006, Godfrey-
Smith, 2008, Longworth, 2006). Crucially, the production only view of  mechanistic causation 
implies ontic causal pluralism. Indeed, if  mechanistic causation is production-only causation, it is 
hard to imagine how the difference-making relation could be something other than a different type of  
causal relation. 
It is worth noting that ontic pluralism is not implied by conceptual SOXUDOLVP 7R XVH )UHJH·V
famous example, we might have different concepts IRUDFHUWDLQVSHFLHVRI YHUWHEUDWHV¶KDVDKHDUW·
DQG¶KDVDNLGQH\·DQGRQHFRXOGDGGWKDWDFFordingly, we might have different types of  evidence we 
take into account to identify the respective species (or identify an individual member of  it). But the 
PDLQSRLQWRI )UHJH·VH[DPSOHLVWKDWWKHVHGLIIHUHQWFRQFHSWVRUGLIIHUHQWW\SHVRI HYLGHQFHDV I 
have added) pick out the same species (ontically speaking). Transposed to the case of  causation, the 
suggestion is that conceptual pluralism (and evidential pluralism) about causation is consistent with 
ontic monism on causation. Our different ways of  hunting down cause-effect relations (when 
looking for different types of  evidence) and of  naming or conceptualising different aspects of  these 
relations need not imply that our (potentially) different concepts and/or our different types of  
evidence pick out different types of  causal relations on an ontic level.43 




It should be said that the pluralistic view of  evidence is a fruitful epistemic stand point, and its 
adoption is actually one of  the strengths of  RWT.44In turn, conceptual pluralism, although not an 
advisable position, for reasons of  clarity of  exposition, does not seem to pose insurmountable 
difficulties for the way we deal with causation matters, both in theory and in practice (see 
Cartwright, 2007). 
Ontic pluralism, on the other hand, is, to put it crudely, a disaster for the epistemology of  
causation in medicine (and for RWT as well). The main reason is that, from an ontic pluralist 
standpoint on causation, it could not justify why and how different evidence is successfully 
aggregated. For instance, why would we necessarily need evidence of  both production and 
difference-making when establishing causal claims, if  production only could in itself  constitute a 
full-blown causal relation? (e.g. if  Helicobacter Pylori can produce via a mechanism gastric ulcer, 
then evidence of  its production should be sufficient.) One could not use here the reply that 
epistemically, we would need evidence of  difference-making in order to differentiate processes from 
pseudo-processes (the former genuinely causal, the latter accidental) since, on the ontic pluralist 
view, difference-making just concerns a different type of  causal relation. Vice-versa, the above 
argumentation could be applied to difference-making causation. Why would we necessarily need 
evidence of  both production and difference-making when establishing causal claims, if  difference-
making only could in itself  constitute a full-blown causal relation?  One could not use here the reply 
that epistemically, we would need evidence of  production in order to differentiate genuine 
dependencies from spurious correlations (the former genuinely causal, the latter accidental) since, 
on the ontic pluralist view, production just concerns a different type of  causal relation. Further on, 
how could different types of  evidence be really aggregated, if  they point to distinct phenomena 
(distinct causal relations)? Hence, one central insight of  RWT (drawn out of  medical practice), 
namely that of  combining evidence from population studies with laboratory evidence, seems to lose 
its relevance. 
Moreover, ontic pluralism is also tacitly involved in the views advocated by EBM. I mean to 
say that the reason why medical specialists of  EBM have seemed to neglect evidence of  
                                                                                                                                                                                  
out a different causal relation³i.e., conceptual pluralism normally presupposes ontological pluralism. However, it is possible to be an 
ontological pluralist without being a conceptual pluralist by maintaining that there are two causal relations ambiguously picked 
RXWE\DVLQJOHFRQFHSWRI FDXVH%RWKYDULHWLHVRI SOXUDOLVPDUHZHDUJXHLPSODXVLEOHµ5usso and Williamson, 2007, 
S LWDOLFVDGGHG+RZHYHUWKHUH LVRQHSRVVLELOLW\ OHIWRXWRI 5XVVRDQG:LOOLDPVRQ·VFDWHJRUL]DWLRQQDPHO\WKDW
one could be a conceptual pluralist and an ontic (or ontological) monist ² as outlined above in the main text. And this 
means that conceptual pluralism needs not be rejected at all price, as Russo and Williamson maintain (whereas ontic 
pluralism has to be rejected). In return, the second of  the two possibilities mentioned by Russo and Williamson 
(conceptual monism and ontological pluralism) is what ends up characterising their own position. The way an 
omniscient being draws out an acyclic Bayes graph (as stated by their concept of  causation) characterises both 
mechanistic causation and difference-making causation. More on this to follow in due course. 
44 Illari (2011) has done much to show how different methodologies and different types of  evidence can be crucial to 
discovering and confirming causal relations. 
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mechanisms lies arguably into a tacit adherence to a pluralistic view of  causation. On this ontically 
pluralistic view, the population level studies are responsible for difference-making causation, whereas 
mechanisms as responsible for production causation only. Accordingly, this ontic pluralism separates 
mechanisms from difference-making, and it makes it hard to see how evidence coming from 
laboratory research could really influence the assessment and interpretation of  the results obtained 
at the level of  population studies, which is precisely what influences the reasoning of  EBM theorists 
DVZH VKDOO IXUWKHU VHH LQ WKH ODVW VHFWLRQRI  WKLV FKDSWHUZKHQ ORRNLQJDW+RZLFN·V FULWLFLVPRI 
RWT).45  
One should attempt to reject thus ontic causal pluralism and advocate causal monism (in a way 
that would unify both production and difference-making). Indeed, Russo and Williamson have 
clearly sensed the dangers and challenges posed by ontic causal pluralism (Russo and Williamson 




problem affects the pluralist who notes that there are two types of  evidence for causal claims³mechanistic and 
probabilistic³and concludes that there are two types of  causal claim, mechanistic and probabilistic. This is clearly a fallacious 
inference, and, worse, opens the pluralist up to the objections of  section 5. Suppose that the pluralist advocates two notions of  
cause, a mechaQLVWLFFDXVHDQGDSUREDELOLVWLFFDXVH7DNHDQ\SDUWLFXODUFDXVDOFODLPHJ¶VPRNLQJFDXVHVFDQFHU·WKDWWKHSOXUDOist 
cashes out in terms of  one or other of  these notions but not both (there must be some such claim, for otherwise she is not a pluralist but rather 
takes causality to be one thing that has two aspects or components). Now the evidence for this claim is multi-faceted, consisting of  
REVHUYHG GHSHQGHQFLHV DQG PHFKDQLVWLFWKHRUHWLFDO FRQVLGHUDWLRQV %XW WKH SOXUDOLVW·V DQDO\VLV RI  WKLV Flaim will be 
single-IDFHWHG VD\ ¶VPRNLQJ LV D FDXVH RI  FDQFHU· %XW WKHQ WKH SOXUDOLVW RSHQV KHUVHOI  XS WR WKH HSLVWHPRORJLFDO
SUREOHPVRI PRQLVP ,I  WKLVSDUWLFXODUXVHRI  ¶FDXVH· LVPHFKDQLVWLFFDXVH WKHQKRZFDQ LWEH WKDWHYHQZKHQWKH
mechanism is established and uncontroversial, further probabilistic evidence is cited in support of  the causal claim? 
However, if  the use is probabilistic, cause2, why are mechanisms invoked as evidence, even when there is ample probabilistic evidence? The 
pluralist FDQ·WH[SODLQWKHYDULHW\RI HYLGHQFHIRUWKHFODLPLI SOXUDOLVPLVULJKWLWVKRXOGEHSRVVLEOHWKDWWKHHYLGHQFHMXVWEHPechanistic, or 
MXVWEHSUREDELOLVWLF6RZKLOHWKHSOXUDOLVWPD\VD\WKDWGLIIHUHQWXVHVRI WKHZRUG¶FDXVH·FDQUHIHUWRGLIIHUHnt relations, some particular use 
must refer to a single relationµ5XVVRDQG:LOOLDPVRQSS-167, italics added).   
 
+RZHYHU5XVVRDQG:LOOLDPVRQ·VVROXWLRQIDLOVEHFDXVHWKH\RQO\manage to reject conceptual 
pluralism (which, as we have seen above, needs not be rejected at all costs). Russo and Williamson 
argue that their epistemic concept of  causation can accommodate both a) evidential pluralism and 
b) a type of  ontic monism which incorporates the evidence of  both production and difference-
making. This ontic monism is taken to differ from the simple-minded monism, which says either 
that all causation is production, or that all causation is difference-making.  On the epistemic 
causation view,46 causal relations are the causal beliefs that an agent with access to total evidence 
should adopt (Russo and Williamson, 2007, p.167). Moreover, the causal beliefs in question should 
                                                        
45 I am suggesting that the EBM proponents are tacitly ontic pluralists because it is the only explanation I can find for 
why they have not been paying more attention to the evidence of  mechanisms. Alternative explanations are  that they 
are pray to a positivistic, theory free ethos. 
46 Which is, parenthetically, a heuristically insightful view of  causation to which I will abundantly appeal in the final two 
chapters of  this thesis. 
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be represented by a directed acyclic graph whose nodes are the variables of  interest and whose 
arrows correspond to direct causal connections, where this graph is constrained by evidence (and 
should otherwise be as non-committal as possible as to what causes what; Williamson 2006, pp. 75-
82). Since the evidence in question is both evidence of  difference making and evidence of  
mecKDQLVPV LH LQ5XVVRDQG:LOOLDPVRQ·VYLHZHYLGHQFHRI SURGXFWLRQ LW VHHPV WKDWHYLGHQWLDO
pluralism is thereby reconciled with ontic monism; all that we seem to be left with, on the ontic side, 
are the beliefs of  the agent with access to the total evidence.  
However, the solution in terms of  the epistemic account of  causation does not provide an 
ontically monistic reunification, but only a conceptual one, since the concepts of  difference-making 
and production are further subsumed under the concept of  causation derived from the inferential 
practices of  the omniscient being. Evidential pluralism remains in place, which is a good thing.  We 
also get conceptual monism, which is nice. But ontic causal pluralism also remains in place, which is 
a bad thing. And ontic causal pluralism remains in place because it continues to be implied by the 
view of  mechanistic causation as productive only (taken together with the evidential pluralism view). 
Irrespective of  whether one is a Humean (as Russo and Williamson are) or not, the view of  
mechanistic causation as productive only implies ontic pluralism about causation, as I stated earlier. 
If  mechanistic causation is production-only causation, it is hard to imagine how the difference-
making relation could be something other than a different type of  causal relation. 
It wort noting that at certain points in their (2007) argumentation, Russo and Williamson are 
ambiguous on ontic vs. conceptual pluralism in that it is not clear what they reject. But there are just 
two possibilities a) either they think they only need to reject conceptual pluralism,  which does not 
help much, because a1) conceptual pluralism is not to be rejected at all price, and a2) ontic pluralism, 
which needs to be rejected at all price is still in place, or b) they assume that by rejecting conceptual 
pluralism then ontic pluralism is also rejected, which is false, because b1)  the conceptual pluralism 
they advocate is consistent with ontic pluralism, since b2) ontic causal pluralism is still ontic causal 
pluralism whether one is a Humean or an anti-Humean (given an understanding of  mechanistic 
causation as production only, together with the acceptance of  evidential pluralism). 
One additional ambiguity is that, while defining mechanisms in terms of  production only, 
Russo and Williamson do not state whether mechanistic production is to be taken as causation or not. 
On the one hand, they argue that the problems of  pre-emption and absences are problems of  
causation, which cannot be solved by an account in terms of  difference making only, or production 
only, respectively (and this is the main theoretical reason for putting forward the epistemic account 
of  causation, as a monistic solution to the pluralism that putatively emerges from the two problems) 
This entails that they accept the cases of  production only as cases of  causation (otherwise,  we would 
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not have to worry about the problem of  pre-emption). But this entails in turn that ontic pluralism 
remains in place even after one adopts the epistemic account of  causation, for the reasons I stated 
above). 
On the other hand, if  their definition of  mechanisms in terms of  production only is not a 
definition of  mechanistic causation (as Jon Williamson has let me know, in a personal communication 
occasioned by our supervision sessions) then, on causally monistic grounds, they should have drawn 
the conclusion that mechanistic causation includes both production and difference-making, which 
they never did. 
Because indeed, the real solution to the issue of  ontic causal pluralism is to join ontically 
production and difference-making. The thought was nicely expressed in Joffe (2013), following his 
analysis of  RWT and its original framework of  epistemic causation: ¶>«@ ZKLFK LV WKH PRVW
important aspect of  a causal relation? Its existence as a mechanism, seen perhaps as a fundamental 
power [i.e. production] or the counterfactual difference that it makes? The answer appears to depend on 
ZKHWKHURQH·VIRFXVLVSULPDULO\RQWKHVWDWLFTXHVWLRQRI ZKDWH[LVWVRURQWKHG\QDPLFFRQFHStion 
RI KRZWKLQJVFKDQJH%XW¶IRFXV·LVSDUWRI HSLVWHPRORJ\ in reality, both aspects are inescapably present, 
because they are the two sides of  a single coin·-RIIHSLWDOLFVDGGHG 
Joffe argues in other words that epistemology aside (i.e. the pluralistic view of  evidence aside) 
difference making and production should ontically be seen as two sides of  a single coin, picking out 
different aspects of  the same causal relation. When it comes to mechanisms, this directly translates 
as being the solution to view difference-making as part of  mechanistic causation, or as issuing from 
the productive activity of  mechanisms. That is to say, on this view, whenever we have production, 
ZHVKRXOGDOVRKDYHGLIIHUHQFHPDNLQJMXVWOLNHLQ)UHJH·VH[DPSOH, a creature with a heart will also 
have kidneys), or to use a slogan, all production is also difference making. Expressed in mechanistic 
terms, this means that whenever A is a cause of  B mechanistically, then we have both production 
and difference making at work between A and B. 
On such a construal of  mechanistic causation, the entities internal to mechanisms make a 
difference upon each other, and upon the final output of  the mechanisms in question, while 
mechanisms in turn make a difference upon the organisms they are part of. Thus, production and 
difference-PDNLQJ DUH LQGHHG OLNH ´WZR VLGHV RI  D VLQJOH FRLQµ WR XVH again -RIIH·V LQVLJKWIXO
expression, in the sense in which wherever production is identified as a causal process, we should 
assume that such a process is also attended by difference-making and dependency (be it expressed 
in the actual world, via interventions or probabilistic dependencies, or, in possible worlds, via simple 
or backtracking counterfactuals, as we will shortly see).  
Accordingly, the definition of  mechanisms I propose is a modified version of  Illari and 
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:LOOLDPVRQ·V² a mechanism for a phenomenon consists of  entities joined causal relations that 
are simultaneously productive and difference-making, organized in such a way that the phenomenon is 
produced and is dependent upon them. Following this construal of  mechanistic causation, RWT is to 
be formulated as follows. In order to establish causal claims, one needs evidence of  both 
production and difference-making. Evidence of  production comes from laboratory studies (and, 
ideal cases, it could also be inferred from population studies). Evidence of  difference-making comes 
from both laboratory studies (the difference-making side of  mechanisms) and from population 
studies. In other words, population studies and laboratory studies amount to two epistemic ways of  
access into the difference-making of  the same causal relations.  
We shall come back shortly to this important aspect of  the ways of  access into the difference 
making in §3, after discussing the problem of  pre-emption. But before moving on to the pre-
emption discussion, it should be said that, in spite of  the quasi-consensus in the literature on 
mechanisms as being productive only, Joffe (2013) is not the only exception to have drawn attention 
to difference-making in relation to mechanisms. 
2QH RWKHU H[FHSWLRQ LV :RRGZDUG·V LQWHUYHQWLRQLVW DFFRXQW RI  PHFKDQLVWLF FDXVDWLRQ
(Woodward, 2003) which has been insightfully applied to the biological realm in Waters (2007). This 
account, however, is dependent on the assumption of  modularity (an assumption which might not 
be adequate for all mechanistic systems). Moreover, it does not seek to unite production with 
difference making but only to provide a methodology of  tracking causation in terms of  difference 
making (which thereby leaves out an important dimension of  mechanistic phenomena); finally, it 
does not discuss the problems of  pre-emption and of  causation by absence. 
Another exception is provided by anti-Humean authors such as Nancy Cartwright or 
Alexander Bird, who view causation as a universal, monistic phenomenon resulting from the 
manifestation of  causal powers (or capacities). Cartwright has even coined a name for her capacities 
driven mechanisms, called ¶QRPRORJLFDOPDFKLQHV·Since capacities or powers are modal properties 
whose manifestation entails a counterfactual expression (Bird, 2005), the difference making should 
attend every manifestation of  powers, and this anti-Humean metaphysics is consistent with the 
simultaneous acceptance of  process causation. However, neither Bird, nor Cartwright discusses the 
cases of  pre-emption, and their arguments are dependent upon a particular metaphysics, i.e. the 
anti-Humean one. 
Finally, we have a group of  philosophers (e.g. Psillos, 2004, Strevens, 2013) whose views are 
close or complementary to the views of  Bird and Cartwright. These philosophers do not adhere to 
anti-Humean metaphysics however, but focus more generally on the existence of  scientific laws and 
their (counterfactually expressed or not) modal characteristics, which differentiate such laws from 
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accidental generalisations. In this framework, causation is viewed as difference-making since it is 
linked to (or derived from) the corresponding causal laws and their features of  non-accidentalness. 
6WUHYHQV· FRQWULEXWLRQ LV SDUWLFXODUO\ XVHIXO VLQFH LW H[SOLFLWO\ VHHNV WR XQLI\ SURGXFWLRQ DQG




The problem of  pre-emption, although it has generated huge discussions, is easy to espouse in 
its basic lines.  Imagine two billiard balls hitting one another. On a classical counterfactual analysis, 
this means that the first ball (or the player hitting it, depending on how one chooses to individualise 
the causal factors) is making a difference to the (moving of) the second ball, which is the effect. The 
counterfactual conditional in question would say that, had not the first ball hit the second, the 
second would not have moved. But now imagine a third ball being hit by a second player, just 
seconds after the first player hit his ball.48 The ensuing trajectories are such that, had not the first 
player hit the first ball, this third ball would have hit the second one. 
 Once this third ball comes into the picture, everything changes, or everything seems to 
change. The reason is that the counterfactual analysis does not seem to work anymore in order to 
single out the first ball as making a difference to the second ball. Hence, it seems to follow that it 
cannot be called anymore a cause, on a counterfactual approach. Therefore, in order to maintain its 
status as a cause, one will have to follow the process linking the first and the second ball, and on this 
ground call the first ball a production cause, but not a difference-making cause any more. More 
generally, one will have to distinguish two types of  causal relations - the production and the 
difference-making one, and claim that mechanisms are only concerned with production causation.  
Now, first of  all, it is worth noting a basic oddity of  this inference from the existence of  pre-
emption to the existence of  different types of  causal relations (or to causal pluralism). The causal 
relation holding between the first ball and the second has changed once the third ball made in into 
the scene, even if, in the actual world, this third ball has no spatio-temporal contact or interaction 
with either the first or the second ball (it interacts with the second in the counterfactual scenario in 
which the first ball misses the mark or is not itself  hit by the player). Out of  a difference-making 
type of  causal relation, the existence of  the third ball has turned the interaction between the first 
and second ball into a production-only causal relation. How come? 
                                                        
47 In spite of  the various problems or shortcomings associated to the above difference-making accounts, the respective 
authors provide valuable contributions, and I will be using some of  their insights in the next section. 
48 I am laying down directly a case of  a so-FDOOHG¶ODWHSUH-HPSWLRQ·VFHQDULRZKLFKLVWKHPRVWGLIILFXOWVFHQDULRRI SUH-
emption. The solution I will draw will also work, mutatis mutandis, for case of  early pre-emption. 
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Let me give a related example from the philosophy of  causation to show how strange this is. 
Metaphysicians of  causation are sometimes inclined to view singular causal interactions as not being 
ontologically primitive, since their status as causes seems to depend on higher causal laws 
(conferring them capacities or causal powers; Lewis, 1986, Bird, 2007). It is a rather thorny 
proposal, particularly since it is so difficult to imagine what ontic status scientific laws have. 
Nevertheless, such an argument is at least intelligible, since it is grounded on the ontological 
dependency between a higher and a lower level of  factors/entities involved in causation (namely the 
particular causal factors interacting and the higher level law).  But how could the presence of  an 
entity with the same ontic level as those involved in the initial causal relation, and with no 
interaction or contact with them, change the status of  the relation in question from one type of  
causal interaction (difference-making) to another (production)?  
The sensible answer is that it could not change it. It is the same causal relation, with or without 
the presence of  the third ball. Accordingly, if  the difference making has characterized this relation 
before the third ball made it into the scene, one has to admit that it will characterize it also when the 
third ball is present. How to make this difference-making visible counterfactually? There is one easy 
solution at hand.49 In the counterfactual scenario that should prove the difference-making of  the 
first ball (by imagining that it has not hit the second ball), one should also remove the third ball. 
More generally, in cases of  pre-emption in which several different causes target the same effect, in 
order to circumscribe the difference-making of  a certain causal factor, one will have to remove all 
other causes from the scene. 
One has to insist here that it is a quite straightforward solution, which reflects scientific 
practice. When this counterfactual scenario is made actual in the actual world by intervention, it is 
simply called experimentation. That is because, that experimentation entails the selection of  a 
certain number of  causes, in a specific, isolated context, and the elimination of  any other factor 
(interference or whatnot) that might get in the way DORQJWKHOLQHVRI 0LOO·VSULQFLSOHV. Of  course, 
objections could be raised but they are easy to answer with plausible replies, and we should not 
                                                        
49 I am using here the basic intuition followed by proponents of  difference-making causation when confronting the  
problem of  pre-emption (e.g. Yablo 2002, Glynn 2013) namely that difference-making coulGVWLOOEHLQSODFHLI ¶DOOWKLQJ
DUH XQFKDQJHG· %HFDXVH WKHVH SURSRQHQWV ZDQW GLIIHUHQFH-making only and reject production, their scenarios are 
unnecessarily complicated. My way of  reverting to an unchanged context is by introducing an intervention or a series of  
interventions in order to eliminate the additional causes (mainly pre-empting, but also over-determining or neutralising). 
7KLVVROXWLRQUHVHPEOHV:RRGZDUG·VLQWHUYHQWLRQEDVHGPHWKRGRORJ\ZKLFKUHTXLUHVLQWHUYHQWLRQVRQFDXVHVVXFKWKDW
they induce corresponding variations in the effects, provided that the respective interventions could not have influenced 
effects on alternative pathways. My scenario is more straightforward though since it requires directly the eliminations of  
alternative causes, and it is ultimately inspired by scientific practice, as I will discuss in the main text above. Another way 
WR VD\ WKLV E\ LQYRNLQJ 0LOO·V 0HWKRGV LV WKDW :RRGZDUG RQO\ DSSHDOV WR WKH PHWKRG RI  FRQFRPLWDQW YDULDWLRQ LQ
framing his scenarios, wheareas, by seeking to reflect actual practice of  science in experimentation, my scenario appeals 




forget that the burden of  proof  is on the side of  the pluralist. 
i) One could claim this solution cannot work as a means to define causes merely in terms of  
difference-making, i.e. it could not work as an analysis or definition of  difference-making causation 
+DOO$SODXVLEOHUHVSRQVHWRWKLV LV WKDWZLVKLQJWRSURYLGHD ¶SXUH·DQDO\VLVRI GLIIHUHQFH
making causation - in which production would not show up at all - is putting the cart before the 
KRUVH ,W PLJKW EH RQ WKH FRQWUDU\ WKDW RQ D PRQLVWLF FRQVWUXDO RI  FDXVDWLRQ WKH ¶SXUH· FDXVDO
relation to be defined is that which lets itself  be decomposed into a production feature and a 
difference-making feature.  
ii) One could also claim that, in order to eliminate all other causes from such a counterfactual 
scenario, one needs an independent way to select these other causes, before eliminating them, and it is 
difficult to articulate, using the possible worlds semantics, how the elimination can be meaningfully 
pursued (Lewis, 1973). The plausible response here is that one can well eliminate the other causes 
using background knowledge, for the pragmatic purpose of  showing the way out of  the pre-emption 
SUREOHPHYHQ LI GLIILFXOWLHV UHPDLQZLWK WKHSRVVLEOHZRUGVVHPDQWLFVDQG WKH LVVXHRI  ¶GHILQLQJ·
difference making causation.50 
iii) The third reason is that there might be cases in which the antecedent of  the counterfactual 
could not be made actual in the actual world for physical reasons (an experiment involving the solar 
system needs to remain purely counterfactual for instance) or for metaphysical reasons (the 
alternative causes that would all have to be eliminated, could all be linked with the cause we are 
interested in such that no one of  them could be withdrawn without the others disappearing as well 
or becoming non-functional, as for instance in non-modular, holistic systems; Williamson, 2011). 
However, Woodword (2002, 2003, 2011) has convincingly shown the meaningfulness of  non-
actualisable counterfactuals for physical reasons. Insofar as we are in a metaphysical or ontic 
discussion, the meaningfulness of  such physically impossible scenarios is just the point we need 
here.51 As for the cases in which the counterfactuals could not be made actual for metaphysical 
reasons, one could well use backtracking counterfactuals in order to make evident the existence of  
difference-making (Broadbent 2007), or one could use a non-counterfactual approach based on 
0DFNLH·V ,186 FRQGLWLRQV (Strevens, 2007, 2012a and 2013).Since 6WUHYHQV· approach not only 
provides a solution to the metaphysically intricate class of  pre-emption cases, but also offers a way 
to incorporate all the intuitions that I have laid out above in my eliminative counterfactual scenario, 
                                                        
50See Woodward (2001) on how one can discuss causation methodologically/pragmatically, without going into the 
discussion of  what causation ultimately is. , UHWDLQ IURP :RRGZDUG·V OHVVRQ WKDW DW OHDVW LQ VRPH GLIILFXOW SDUWLFXODU
cases (as the cases of  pre-emption are) one could adopt a pragmatic solution to solve these particular cases, and then 
pursue a more general discussion as to what causation ontically is. 
51Of  course, from a practical point of  view, there is still a worry associated to such scenarios which are physically 
unrealizable in the actual world, and I will come back to this worry towards the end of  this section. 
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and I will briefly describe it below.  
7KHPDLQ LQVLJKWRI  6WUHYHQV· DSSURDFK, as said, is that one can view the difference-making 
causes as dHVFULEHGE\0DFNLH·V,186FRQGLWLRQVLHDVQHFHVVary parts of  sets of  sufficient factors 
for determining effects (where this sufficiency can be expressed as an entailment relation between 
the corresponding statements of  causes and effects). To see which factors are INUS conditions and 
hence difference-makers, given an actual state of  affairs in which the effect obtain, one proceeds to 
successively set aside factors from the background, and checking each time whether the effect is still 
in place (and, I sKRXOG DGG RQH FDQ HDVLO\ UHFRJQL]H KHUH WKH WUDFHV RI  0LOO·V PHWKRG RI 
difference).52 In logical terms (which, as Strevens underlines, are not counterfactual) given a 
conditional whose consequent stands for the effect and whose (complex) antecedent stands for the 
background state of  affairs at the time the effect is produced, one proceeds by successively setting 
aside (or abstracting away) the clauses of  various background factors, and then checking whether 
the entailment relation still holds. If, upon abstracting away such a clause, the entailment relation still 
holds, we are not dealing with an INUS condition and the corresponding factor is not a difference-
maker. If  the entailment does not obtain, we are dealing with an INUS condition and the 
corresponding factor is a difference-maker (Strevens, 2007, §4). 
There are two features of  this procedure of  abstracting away (the kairetic procedure, as 
Strevens calls it in his later publications) that are particularly important for pre-emption cases.  
a) First, it differs markedly from the procedure employing counterfactuals. In the 
counterfactuals case, the background state of  affairs needs to take into account the entire world 
state before the effect occurs and to draw possible words scenarios in which, by operatiQJ¶PLQLPDO·
¶VXUJLFDOLQFLVLRQV·RQthe world state, the putative causes are eliminated (which should be followed 
by the absence of  the effect in question if  the eliminated factors are difference-makers). In the 
kairetic procedure, the background state of  affairs needs not be the entire world state. One can just 
focus on a particular (candidate) set of  factors deemed to be jointly sufficient for the effect and 
check which of  these particular factors are really INUS conditions or not (Strevens, 2007, §2).  
In addition, causal factors are not strictly speaking eliminated from the background state of  
affairs. By setting aside clauses corresponding to particular factors from the antecedent of  the 
background state of  affairs, one does not eliminate these factors (i.e. one does not logically negate 
their corresponding clauses), but one abstract them away, one chooses not to take them into 
FRQVLGHUDWLRQ7RXVH6WUHYHQV·H[DPSOHDEVWUDFWLQJDZD\gravitation from the background state of  
                                                        
52 -XVWWRUHFDOO0LOO·V0HWKRGRI 'LIIHUHQFHVD\VLI DQLQVWDQFHLQZKLFKWKHSKHQRPHQRQXQGHULQYHVWLJDWLRQRFFXUV
and an instance in which it does not occur, have every circumstance save one in common, that one occurring only in the 
former; the circumstance in which alone the two instances differ, is the effect, or cause, or a necessary part of  the cause, 
of  the phenomenon. 
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affairs does not mean negating its clause in a possible world scenario in which gravitation does not 
exist; it means staying in the actual world and not taking it into consideration when drawing factual 
conditionals corresponding to cause-effect relations to be ascertained.  
b) The relation of  entailment that is under scrutiny in the kairetic procedure is not purely 
ORJLFDOHQWDLOPHQWDVLQ0DFNLH·VRULJLQDOHPSLULFLVWDFFRXQWEXWLWLVDUHODWLRQRI causal entailment. 
Strevens means by this that the factors taken into consideration in the background state of  affairs 
need to be linked by a production causal process to the effect under scrutiny. Among other reasons, 
Strevens makes this move in order to solve a series of  problems associated to Mackie original 
account - in which one could count as INUS conditions factors individualized by Goodman 
predicates. At any rate, this move transforms the kairetic procedure into a monistic analysis of  
causation, in which both production and difference-making are involved Strevens, 2007, § 5.1). 
Now, cases of  pre-emption, involving as they do actual (i.e. pre-empting) and potential (i.e. 
pre-empted) causes, can be described as cases in which multiple such sufficient sets of  factors act or 
could act to induce the same effects.  And there are two (interrelated) solutions that can be 
advanced in the terms of  the kairetic procedure. The first is quite straightforward, based on the a) 
feature outlined above. One can just focus on one set of  candidate sufficient set, and assess the 
INUS conditions of  its components. In our example, one can pick out the set of  conditions 
involving the first player, which are sufficient to entail the effect. Suppose that while hitting the first 
ball, the first player whistles.53 Does his whistling count as a difference making (ontically) and as an 
INUS condition (logically)? This is an event that is arguably causally related by some sort of  process 
to the event of  the second ball moving (through the emitted sound waves, say). But the clause 
incorporating it into the background state of  affairs is not an INUS conditions and the whistling is 
not a difference-maker, as it can be abstracted away while the relation of  entailment holds. Is the 
hitting of  the first ball a difference-maker? It is, because its clause cannot be abstracted away 
without breaking the entailment. 
The second solution places more weight on the b) feature outlined above, in the sense that the 
pre-empted, possible causes of  pre-emption scenarios are not strictly speaking related by causal 
processes to the effect under scrutiny. Remember that we are not in a possible world, counterfactual 
scenario, but we have remained in the actual world. And in the actual world, the pre-empted causes 
do not actually get to produce the effect under scrutiny (Strevens, 2007, §5.4). It is only the actual 
cause that gets to produce the effect. 
Notice that these (interrelated) solutions work perfectly also for causes that are metaphysically 
inseparable in a counterfactual scenario, since we need not enter into a counterfactual scenario at all. 
                                                        
53 I have interchangeably used in this section the terminology and examples of  causal factors and causal events. There is 
some debate as to which terminology is the more appropriate and the reader should choose her favourite denomination. 
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One will either focus on the INUS conditions that includes the actual (pre-empting) cause, and/or, 
in case the pre-empted, metaphysically inseparable cause is also taken into consideration, one will be 
able to abstract it away on grounds of  it not being linked by a process to the effect under 
consideration. 
In more recent publications (2012a, 2013), Strevens has refined his kairetic approach by 
considering as starting point the fundamental processes of  physics (Strevens, 2012a, pp. 451-452) 
and conceiving of  the abstracting away procedure in such a way that absences, resulting from the 
attribution of  negative properties, could also be conceive as difference-makers attending production 
relations (Strevens, 2013, p. 313). Since the cases of  causation we are interested in concern the level 
of  biology/medicine, we do not have to look at the possibilities of  beginning the abstractive 
procedure from the level of  fundamental physics.  
Similarly, since the present discussion of  mechanisms as difference making only requires that 
all production is also difference-making, we need not enter into the discussion whether all 
difference-making is also production, and accordingly need not look into his account of  causation 
by absence. But it is worth just noting that medicine is rife with assertions of  causation by absence. 
Take the example of  the claim that lack of  C vitamin causes scurvy. This claim that an absence is a 
difference-maker for a disease picks up a causal relation (or a series of  causal relations) for which a 
description in terms of  production is also readily available ²  the process of  formation of  spots on the 
skin, and of  spongy gums, the bleeding from the mucous membranes, the defective collagen 
fibrillogenesis, etc. In fact, the story is much broader, because the whole field of  medicine can be 
viewed as resulting from causation by absence. In contemporary medicine each and every 
pathological process admits a causal rendition in terms of  the dysfunctioning, or the lack of  normal 
functioning of  a certain organ, system, tissue, type of  cell, etc. Surely, we would not want to say that 
medical causation consists solely in difference making causation by absence which is separated from 
the processes of  production causation (as ontic causal pluralist would have it, or as it would follow 
if  indeed the problem of  causation by absence was really a problem for ontic causal monism); the 
entire array of  physiopathological processes involving production stands behind any claim that 
dysfunctioning or lack of  functioning has produced such and such harmful effects.  
One last word here about the problem of  pre-emption as such. We have seen that Strevens 
carefully distinguishes his kairetic procedure from the counterfactual approach to pre-emption, and 
there are clear conceptual advantages that are thereby obtained. But there is one counterfactual 
approach that comes close, I believe, both to his insight and to his results, namely Broadbent·V
(2007) approach in terms of  counterfactuals. Just like Strevens, Broadbent focuses on the 
sufficiency of  causes rather than on their necessity, as in the classical counterfactual approach. But 
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instead of  removing factors from sets of  INUS conditions in order to test the sufficiency of  these 
sets, Broadbent chooses to pick out the counterfactual scenarios in which the effect does not show 
up, and to infer by backtracking the absence of  the actual difference-maker, which was sufficient to 
produce the effect in the actual world (Broadbent, 2007, p. 170).54 The procedure works in cases of  
pre-emption, because arguably, the closest possible world in which the effect is absent is one in 
which actual pre-empting cause is missing and the actual pre-empted cause has not yet acted 
(Broadbent, 2007, pp. 177-182). In our billiard example, the closest possible world in which the 
second ball is not moving is one in which the first ball has not been hit, and this possible world 
scenario corresponds to the small (perhaps infinitesimal) period in which the third ball has not yet 
reached the second (admitting that the third was hit at all). 
7KDWWKHGLVWDQFHEHWZHHQ6WUHYHQV·DSSURDFKDQG%URDGEHQW·VLVQRWVRJUHDWFDQEHVHHQE\
ORRNLQJDW0LOO·VPHWKRGRI difference, where the intuitions of  both approaches are present. The 
PHWKRG RI  DJUHHPHQW VD\V WKDW ¶If  an instance in which the phenomenon under investigation 
occurs, and an instance in which it does not occur, have every circumstance save one in common, 
that one occurring only in the former; the circumstance in which alone the two instances differ, is 
the effect, or cause, or a necessary part of  the cause, of  the phenomenon· (Mill, 2002 [1843], p. 
455). This is a method of  inferring causes that supposes minimal changes in the causal background 
associated to the presence or absence of  the effect (as opposed WR0LOO·VPHWKRGRI DJUHHPHQWIRU
instance, which requires, a great variation in the causal background), and as it happens, Mill covers 
in the method of  difference the possible discovery of  both the sufficient cause, and of  a necessary 
part of  a sufficient cause (which corresponds to the INUS conditions). Broadbent and Strevens 
seem to pick upon the different ends of  the same stick (which are both the right ends). Broadbent 
focuses on and starts from the absence of  the effect, in order to infer the absence of  the sufficient 
cause. Strevens focuses on and starts from the sufficiency of  (the set of  candidate INUS conditions 
making up) cause for the emergence of  the effect, abstracting away various candidate INUS 
conditions and checking whether the entailment of  the effect still holds (which is the same as 
¶WHVWLQJ·GLIIHUHQWFRQMXQFWLRQVRI ,186FRQGLWLRQVWRVHHLI WKHHIIHFWREWDLQV. Assuming the cause 
effect relation can be represented as a conditional, Strevens starts his approach from modus ponens 
whereas Broadbent starts his approach from modus tollens.   
These are then the reasons why I am inclined to see some common ground between the 
approaches of  the two authors. But be that as it may, they both offer insightful solutions to the 
problem of  pre-emption, which offer satisfying, reasonable and plausible responses to potential 
                                                        
54 Backtracking counterfactuals are not as uncommon as one might think. As Broadbent points out, even the Inference 




difficulties associated to my scenario of  elimination drawn at the start of  this section. Of  course 
details to be clarified remain (an entire alternative thesis could be written on this subject) and such 
details would probably be arduously picked up by the proponent of  ontic causal pluralism. But 
again, the burden of  proof  lies on the latter·V side, since causal pluralism is such an unnatural view 
to uphold, at least in the field of  medicine, where it would lead us into great epistemological aporias 
and even skepticism about causation, as pointed out in the beginning of  this chapter. 
The position on pre-emption I have sketched above could be applied for mechanisms as a 
whole (when their difference-making is pre-empted, but also neutralised, or modified, by other 
causes or mechanisms) and, mutatis mutandis, for the causal relations inside the mechanisms 
themselves. On this approach, we end up with production mechanistic processes that are attended 
by difference-making, where the diference-making in question could express the sufficiency of  the 
cause (if  C was in place, E would be in place) and/or its necessity (if  C was not in place, E would 
not be in place), and/or its backtracking, explanatory status for the effect (if  E was not in place, C 
had not been in place), and/or the manipulability dependency to the effect (if  the value of  C was 
wiggled, the value of  E would be wiggled as well). And again, all these conditionals approximately 
tUDQVSRVH 0LOO·V 0HWKRGV LQWR WKH ODQJXDJH RI  FRXQWHUIDFWXDOV ZKHUH 0LOO·V 0HWKRGV DV ,
mentioned above, are basic postulates of  any experimental research. I will look in the next section at 
how all this bears on the revised form of  RWT I propose. 
 
§3. The revised RWT 
Now, if  there is one clear advantage that looking into the pre-emption brings about in our 
discussion of  difference making and mechanisms in medicine, is that it helps us to see the necessity 
of  RWT and to grasp a better hold of  the way in which the difference-making mechanisms 
contribute to the revised version of  RWT I have proposed. 
To recall from the previous section, first, I have propose a definition of  mechanisms as a 
PRGLILHGYHUVLRQRI  ,OODUL DQG:LOOLDPVRQ·V  ² a mechanism for a phenomenon consists of  
entities causal relations that are simultaneously productive and difference-making, organized in such a way that 
the phenomenon is produced and is dependent upon them. Second, following this construal of  
mechanistic causation, I have proposed a revised form of  RWT. This revised RWT says that, in 
order to establish causal claims, one needs evidence of  both production and difference-making ² 
where evidence of  production comes from laboratory studies (and, in ideal cases, could also be 
inferred from population studies), whereas evidence of  difference-making comes from both 
laboratory studies (the difference-making side of  mechanisms) and from population studies.  
A consequence of  this reformulated RWT is that population studies and laboratory studies 
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amount to two epistemic ways of  access into the same difference-making of  the same causal 
relations. Why would we need two different epistemic ways of  access in the same difference-making 
of  the same causal relations? Which is the same as asking ² how is the evidence from population 
studies and the evidence from laboratory usefully aggregated and fruitfully used in conjunction for 
the purpose of  establishing causal claims?  
This is a question with multiple answers, and some of  them will require further elaboration in 
the following chapters.55At least the first answer that can be straightforwardly provided now ² given 
the overview of  pre-emption situations we went through ² namely that I)evidence of  difference 
making from the level of  population studies can usefully complement the evidence of  difference 
making obtained from laboratory experimentation in order to ensure that pre-emption and 
analogous situations do not distort our assessments of  the causal actions of  mechanisms. By 
analogous situations I mean cases in which other mechanisms, parts of  mechanisms or causal 
factors act or could act, neutralizing, over-determining or modifying the effect of  the mechanism, 
the part of  mechanism or the causal factor we are interested in. 
The simple eliminative scenario I have brought forth in the beginning of  this section requires 
for the actual manifestation of  the difference-making of  mechanisms that the alternative causes be 
removed. I have noted this is a pragmatic solution, and there is no need to insist on the general 
appeal of  its underlying intuition, which is present in various inferential techniques devised to 
delineate causal relations (including the Bayes nets approach). But there is still a pragmatic question 
to be asked: how can we be sure that all the alternative causes have been eliminated? Let us grant 
that in ideal situations, laboratory experimentation can proceed by complete isolation of  the 
mechanism or part of  mechanism under study (in case the mechanism in question is modular). But 
obviously this isolated context is different from the in vivo context in which mechanisms act within 
an organism.  And the appeal of  population studies at this point is precisely that they could offer an 
assessment of  difference making in which the alternative causes and influences are eliminated or 
rendered as less interfering as possible. By randomization, RCTs can eliminate or reduce the bias 
associated to interfering causal contexts, and I should not lose the occasion of  pointing out that 
they do so by putting into practice 0LOO·V0HWKRGRI $JUHHPHQW56 
In addition, the interplay with the population studies allows us to solve a practical problem 
                                                        
55 The work to be done in the following chapters, as related to RWT, has been alluded to in the introduction to the 
present chapter. Since we have here a suitable place for sign-posting, after the convoluted discussion of  pre-emption, I 
will remind the reader the main thread of  the thesis and how the following chapters discuss the advantages of  the 
interplay between laboratory studies of  difference-making mechanisms and population studies. The respective 
advantages will be numerotated using roman letters. 
56 7RUHFDOO0LOO·VPHWKRGRI  DJUHHPHQW VD\V WKDW LI  two or more instances of  the phenomenon under investigation 
have only one circumstance in common, the circumstance in which alone all the instances agree, is the cause (or effect) 
of  the given phenomenon. 
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noted above in relation to physically impossible counterfactuals. These counterfactuals have 
antecedents which cannot be realized in the actual world. The same goes with a vengeance for the 
metaphysically impossible counterfactuals that seem to be necessary to solve pre-emption cases in 
which the pre-empted and pre-empting cases being metaphysically inseparable, as was also noted 
above. The fact that, as Woodward has argued, physically impossible counterfactuals are still 
meaningful saves the day as far as the strictly ontic discussion of  causal pluralism is concerned. On 
the other hand, for the pre-emption cases in which the pre-empted and pre-empting cases being 
PHWDSK\VLFDOO\LQVHSDUDEOHWKHRWKHUKDQG6WUHYHQV· kairetic procedure allows us to make the point 
that ontic causal monism (and its consequence under focus here, that mechanistic production 
should be seen as inseparable from difference making) is not endangered even by such pre-emption 
cases.  
As Nancy Cartwright used to remark with respect to her capacities - ¶HYHQZKHQWKH\DUHQRW
PDQLIHVWHG WKH\ DUH VWLOO WKHUH· &DUWZULJKW  ²we can similarly hold that, even when the 
difference-making is not manifested in the actual world, it still remains an ontic or metaphysical 
feature of  causal relations. Take another analogous example. Laws in the special sciences are 
notoriously applied ceteris paribus, and it has been argued that such ceteris paribus clauses should also 
be ascribed to the laws of  the exact sciences, physics included, in order to specify for instance the 
lack of  interference (Cartwright, 1983).57 Are such ceteris paribus clauses - which seem to impose 
restrictions on the scope of  law-like statements and on the manifestations of  laws as such - a reason 
to strip the respective laws of  their governing characteristic of  universality and being 
exceptionalness? There are some strong arguments to answer no (Kline and Matheson, 1986). Laws 
should not be stripped of  their law-hood by ceteris paribus clauses that seem to limit their actual 
manifestations even for the case of  physics. Similarly, we can add, the mechanistic production 
causation should not be stripped of  its difference-making dimension by pre-emption cases that 
seem to limit the actual manifestation of  this difference-making. 
But then, this point having been agreed on the strictly metaphysical or ontic side of  the 
discussion, we are left, as I said, with a practical or methodological question. What to do in those 
cases in which the manifestation of  difference-making cannot be enabled by actual interventions? 
The worry appears most evidently for certain cases of  internal mechanistic causation, in the case of  
those biological mechanism that are not modular, i.e. in which the functioning of  mechanistic items 
depends holistically on the entire mechanisms such that sub-mechanisms cannot be detached in 
order to isolate their actions.  The worry is much diminished insofar as the output of  mechanisms is 
concerned, since it is much less likely that the output of  alternative mechanisms pre-empts or 
                                                        
57 Anti-Humean accounts of  laws have clauses stipulating the presence of  stimuli and the lack of  antidotes in the 
canonical form of  their rendition of  scientific laws, of  physics included (see Bird, 2007). 
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interferes with the output of  alternative mechanisms, in such a way that laboratory experimentation 
(complemented if  needed by the randomisation of  population studies) could not allow us to 
evaluate the difference-making of  the mechanism of  interest.58 
Nevertheless, the worry should be dealt with, and the interplay with population studies specific 
of  RWT offers a way out because, on a practical or epistemic level, the population studies offer us 
an average difference-making that reflects the difference-making of  the mechanism we are 
interested in, from the point of  view of  entire human organisms.59 And of  course, the problem of  
pre-emption aside, we are always interested not just in the difference-making of  mechanisms, as it 
can be assessed in isolated laboratory setting, but also in how this difference-making ends up being 
reflected in real-life, complexly interacting human organisms. 
At this point, we need to face another obvious objection. Suppose that an EBM proponent 
accepts the entire above argumentation about the difference-making of  mechanisms. Nonetheless, 
such a proponent will also surely claim (in line with the obvious preference of  EBM theorists for 
population studies) that it is the difference making of  population studies that does all the job for the 
purpose of  testing and confirming causal claims, in contrast to the difference making of  
mechanisms obtained from laboratory studies. Mechanisms might matter in the context of  
discovery, when we learn initially about causal relations, but in the context of  confirmation, we are 
only left with population studies, which have the entire epistemic superiority vis-a-vis the laboratory 
studies. So why all the fuss about the difference-making of  mechanisms? Relatedly, it could be 
pointed out that, after all, we would be interested in mechanisms, and we would be interested in the 
difference-making of  mechanisms, insofar as this assessing this difference-making is helping us 
assess causal relations in medicine. Why invoke after all the fact that the difference making of  
population studies could help us assess the difference making of  mechanisms, as I maintained 
above? Are we not primarily interested in assessing the medical causal claims simpliciter (it is 
organisms which should be cured after all)? 
                                                        
58 Broadbent (2007) observes that most philosophical examples of  complicated pre-emption involve various strange 
entities and situations (wizards casting spells for instance, in the trumping cases) and that such complicated cases of  pre-
emption are much less likely to be encountered in real life. Cases of  pre-emption have not deterred Kenneth Waters, for 
example, one one the most established philosophers of  biology, to adopt a difference making approach (derived from 
:RRGZDUG·VIRUOLIHVFLHQFHVFDXVDWLRQVHH:DWHUV 
59 A somehow similar point has been made by the proponents of  RWT who maintain that evidence of  difference-
making from population studies can help us in cases in which evidence of  mechanisms is unclear as to the overall 
direction of  causation at the level of  entire organisms, given multiple mechanisms that might have interfering pathways. 
Given our previous discussion in this chapter, an obvious observation is that, on the premise of  causal pluralism (a 
premise entailed by the definition of  mechanistic causation as productive only), it is not very clear how evidence of  
difference making causation could be relevant for the evidence of  production causation (production causation being a 
different causal relation in the framework of  causal pluralism). In our terms, of  course, the evidence of  difference-
making from population studies gives us the overall direction of  causation and the overall difference-making for a 
certain series of  causal interactions linking two factors A and B (say, most generally, the treatment and the result of  the 
treatment). A more rigorous comparison between the epistemic consequences of  my revised RWT and the old form of  
RWT will be provided in the next chapter. 
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Having played the role of  the GHYLO·Vadvocate, let me return to the angelic (or prosecution) 
side, because this objection offers the ideal background to present the other advantages of  the 
revised form of  RWT. We have looked above in some detail at I) the epistemic advantage that 
evidence of  difference making from the level of  population studies can usefully complement the 
evidence of  difference making obtained from laboratory experimentation in order to ensure that 
pre-emption and analogous situations do not distort our assessments of  the causal actions of  
mechanisms. But we also have the fact that II) the difference-making of  mechanisms matters for 
individualizing the causal factors assessed by population studies. This simply means that which causal 
factors are to be ascertained in relation to which effects is substantially influenced by our mechanistic 
knowledge.60 Of  course, this is only possible in the framework of  ontic causal monism, in which the 
productive and difference making causal relations of  mechanisms are the same as the causal 
relations reflected in the dependencies of  population studies. Another way to say this is that the 
classical distinction between the context of  discovery and the context of  confirmation should be 
carefully applied when it comes to the testing of  medical claims. A population study backed up by 
detailed mechanistic knowledge will be much more finely grained and targeted in its results, than a 
population study backed up by approximate knowledge of  mechanisms and roughly individualised 
causal factors 
An almost direct consequence of  II) above are III) and IV) ²which indicate that mechanistic 
evidence and population studies evidence reinforce reciprocally their quality and weight when they 
cohere (again, justifiably so only in the framework of  the difference making of  mechanisms). It 
follows directly from II) above that III) evidence of  population studies backed up by detailed 
mechanistic evidence should be qualitatively superior to the evidence of  population studies backed 
up by poor mechanistic evidence. And, on a closer look, the reverse should also be true ² IV) the 
mechanistic evidence whose findings are reflected in population studies assessments should be 
graded higher than the mechanistic evidence whose findings are not reflected in the assessments 
from the level of  populations. 
And this leads us to V) - the fact that the evidence of  difference making of  mechanisms, when 
backed up by evidence of  difference making from the level of  populations, allows us a better grasp 
of  the problem of  extrapolation. Recall the objection just stated above. Why invoke after all the fact 
that the difference making of  population studies could help us assess the difference making of  
mechanisms, as I maintained above? Are we not primarily interested in assessing the medical causal 
claims simpliciter? Yes, we are primarily interested in assessing the medical causal claims simpliciter. But 
                                                        
60 Notice the contrast the claim of  Clarke et al in their (2014) that the main use of  mechanistic evidence is to rule out 
spurious causation. We can see that the difference making of  mechanisms allows us to have a much more rich view of  
the interplay with the population studies. This will be discussed in more detail in the next chapter. 
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it happens that mechanisms have been invoked as the main epistemic device of  solving the difficult 
problem of  extrapolation. It was, most probably too much of  a charge to put on mechanistic 
evidence, and it has been argued that mechanisms can only but fail in this task. However, the revised 
RWT can usefully be used as a framework to improve upon the role of  mechanisms in 
extrapolation, and it can do by a joint assessment of  the difference making of  mechanisms, coming 
both from laboratory studies and population studies. Or so I will argue in chapter 5. 
Indeed, even if  we will see how I) and also II)-V) preliminarily at work in the next section  - 
ZKHUH,GLVFXVV+RZLFN·VFULWLFLVPDQGVKRZWKDWWKHUHYLVHGIRUPRI 5:7can plausibly withstand 
this criticism -  the II)-V) epistemic advantages are worth and require further development. II), III) 
and IV) will be discussed in more detail in the next chapter with respect to the notion of  the weight 
or quality of  evidence, in a pre-confirmation context, and V) will be discussed in chapter 5.   





In his (2011) Jeremy Howick lays down five (interrelated) lines of  criticism against the initial 
form of  RWT which views as necessary for establishing causal claims both the evidence of  
difference-making from population studies, and the evidence of  mechanisms (i.e. of  production 
only) from laboratory studies. +RZLFN·VFODLPVDUH that: 
a) in certain cases population studies are sufficient for prevention or treatment purposes, 
even if  causal claims have not yet been established (and hence we need not appeal in addition to 
mechanistic evidence). (Howick, 2011, p. 930) 
b) in certain cases population studies are sufficient for confirmation of  causal claims (and 
hence we need not appeal in addition to mechanistic evidence). (Howick, 2011, pp. 931-932) 
c) population studies cannot establish the existence of  a mechanism (and hence in cases 
outlined in a) and b) above, one cannot argue that mechanistic evidence was still somehow taken in 
consideration when using population studies results). (Howick, 2011, pp. 933-934) 
d) in certain (rare) cases, evidence of  mechanisms from laboratory studies can be sufficient 
for establishing causal claims (and hence one needs not appeal to in addition to evidence from 
                                                        
61 Too much signposting might be confusing for the reader, but just to say that chapters 6 and 7 will take up again II) 
and III) and will show their relevance for confirmation purposes, in the framework of  a collaboration between IBE and 
Bayesianism. More precisely, chapter 6, which takes up and continues the rationale of  III), will argue that - VI) 
mechanistic evidence can increase the resilience of  probability functions for the hypotheses backed up by such evidence. 
Finally, chapter 7 will take up and continue the rationale of  II), arguing that ²VII) mechanistic evidence could constrain 
the prior and likelihood probabilities, for hypotheses backed up by such evidence. 
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population studies). (Howick 2011, p. 938) 
e) mechanisms cannot solve on their own the problem of  extrapolation (contrary to the 
claims of  RWT proponents, e.g. Russo and Williamson, 2007) and, as a general conclusion, too 
much epistemic burden is put on mechanistic evidence by RWT (Howick, 2011, p. 934). 
I will argue that some of  these claims are based on a misunderstanding of  RWT and the 
arguments motivating it. Some others, however, criticize successfully the initial form of  RWT, even 
when taking into account ,OODUL·V(2011) disambiguation. Nonetheless, they are unsuccessful with the 
revised form of  RWT I propose. 
Claim a) is correct, but it just does not concern RWT. RWT is a thesis about establishing causal 
claims, whereas a) discusses cases of  prevention or cases of  medical treatment where causal claims 
have not been entirely established. In cases of  prevention, naturally, if  there is enough evidence of  
potential harm, medical action can be taken, before the causal action of  the potentially harmful agent 
was established. Accordingly, preventative actions do not concern RWT. Similarly, in serious 
diseases, we might use treatments whose mechanism of  action is not known, but which seem to 
have positive effects upon evaluation by population studies. But this does not mean that we should 
not seek to know more about the respective mechanisms, and Howick draws his examples from 
areas of  medicine (psychiatry and neurology) in which we could really use more mechanistic 
knowledge. But in these cases in which we lack completely mechanistic knowledge are cases in 
which the causal claims have not been establLVKHGDQGZHWKXVDUULYHDW+RZLFN·VEFODLP 
Claim b) is partly based on a misunderstanding, but partly it also hits the target. It is based 
on a misunderstanding because mechanistic knowledge, contributes to individualizing the causal 
factors assessed by population, and also because population studies can only be sufficient to 
establish causal claims in ideal situations in which we would have at disposal for RWT an infinite 
randomization. Outside of  such ideal situation, in real life that is to say, one also needs evidence of  
production from mechanisms in order to rule out spurious causation (Russo and Williamson, 2007). 
  But partly, claim b) hits the target, because the old form of  RWT cannot explain why is it 
that, in such ideal situations, the evidence of  population studies would be sufficient. It cannot 
explain it because, as I have argued in the section 1 of  this chapter, by sticking to the definition of  
mechanisms as productive only, the consequence of  ontic causal pluralism is unavoidable. Hence, 
from evidential pluralism (the advisable position to take concerning evidence) one cannot fall back 
on ontic causal monism - the advisable ontic position to take, in which evidence of  both production 
and difference making concerns the same causal relation ² but only on ontic causal pluralism. On the 
production only definition of  mechanisms (either of  mechanistic causation or of  mechanistic 
evidence) evidence of  production concerns production causation only, whereas evidence of  
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difference making concerns difference making causation, which is bound to be a different causal 
relation from the productive type. In other words, evidence from population studies and evidence 
of  mechanisms turn out to concern different causal relations. And it follows finally, that in the ideal 
case of  infinite randomization for population level RCTs, evidence of  difference making would be 
sufficient to establish causal claims. 
This is directly relevant for the claim c) above, that population studies cannot establish the 
existence of  a mechanism. Given a framework of  ontic causal pluralism and a definition of  
mechanisms as productive only (either concerning mechanistic evidence or concerning mechanistic 
causation ² the consequences are the same), population studies cannot establish the existence of  a 
PHFKDQLVPDQG+RZLFN·VFULWLFLVPKLWVWKHWDUJHW 
,PSRUWDQWO\ LW KLWV WKH WDUJHW HYHQ ZKHQ WDNLQJ LQWR FRQVLGHUDWLRQ ,OOLDUL·V 
disambiguation of  RWT. As stated in the Introduction to this thesis, Illari distinguishes two senses of  
evidential pluralism, with respect to the type of  evidence (either production or difference-making, 
and with respect to the source of  evidence (either population studies or laboratories studies). This 
disambiguation of  the meaning of  evidential pluralism aOVR GLVDPELJXDWHV 5:7 ,Q ,OODUL·V YLHZ
RWT requires no longer evidence of  difference making from population studies and evidence of  
mechanisms (i.e. of  production) from laboratory studies (as in the initial version set out in Russo 
and Williamson, 2007). It requires instead evidence of  difference making that could come either 
from population studies or laboratory studies, and evidence of  mechanisms (i.e. production) that 
could come either from population studies or laboratory studies.  
Yet, this disambiguation is not sufficient to respond to the criticism in c), because 
mechanisms are still considered by Illari as productive only (see also Illari and Williamson, 2011), 
and we have all the consequences of  ontic causal pluralism outlined above. In other words, we are 
told that evidence of  mechanisms could be searched for at the level of  population studies but the 
conceptual terms of  the discussion do not allow that this evidence could ever be found there. If  
mechanisms are concerned with production only, and accordingly with the production type of  
causal relation, how could evidence of  them be found on the level of  populations, which give us 
evidence of  difference-making (probabilistic dependencies established on population studies can 
only mean difference-making), and hence are concerned with the a different type of  causal relation, 
the difference-making one? 
The revised version of  RWT I have proposed, which requires for establishing causal claims 
evidence of  both production and difference-making, while evidence of  production comes from 
laboratory studies, whereas evidence of  difference-making comes from populations studies and 
laboratory studies (on mechanisms), since mechanisms are concerned with both production and 
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difference-making, can withstand the criticism of  claim c), because it is unmistakably grounded in 
ontic causal monism. Hence, in the ideal case in which we would have infinite randomization for 
population level RCTs, the establishing of  the causal relation allows to infer the existence a 
mechanism, producing this same causal relation. 
Interestingly, by insisting that evidence of  population studies could never give us insight into 
the existence of  a mechanism, Howick turns out to adhere implicitly to the framework of  ontic 
causal pluralism - because only in this framework such an inference from population studies to 
mechanisms is impossible. This echoes the point I made earlier in §1 of  the present chapter, that the 
general position of  EBM theorists on the role and value of  mechanistic evidence indicates 
embracing ontic causal pluralism (although an overly conscientious pursuit of  the empiricist ideal of  
¶YDOXH-IUHH·¶REMHFWLYH·VFLHQFHFRXOGDOVREHDWSOD\  
Claim d) is also correct and it hits the target. In certain (rare) cases, evidence of  mechanisms 
is sufficient for establishing causal claims. This contradicts evidently the initial form of  RWT. It is 
however consistent with my revised RWT. Evidence of  a mechanism provides evidence of  both 
production and difference-making, which is just what is required by the revised RWT. These cases 
are rare because, most often, evidence of  difference making coming from mechanisms should be 
backed up by evidence of  difference-making coming from population studies, for the reasons laid 
out at the end of  the previous section. 
And cases of  difficult extrapolation are certainly cases in which we need evidence of  
difference making from both laboratory studies looking at mechanisms, and population studies. We 
DUULYH WKXVDW+RZLFN·VFODLPGZKLFK LVSDUWO\EDVHGRQ a misunderstanding, and partly hits the 
target. It is based on a misunderstanding because the very logic of  RWT demands not that evidence 
of  mechanisms be used alone (even if  the rare cases in which is used alone can be accommodated) 
but that this mechanistic evidence be attended by population studies whenever possible. In my 
scheme, it would also be necessary that one had as great and detailed knowledge of  a mechanism as 
possible (pace Darby and Williamson, 2011). However, claim e) also partly hits the target, because 
RWT proponents have claimed that mere knowledge of  the existence of  a mechanism is sufficient 
for extrapolation purposes (Darby and Williamson, 2011). The latter position is based on a view of  
mechanisms as productive only.  But as I will argue in chapter 5 - ORRNLQJDWDQRWKHURI +RZLFN·V
contributions (Howick et al. 2013) and taking also in account the discussion of  extrapolation in 
Clarke et al (2014) ² we need the difference-making of  mechanisms, in combination with the 
evidence of  difference making from population studies, in order to be able to respond to the 
GLIILFXOWLHVUDLVHGE\+RZLFN·VFULWLTXH 
However, before embarking on the problem of  extrapolation, the next chapter will allow us 
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to take a closer look at the evidential interplay between laboratory and population studies, in the 
RWT terms I have proposed. 
 
Conclusion chapter 3 
I have argued that difference making should be viewed as part of  mechanistic causation. I have 
proposed accordingly a difference-making definition of  what a mechanism is (modifying the 
definition of  Illari and Williamson, 2011) and a revised form of  RWT. I have discussed the problem 
of  pre-emption and I have argued that it does not pose a threat to my view of  mechanisms. Finally, 
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Evidence of  mechanisms 
(production and difference 
making) from laboratory 
studies 
Grading laboratory 
studies evidence of  
mechanisms 
A is making a difference 
to B here. 
A produces B here. 
A is cause of  B 
A is cause of  B in 
this patient. 
Chapter 4 
Chapter 4 argues in favour of  3 interrelated claims.  
 
x Mechanistic knowledge helps to individualise the causal 
factors taken into consideration by population studies. 
x Mechanistic evidence increases the weight of  
population studies evidence and hence contributes to 
the pre-confirmation grading of  its quality.  
x Difference making evidence from the population 
studies increases the weight of  mechanistic evidence 
and hence contributes to the grading of  its quality.   
 
The inferential background used to justify these claims 
concerning the pre-confirmation grading of  evidence is 
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Chapter 4. The weight of  evidence and the evidential interplay between 




The previous chapter has listed a number of  five epistemic advantages of  RWT in the ontic 
framework of  mechanisms as difference-making. These are that I) evidence of  difference making 
from the level of  population studies can usefully complement the evidence of  difference making 
obtained from laboratory experimentation, in order to ensure that pre-emption and analogous 
situations do not distort our assessments of  the causal actions of  mechanisms, III) mechanistic 
evidence could increase the weight of  population studies evidence and hence could contribute to 
the pre-confirmation grading of  its quality, IV) difference-making evidence from the population 
studies could increase the weight of  mechanistic evidence and hence could contribute to the grading 
of  its quality, and V) evidence of  difference-making from population studies could fortify the 
evidence of  difference-making from laboratory in order to identify robust mechanisms, which 
should be better prepared to face the problem of  extrapolation. 
I) was discussed above in the context of  the pre-emption discussion, and we have seen II)-V) 
SUHOLPLQDU\DWZRUNLQWKHDERYHVHFWLRQRQ+RZLFN·VFULWLFLVP of  RWT. However, II)-V) are worth 
further discussion, both in order to clarify their content, and in order to underlie the contrast 
between the revised form of  RWT and the previous use of  RWT, in particular as deployed in Clarke 
et al. 2014. The present chapter will look in more detail at II), III) and IV), while the next chapter 
will take up V) (and also, as we shall see, I), from a different perspective). 
Now, the basic intuition behind II) is that which causal factors are to be ascertained in relation 
to which effects in population studies is substantially influenced by our mechanistic knowledge. In 
turn, the basic intuition behind III) and IV) is that mechanistic evidence from laboratory studies and 
population studies evidence reinforce reciprocally their quality and weight when they cohere. In 
other words - III) evidence of  population studies backed up by detailed mechanistic evidence should 
be qualitatively superior to the evidence of  population studies backed up by poor mechanistic 
evidence, and conversely ² IV) the mechanistic evidence whose findings are reflected in population 
studies assessments should be graded higher than the mechanistic evidence whose findings are not 
reflected in the assessments from the level of  populations.  
Among others, these intuitions should lead us to extend the criteria of  evaluating the quality 
and weight of  mechanistic evidence we have discussed in chapter 2. The Clarke et al. criteria - which 
were analysed and justified in chapter 2 using TIBE (the testimonial usage of  IBE) - concerned 
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strictly the laboratory studies in which mechanistic evidence is obtained. However, given the basic 
thrust of  RWT, we should expect that evidence of  population studies have some role to play as well 
in grading mechanistic evidence (and vice-versa, contrary to the ethos of  EBM). 
One justification for why this mutual reinforcement of  quality and weight of  evidence should 
be in place (or rather, the conceptual possibility of  this mutual reinforcement) was laid out in the 
previous chapter, in relation to the construal of  mechanisms as both productive and difference 
making - in which in which the productive and difference making causal relations of  mechanisms are 
the same ontically as the causal relations reflected epistemically in the dependencies of  population 
studies. This construal of  mechanisms also makes possible the individualization by mechanistic 
knowledge of  the causal factors taken into consideration by population studies.  
In the present (short) chapter, two additional justifications are put forward (maintaining and 
continuing to take advantage of  the construal of  mechanisms as difference-making). One 
justification is straightforward ² the fact that in the practice of  medicine we can actually find this 
mutual reinforcement of  quality, as well as this way of  individualizing the causal factors. The other 
justification uses the framework of  IBE, as in chapter 2 - with the difference that instead of  the 
tHVWLPRQLDO VLGH RI  H[SODQDWRU\ LQIHUHQFHV LW ZLOO DSSHDO WR ZKDW /LSWRQ KDV GXEEHG ¶WKH guiding 
UROH·RI ,%(DVZHOODVWR,%(·VFDSDELOLW\RI WDNLQJLQWRDFFRXQWERWKWKHEDODQFHDQGWKHZHLJKW
of  evidence. 
As it might be recalled from chapter 1, Lipton acknowledged that in most cases of  theory 
confirmation, given its preponderantly qualitative use and conclusions, IBE will not be sufficiently 
fine-grained to allow us to confirm or disconfirm the hypotheses at stake.62Accordingly, Lipton 
afforded to IBE a more modest role, namely that of  guiding, of  pointing out towards the right 
theories. In plain terms, this is not a confirmation role but amounts to a supporting contribution before 
the confirmation stage. However, as it happens, even if  this guiding role cannot be sufficient in 
itself  for confirmation purposes, it suits perfectly the pre-confirmation stage of  grading the quality 
of  evidence with which we have been concerned in chapter 2, i.e. it is perfectly suited as a 
justificatory framework of  the criteria or ¶UXOHV RI  WKXPE· that should point towards quality 
evidence. 
In the particular context of  this chapter, the criterion to be justified is that mechanistic 
evidence backed up by population studies evidence is of  a better quality than mechanistic evidence 
WKDW LV QRW EDFNHG XS E\ HYLGHQFH IURP SRSXODWLRQ VWXGLHV ,W LV DQ ¶H[WHUQDO· FULWHULRQ for 
mechanistic evidence, as it were, LQ FRQWUDVW WR WKH ¶LQWHUQDO· FULWHULD RI  PHFKDQLVWLF HYLGHQFH RI 
                                                        
62 An exception to this are the Inferences to the Only Explanation, which are basically IBEs that apply to particularly 
rich evidence, being able to eliminate the alternative candidate hypotheses and pick out the right one. Chapter 1 has 
provided some exemplifications as applied to mechanistic evidence. 
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Clarke et al. (i.e. criteria that concern solely the laboratory studies). 7KH ¶JXLGLQJXVH·RI  ,%(ZLOO
also justify a corresponding ¶H[WHUQDO· FULWHULRQ for evidence of  population studies, saying that 
population studies evidence backed up by mechanistic evidence is of  better quality than population 
studies not backed up by mechanistic evidence (or less detailed mechanistic evidence).63 
7KHUDWLRQDOHRI MXVWLILFDWLRQIRUERWKRI WKH¶H[WHUQDO·FULWHULDDERYHwill be straightforward. In 
/LSWRQ·V causal interpretation of  IBE, we are of  course seeking to infer the right explanation, but 
JLYHQWKHUROHSOD\HGE\0LOO·VFULWHULDZHFRXOGGLUHFWO\VWDWHWKDWZHDUHORRNLQJIRUWKHFDXVHVRU
causal theories) to explain effects. $QG LWZLOO WXUQRXW WKDW WKH WZR ¶H[WHUQDO· FULWHULD DUH MXVWLILHG
because, at bottom, what they state is that having multiple epistemic ways of  access into the cause 
or into the cause effect-relations, is better than just having one single epistemic way of  access. 
With respect to the form of  argumentation, given the guiding role of  IBE LQ /LSWRQ·s same 
interpretation, IBE will provide the respective justifications by drawing its explanatory conclusions 
with an ¶DVLWZHUH· clause. The argumentative scenario will be to suppose that IBE was allowed to 
pick out the right hypothesis, in cases in which the rival hypotheses seem to have the same balance, 
but a different weight. Again, given the guiding role of  IBE, the fact that hypothesis H1 would be 
picked out by IBE as the right theory (rather than its rivals), will just mean that ¶DVLWZHUH·, theory 
H1 is the confirmed theory. At the pre-confirmation level of  grading evidence of  mechanisms, this 
will actually mean that the evidence in favour of  H1 has more weight than the evidence in favour of  
the rival hypotheses. And this will mean in turn that it is of  a better quality than the evidence in 
favour of  the rival hypotheses - thereby justifying the  WZR ¶H[WHUQDO· FULWHULDRI JUDGLQJHYLGHQFH
mentioned above, which, as I will show, are already (more or less tacitly) employed in medical 
practice. 
In the following chapters, we will move beyond this pre-confirmation level. In chapter 5, the 
¶H[WHUQDO·FULWHULRQRI JUDGLQJPHFKDQLVWLFHYLGHQFHZLOOEHSXWWRXVHIRU extrapolation purposes. In 
FKDSWHUVDQGWKH¶H[WHUQDO·FULWHULRQRI JUDGLQJSRSXODWLRQstudies evidence will be put to use 
for confirmation purposes, in the context of  the collaboration between IBE and the Bayesian theory.  
It should be underlined that in the context of  the present chapter, we just cannot move beyond 
the pre-confirmation levHODQGWKH¶DVLWZHUH·FODXVHRI ,%(FRQFOXVLRQVFDQQRWEHHOLPLQDWHG7KDW
is to say, this guiding use of  IBE cannot be a confirmation use, given the predominantly qualitative 
aspect of  IBE-type inferences. To draw confirmation conclusions, one needs also the quantitative 
aspect, in order to distinguish the cases in which the balance is indeed equal between rival 
hypotheses, to adjudicate in cases in which the balance is not equal, and, when the weight of  
                                                        
63 Or, mechanistic evidence established using less different methodologies. We could employ at this point all the 




evidence comes into play, to reflect this qualitative side of  evidence in quantitative terms. Chapters 6 
and 7 will defend in this respect a form of  collaboration between IBE and Bayesianism, in which 
the explanatory part of  confirmation inferences does justice to the weight of  evidence by 
constraining priors and/or likelihoods, and by increasing the resilience of  hypotheses backed up by 
mechanistic evidence. 
The present (short) chapter then marks our final discussion in the present thesis of  the pre-
confirmation stage, and will be structured as follows. §1 will lay down a necessary, preliminary 
discussion of  the relation between IBE and the weight/balance of  evidence pair of  concepts, using 
as an example an episode from the early history of  atherosclerosis; in addition, it will prepare the 
way to for looking into tacit criteria of  grading evidence that are used in medical practice. §2 will 
look at the evidential interplay between mechanistic studies and population studies, in the 
background of  the revised RWT, showing how the IBE-based assessment of  the weight of  
evidence points towards the reciprocal reinforcement of  quality for mechanistic studies and 
population studies (thus treating points III) and IV) from the above classification of  the epistemic 
advantages of  the revised RWT). Examples will also be drawn from the history of  atherosclerosis 
research. §3  will draw contrast with the previous treatment of  RWT in Clarke et al. (2014) and will 
discuss the way mechanistic knowledge can individualise the causal factors taken into consideration 
by population studies (thus treating point II) from the above classification of  the epistemic 
advantages of  the revised RWT). 
 
§1 IBE and the balance/weight distinction 
As mentioned in the Introduction to this thesis, one of  the crucial conceptual distinctions in 
the epistemology of  evidence is that between the balance and the weight of  the evidence, the latter 
depending crucially on the reliability of  evidential sources (Joyce 2005, Kelly 2008 and 2014). A 
strong balance of  evidence for a certain outcome in a chance set up, for instance, might have little 
weight if  the operation or experiment is performed just a few times. Repeating the experiment 
would have the consequence of  increasing the weight of  the evidence, even if  the same outcome 
was obtained (the balance of  evidence remaining the same). To come back to the causation cases, a 
population level correlation might have a strong balance, and yet, for various reasons, its weight 
might turn out to be quite weak³the size of  the population might be too small, or the other 
potential causal factors might not have been sufficiently screened off  (by not choosing the right 
subjects in a case control or observational study, or by not randomizing and double blinding 
accurately in an RCT). 
It is not very often mentioned that the differentiation between the balance and the weight of  
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evidence was put forward by John Maynard Keynes, who was, among many others, an early 
SURSRQHQW RI  ORJLFDO SUREDELOLWLHV ,Q  .H\QHV ZURWH ¶$V WKH UHOHYDQW HYLGHQFH >IRU D
hypothesis] at our disposal increases, the magnitude of  [its] probability may either decrease or 
increase, according as the new knowledge strengthens the unfavorable or favorable evidence; but 
something seems to have increased in either case³we have a more substantial basis on which to 
rest our conclusion.... New evidence will sometimes decrease the probability of  [the hypothesis] but 
ZLOODOZD\VLQFUHDVHLWV´ZHLJKWµ·.H\QHVS apud Joyce, 2005, p. 158). 
 The worry was that in computing probabilities, one might lose sight of  the qualitative side of  
evidence, of  how reliable the sources of  evidence are. Indeed, initially, Keynes just did not know 
how to incorporate the weight into his formulas (Cohen, 1986, pp. 264-267), with Karl Popper 
alleging subsequently that the notion of  weight gives rise to insoluble paradoxes in the theory of  
probability (O'Donnell, 1992, pp. 44-47). Parenthetically, the balance/weight distinction remains 
problematic for probabilistic theories of  evidence assessment. Bayesian theorists still have problems 
with how to calculate the balance of  evidence (with different measures of  it being proposed),64 and 
continue to be accused often of  not taking (sufficiently) into account the weight of  evidence.65 
Is it the same for IBE? As we have seen in the chapter 1 - when exemplifying the use of  IBE 
in mechanistic laboratory research³ the weight or quality of  evidence is always taken into account 
when inferring the best explanation. Suppose we have two theories H1 and H2 that seem to have the 
same balance. If  H1 is preferred to H2 on explanatory grounds, this means that in the actual process 
of  inferring that H2 explains better the overall evidence than H1, it was already taken into account 
that the sources of  evidence in favour of  H1 were superior in terms of  reliability to the sources of  
evidence in favour of  H2 $V ZH KDYH DOVR VHHQ LQ FKDSWHU  LQ ZKLFK +DUPDQ DQG 3VLOORV·
comparison between enumerative induction and IBE-based ampliative induction was presented, one 
does not first draw the explanatory infeUHQFH WKDW ¶DOO $V DUH %V· RU WKDW ¶$V FDXVH %V· DQG WKHQ
enquire whether the samples in favour of  As being Bs, or of  As producing Bs, are biased or not. 
Whether the samples are biased or not is really part of  the explanatory inference that adjudicates 
between different hypotheses at stake. This is so both for the rare cases in which IBEs allow us to 
actually confirm a hypothesis, by being able to rule out all alternative hypotheses (what I have called 
                                                        
64 For an overview, see for instance, Glass (2012). Since, as mentioned in chapter 1 and chapter 2, I do not take IBE to 
be a rival of  Bayesianism but rather its companion in those situations where the numerical data is not sufficient or the 
evidence is rather qualitative than quantitative, I will not go into the proposals that IBE itself  can offer numerical 
expressions of  the measure of  confirmation, advanced by Glass himself  in his (2007) and (2012), and also more 
recently in by Douven and Wenmackers(2015) and Douven and Schupbach (2015), Douven and Schupbach (2015b) 
interesting as these proposals may certainly be. My purpose in this section is to show that IBE does not have a conceptual 
problem with the balance/weight distinction³in other words, that it can coherently deal with and incorporate these 
aspects of  the evidence.   
65 See for instance Joyce 2005 (and also the discussion in chapter 6). One possible solution for the Bayesian is to derive 
the weight of  evidence from the balance, but it is problematic, since the weight of  evidence entails a qualitative aspect 
that the balance per se does not contain.  
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LQFKDSWHU IROORZLQJ$OH[DQGHU%LUG·V WHUPLQRORJ\,nference to the Only Explanation), and for 
WKH¶DVLWZHUH·FDVHVLQZKLFK,%(VKDYHMXVWDJXLGLQJUROH 
Take an example from the early stages of  the atherosclerosis research - the strong correlations 
noticed in rabbits in early XXth century by Anitschkow and other researchers (like Wesselkin, 
Wacker and Hueck) between the level of  cholesterol and the atherosclerotic lesions in arteries 
(Kritchevsky, 1995). The general medical community did not consider these rabbit findings as 
reliable, good quality source of  evidence. Why? Because, among other things, the atherosclerosis 
results obtained from animal experimentation with various other species were quite ambiguous, i.e., 
the other results either did not show a correlation or showed only a very weak one (Furie and 
0LWFKHOO  S  7KH DUJXPHQW IRU QRW DFFHSWLQJ $QLWVFKNRZ·V ILQGLQJV FRXOG ZHOO EH
interpreted as IBE with a guiding role (where the best available explanation in that period was the 
senescence theory), an inference that would count rabbit experiments in vivo as unreliable source of  
evidence of  mechanism(s).66 
Now, what is rather striking is that how the grading the rabbit evidence as lacking quality (or as 
having a low weight) contributed to the conclusion (drawn by the medical community at the time) 
that the senescence theory is to be preferred was kept more or less tacit. It is a fact that medical 
researchers rarely make entirely plain their rules of  reasoning (or they used to until very recently). 
The situation is not ideal, and we could XVHIXOO\ UHFDOO KHUH 3VLOORV· LURQLFDO FRPPHQWV RQ WKH
search for the Holy Grail of  scientific confirmation and reasoning that seems to be present in 
recent philosophy of  science: one would like to have rules that are transparent and algorithmic, and 
whose following would just be a matter of  grasping their logical form (and the Bayesian theory, 
adds Psillos, seems to respond, at least in part, to this ideal). However, in messy real-life situations, 
in which most often, scientist employ explanatory reasoning, what we have are the (to a certain 
extent) imprecise and tacit models of  the IBE. However, scientific explanations, claims Psillos, are 
imprecise and tacit because they are hardly amenable to an abstract, context-free algorithmic form; 
yet, they should be sufficiently precise insofar as one looks at real-life cases, uses the background 
knowledge of  each science, and pays enough attention the particular whole context experimental 
situations (Psillos 2007, pp. 441-447). 
The case of  medicine certainly seemVWRVXLW3VLOORV·GHVFULSWLRQ7KHUHDUHWDFLWZD\VRI XVLQJ
explanatory inferences in medicine, both with respect to the quality evaluation of  the evidence and 
with respect to the confirmation of  hypotheses. At the same time, this does not mean that one 
should not try, as much as it is possible, to make explicit the explanatory inferential rules at stake, 
even if  one will not be able to reach the ideal of  abstract, context-free rules. In our case, what we 
                                                        
66 Indeed, pace authors like Steinberg, the decision not to accept the lipid theory at that stage of  research and evidence 
was justified.  
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should do is to look in particular at the tacit rules of  evaluating the quality of  evidence, in order to 
make explicit how the evidential interplay between mechanistic studies and population studies is 
explanatorily understood in inferences that take into account the weight of  evidence.  
To illustrate what I mean - when Bradford-Hill articulated his nine criteria of  medical causality 
in 1956, there was, of  course, a clear display of  his gifts as an exceptional statistician. However, at 
the same time, his work spelled out a series of  criteria that were already present in the 
epidemiological medical research³tacitly or less clearly and systematically articulated. As argued in 
chapter 1, IBE in general seems to correspond de facto to scientific research and evaluation. If  then 
there are tacit criteria and rules for taking into account the weight of  evidence with respect to the 
interplay between laboratory studies and population studies, then looking at how IBE reflects 
previous research into mechanisms and population causal claims might well help us to bring to the 
surface and articulate these more or less tacit criteria and rules. It is what we will do in the next 
section. 
 
§2 Weight or quality of  evidence, and the interplay between populations and 
mechanisms 
What I am seeking to make explicit from the history of  atherosclerosis should be no secret to 
the reader by now. I am looking for mutual reinforcement of  quality between laboratory evidence 
and the population studies evidence, as well as illustrations of  the individualisation of  causal factors 
in population studies, driven by mechanistic knowledge (underlined by explanatory reasoning). We 
do not have to look very far. The key moments in this history offer readily relevant material. 
Take first the way in which population studies influenced the mechanistic research. What 
happened was that after the sceptical period of  Anitschkow in the ·VDQG·VDQGDODFNRI 
research activity until after the end of  the WWII D VHULHV RI  SRSXODWLRQ VWXGLHV LQ WKH ·V
maintained interest in the cholesterol hypothesis, even if  there were no major mechanistic 
discoveries in the respective period. The population studies were not conclusive, but they showed 
interesting correlations between the level of  cholesterol and lipids in general, and cardiovascular 
events, sometimes in quite distinct environments and contexts.  
To take the clearest exampleDIDPRXVLQPHGLFDOFLUFOHVVWXG\FDOOHG¶7KH6HYHQ&RXQWULHV·, 
which started in 1958, took into account epidemiological data from countries as diverse as Finland 
and Japan, looking at the correlation between the cholesterol diet intake and the frequency of  
cardiovascular events (Steinberg, 2007, pp. 34-35). Such population studies addressed obviously the 
numerical, quantitative basis of  the correlation between cholesterol (and lipids in general) and 
cardiovascular diseases LHDGGUHVVHGWKH¶EDODQFH·RI WKHHYLGHQFHIRUWKHFKROHVWHUROK\SRWKHVLVVR
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to speak.  But given the diversity of  patients taken into consideration, they addressed also the 
qualitative side of  the evidence LH LWV ¶ZHLJKW· LQ IDYRXU RI  WKH UHVSHFWLYH K\SRWKHVLV $QG WKH
increase in weight brought about by studies such as the Seven Countries study and others (the 
Framingham Heart study, began in 1948, the Minnesota trial, began in 1947) influenced also the 
mechanistic research and evidence. 
 The main problem of  mechanistic evidence, as mentioned in the previous section, was its 
heterogeneity, its decreased qualitative aspect ²although strong correlations were observed in one 
type of  animal experimentation, much weaker or no correlation were observed in the other types of  
animal experimentation, involving other species. In spite of  these problems, research into the 
PHFKDQLVPV DVVRFLDWHG WR FKROHVWHURO FRQWLQXHG LQ WKH ·V DQG WKH ·V, due to the interesting 
results of  population studies. In other words, the increase in weight of  population studies in that 
period, due to the diversity of  evidential sources taken into consideration, transferred onto the 
mechanistic evidence and research, whose problem had been precisely a low weight due to lack of  
diversity in evidential sources. 
Take second the way in which laboratory research advancement influenced the population 
studies. One evident way in which, in general, laboratory research advances (and in which the 
corresponding quality of  evidence increases) is expressed in the Clarke et al criterion of  the number 
of  features known of  a mechanism. Discovering entities or intermediate chains in the mechanism 
itself  - along the micro-structural research on mechanisms whRVH UHOLDQFH RQ 0LOO·V PHWKRGV ,
discussed in the chapter 1, and in perfect agreement with the understanding of  mechanisms as 
difference-making I have outlined in chapter 3 ² increases the weight of  mechanistic evidence. But 
does it not increase also the weight of  population studies evidence?   
It should do so, given that although population studies are a different source of  evidence, it is 
evidence of the same causal relations that laboratory studies are concerned with, in our framework 
of  causal monism. And what the history of  atherosclerosis shows is that, when, starting from the 
mid-·V, more and more chains in the mechanism of  atherosclerosis were discovered (e.g., various 
types of  lipoproteins, the LDL receptor, the scavenger receptor), the hypothesis of  the pathogenity 
of  cholesterol gained more acceptance, even if the general results from the population level remained 
the same (in other words, even if  the balance of  evidence afforded by the population studies 
remained the same; Stehbens, 2001).67As David Steinberg, one of  the scientists involved actively in 
research at that time, observes, one just needed a decently detailed mechanism, in order for the 
                                                        
67 What Stebhens shows is that, due to the success in mechanistic research, the medical community tended to favour the 
trials showing cholesterol significance and to disconsider the trials with different results; see also Ravnskov (1992). 
Unfortunately, the history of  atheroscelosis has had such episodes, and the continued animosity between proponents of  
the general view and contesters did not help much to to clarify the issue of  which studies were (or should have been) 
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causal hypothesis formulated initially by observing correlations on the level of  entire organisms, to 
be accepted (Steinberg, 2007, p. 89).  
Why is it that discovering more intermediate chains within mechanisms contributed to the 
JHQHUDO DFFHSWDQFH RI  WKH FKROHVWHURO K\SRWKHVLV ZKLFKKDG EHFRPH DOUHDG\ LQ WKH ·V D KDUGO\
disputed dogma) and increased the weight of  the evidence in favour of  the cholesterol causal 
claims? On an IBE approach, the answer is straightforward³because mechanisms explain, and the 
more fine-grained a mechanism supporting a certain hypothesis is, the more explanatory the 
hypothesis becomes in comparison with other hypotheses.68 This is guiding IBE inference, that does 
QRWWDNHWKHUHVSRQVLELOLW\RI FRQILUPLQJWKHPRUHH[SODQDWRU\K\SRWKHVLVEXWMXVWLILHVWKH¶H[WHUQDO·
criterion of  grading higher the quality of  evidence from population studies when the evidence from 
laboratory research converges in similar results. 
Why is it that the weight of  evidence of  mechanistic evidence was increased by corroboration 
from population level correlations? Because, an IBE-based answer would go, what we look for in 
evaluating hypotheses is ultimately to find the right causes, or the right causal law in order to explain 
effects, and having two epistemic ways of  access into the causes at hand (i.e. laboratory research 
into mechanisms, and population studies) makes a hypothesis more explanatory when these two 
epistemic sources converge in their results. $QG WKLV MXVWLILHV WKH ¶H[WHUQDO· FULWHULRQ RI  JUDGLQJ
higher the quality of  evidence of  mechanisms from laboratory studies when the evidence from 
population studies converges in similar results.  
Naturally, this reasoning only works in the framework of  the revised RWT given ontic causal 
monism, and when viewing mechanisms as both productive and difference making. In the next 
section, I will compare my scheme RI MXVWLILFDWLRQIRUWKHWZR¶H[WHUQDO·FULWHULDRI JUDGLQJHYLGHQFH
with the treatment of  the interplay mechanisms-population studies provided in Clarke et al (2014), 
in the framework of  the initial RWT, in which mechanisms are viewed as productive only. This will 
allow us to bring to the fore the last advantage of  the revised RWT to be discussed in the present 
chapter, namely the individualisation by mechanistic knowledge of  causal factors dealt with in 
population studies - what was classified in the beginning of  the chapter as the advantage IV) of  the 
revised RWT - and will help us make the transition to the next chapter discussing extrapolation. 
 
§3 Individualisation of  causal factors 
 
In order to see this, consider how this interplay is portrayed in Clarke et al. The authors argue 
that both mechanisms and population level assessments should be taken into account when 
                                                        




evaluating evidence in medicine for two main reasons a) evidence of  population studies can clarify 
complicated mechanistic evidence and b) mechanistic evidence can rule out spurious correlations 
established in population studies.69 In a bit more detail: 
a) when mechanistic evidence is unclear due to the problems of  complexity and masking, 
population correlations could help. The problems of  complexity and masking say that for 
PHFKDQLVPV ZLWK WRR PDQ\ LQWHUQDO SDWKV DQG IRU PHFKDQLVPV FDQFHOOLQJ HDFK RWKHU·V HIIHFWV LW
might be hard to detect the causal relations as such and also the direction of  causal relations 
(whether A causes or prevents B, or has no influence at all on B, or finally, whether B does not in 
fact cause A in turn). In these situations, population studies could provide the net contribution of  a 
putative cause to a putative effect and the direction of  causation. 
 
¶(YHQZKHUH a mechanism linking A to B is well established and known in some detail, it can be hard to infer 
whether A has a positive effect on B, or A prevents B, or indeed whether A has any net effect on B at all. This is 
particularly true in cases where the mechanism is complicated: where there are several links on a pathway from A to B 
or where there are several pathways from A to B. It is also a problem where a mechanism is known to be non-robust 
over time or over other changes in situation. It is typically evidence of  correlation that is crucial for determining 
whether any causation is positive or negative and what the net effect is. Thus evidence of  mechanisms should be used in 
FRQMXQFWLRQ ZLWK HYLGHQFH RI  FRUUHODWLRQ QRW RQ LWV RZQ WR LQIHU FDXVDO FODLPV« 7Ke human body is a complex 
system, and the more we discover about it the more it seems that it is very common to have multiple mechanisms 
operating. If  there are multiple mechanisms operating, they may impact on each other, and one or more may mask the 
effeFWVRI WKHPHFKDQLVP\RXKDYHGLVFRYHUHG·(Clarke et al. 2014, pp. 349-351). 
 
b) in turn, mechanistic evidence can rule out the dangHU RI  ¶IDOVH SRVLWLYH· UHVXOWV due to 
spurious correlations recorded on a population level. This danger arises because positive correlations 
might be due to confounding or accidental co-variation, due to variables that are semantically 
connected, to logical, physical and mathematical connections. In these cases, proof  of  a mechanism 
or of  the non-existence of  a mechanism could UXOHRXW WKH ¶IDOVHSRVLWLYH·FRUUHODWLRQV³the true 
FDXVDOFODLPVDUH¶FOLQFKHG·E\HYLGHQFHRI DPHFKDQLVPClarke et al. 2014, pp 340-351). 
These two points are important and they suit the parts of  the history of  atherosclerosis we 
looked at in the previous. a) After the DPELJXRXVODERUDWRU\UHVXOWVIURP$QLWVFKNRZ·VSHULRGGXH
to the complexity and masking of  the mechanisms at work in different animal models,70 the 
population studies initiated after WWII showed a correlation sufficiently robust between various 
lipidic factors and cardiovascular events to warrant further mechanistic research. b) The plethora of  
mechanistic discoveries of  intermediate chains backed up the above correlations and contributed to 
the increasing acceptance of  the hypothesis that high cholesterol is pathogenic, because the 
                                                        
69There are some other reasons, like the fact that mechanistic knowledge allows the application of  general schemes of  
treatment to particular patients, or that mechanisms help with the problem of  extrapolation. As mentioned, I will look 
at extrapolation in the next chapter, in which I will also consider the views of  Clarke et al on this matter.  
70 Indeed, in those early animal experiments, the ambiguous results were due to the fact that some species possess a very 




presumption of  spurious correlations on the population level was, for the most part, withdrawn.  
Clarke et al have drawn points a) and b) in the framework of  the initial RWT and by viewing 
mechanisms as productive only. There would be several (interconnected) contrasts to underlie (some 
of  which will be developed in the following chapters) when comparing their scheme of  the 
evidential interplay between population studies and mechanistic research with the scheme of  the 
revised RWT. 
The first contrast to be underlined is that, while a) and b) are valid points, which recognised in 
the evolution of  medical knowledge, they could not justified in the scheme of  Clarke et al and in the 
framework of  the initial RWT. As argued in chapter 3, the initial RWT, insofar as it is associated 
with a definition of  mechanisms as productive only is ontically a causal pluralistic account. This 
means that the difference making and the production causal relations are different causal relations. 
Hence, mechanistic evidence could not justifiably bear upon the evidence from population studies, 
and neither the latter could bear upon the former. They could bear upon each other in an ontic 
monistic framework, which entails that mechanisms should also be difference-making. 
The second contrast is that Clarke et al. do not discuss this evidential interplay in terms of  the 
balance/weight distinction, which is present in the analysis provided above as a consequence of  the 
revised RWT. Apparently, a) coUUHVSRQGV LQ FRQWHQW WR ZKDW , KDYH WHUPHG DERYH WKH ¶H[WHUQDO·
criterion of  grading mechanistic evidence, whereas b) seems to correspond in content to what I 
KDYHWHUPHGDERYHDVWKH¶H[WHUQDO·FULWHULRQRI JUDGLQJSRSXODWLRQVWXGLHVHYLGHQFH8QGRXEWHGO\, 
there is an area of  overlap (and, as throughout the present thesis, the work of  Clarke et al has been a 
source of  inspiration, even if, given the necessity to distinguish my claim, it has been the critical part 
that has mostly emerged). But I would maintDLQWKDWWKHXQGHUVWDQGLQJRI WKHWZR¶H[WHUQDO·FULWHULD
in terms of  reciprocal increase of  quality or weight is more fruitful than putting forward the 
establishment of  the nett effect or direction of  causation as a) does, or the ruling out of  spurious 
causation, as b) does. 
As far as a) is concerned, if  adopt the revised RWT understand it as referring to the nett 
difference making (what else could measure as nett the dependencies of  population studies?) then the 
idea of  increase in quality or weight of  the mechanistic evidence makes sense because population 
studies, in conjunction with laboratory research, could be used to differentiate fragile from robust 
mechanisms. A robust mechanism would be a mechanism which manifests its difference making 
even when the causal context changes, as opposed to a fragile mechanism. This might matter 
substantially for the issue of  extrapolation, and I will look at this aspect in more detail in the next 
chapter, chapter 5. 
As far as b) is concerned, there is more to the contribution of  mechanistic evidence to 
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population studies evidence than ruling out spurious causation. Suppose spurious causation is ruled 
out. But is not is more that mechanistic evidence contributes? If  there is an increase in weight, in 
different degree, beyond the stage at which at which spurious causation has been ruled out, then 
this increase of  weight might well matter for confirmation purposes, and I will look at this aspect in 
chapter 6. 
Finally, as far as both a) and b) are concerned, sticking to a definition of  mechanisms as 
productive only makes us loose an important phase in the interplay between population studies and 
mechanisms. It is the phase in which the discoveries from laboratory studies are used to refine and 
focus the enquiries at the population level.  
Recall that according to Clarke et al., the problems of  masking and complexity are problems of  
mechanisms, which can be solved by appeal to population correlations. This is entirely true, but the 
problems of  complexity and masking concern not just mechanisms - these problems could show up 
also at the level of  population assessments. And it might happen, on the contrary, that when the 
issues of  complexity and masking are present on the level of  populations, knowledge of  
mechanisms in turn could help solve these issues from the population level.  
Indeed, what is interesting about the early history of  atherosclerosis is that not all population 
assessments showed proof  of  correlation between the causal factors at stake. Some did not show 
any correlation at all. Whereas, in some cases, this failure to obtain conclusive results can be 
attributed to various set-up biases,71 in other cases, no significant methodological flaws seem to have 
been in place. For instance, the 1968 British Medical Research Council (MRC) Study showed no 
significant benefit at all of  lowering cholesterol for cardiovascular events; in the two groups, the 
difference of  events was 74 versus 62 (Steinberg, 2007, pp. 54-55). Steinberg points out that, due to 
the small number of  patients taken into consideration (400), what the study showed was that the 
effect was less than a 50 percent reduction in cardiovascular events. However, mixed results have 
always existed, and apparently, they tended to be overlooked, especially after the 1970s.72 Moreover, 
real-life examples aside, as a matter of  principle, population level studies, even the most 
sophisticated double blinded randomised ones, cannot always discover correlations.73 This could 
well have been the case in the history of  atherosclerosis research because, in such a complex, 
multifactorial disease³involving several systems, including the metabolic and the cardiovascular 
                                                        
71 For instance, consider the lack of  patient compliance in the Finnish Mental Hospitals Study, 1968, which reached 
levels of  significance for women in just one of  the hospitals. Similar lack of  compliance was reported for the Minnesota 
Coronary Survey, 1968 (Steinberg 2007, pp. 36-37) 
72 Even in 1992, Ravnskov ZDVDUJXLQJ LQ WKH%ULWLVK0HGLFDO -RXUQDO WKDW ¶DSDUW IURP WULDOVGLVFRQWLQXHGEHFDXVHRI 
alleged side effects of  treatment, unsupportive trials were not cited after 1970, although their number almost equaled 
WKH QXPEHU FRQVLGHUHG VXSSRUWLYH« >$@XWKRUV Rf  papers on preventing coronary heart disease by lowering blood 
FKROHVWHUROYDOXHVWHQGWRFLWHRQO\WULDOVZLWKSRVLWLYHUHVXOWV·(Ravnskov, 1992, pp. 15-19). 
73 See Worall (2007), Worall (2010) for discussion. 
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system, and lifestyle and diet elements³taking into account all the causal factors involved was (and 
perhaps still is) very difficult.  
What this suggests, again, is that the problems of  complexity and masking can manifest 
themselves not only at the level of  mechanisms but also on the level of  population correlations, i.e., 
WKDWWKHVHSUREOHPVFDQ¶SURSDJDWH·IURPWKHPLFUostructural level to the macrostructural one. Two 
mechanisms can cancel or mask each other, and the pathways of  a mechanism might be so 
complicated that the nett result and difference making is not visible on a population level. It is for 
this reason that, in the overall interplay, mechanistic discoveries can help population assessments not 
just by singling out, among the positive results of  populations studies, the ones that are truly causal 
DQGKHQFHUXOLQJRXWWKH ¶IDOVHSRVLWLYH·UHVXOWV0HFKDQLVWLFdiscoveries can also help population 
assessments by reconfiguring the space of  causal hypotheses when the results from the population 
level are inconclusive, or even show no correlation at all.  
A good example is the case of  the 1969 Wadsworth Veterans Administration Hospital Study, in 
which due to the fact that strokes and advanced peripheral arterial disease were not included among 
the putative effects of  atherosclerosis, the results did not reach statistical significance. Once 
evidence of  mechanisms was gained showing that cerebral strokes are also consequences of  
atherosclerosis, the results of  the study were retrospectively evaluated as statistically relevant 
(Steinberg 2007, pp. 184-186). Yet another case in point is the whole array of  population studies 
that followed the discovery of  lipoproteins, the LDL receptor, the scavenger receptor, and the other 
crucial mechanistic chain in the physiopathology of  atherosclerosis (Steinberg, 2007, pp. 102-104). 
A final observation that is in order here is that the FDVHRI WKH¶SURSDJDWLRQ·RI WKHSUREOHPV
of  masking and complexity to the level of  population studies could be easily overlooked if  one 
adopts a definition of  mechanisms as productive only, given ontic causal pluralism that follows from 
the latter positLRQ:K\WKHUHFRXOGEHD¶SURSDJDWLRQ·RI WKHSUREOHPVRI PDVNLQJDQGFRPSOH[LW\
to population studies is clear, if  one adopts the definition of  mechanisms as both productive and 
difference-making, and one insists accordingly that the mechanistic causal relations are the same 
relations that are reflected epistemically in population level studies. If  these causal relations are the 
same, then whatever epistemic problem might show up at one level of  epistemic access into these 
relations, i.e. the laboratory studies into mechanisms, could also show up at the other level of  
epistemic access into these relations, i.e. the population studies. 
And, with respect to the issue of  mechanisms and pre-emption, which we discussed in the 
previous chapter, it is somehow ironical that mechanistic knowledge could help solving the 
problems of  complexity and masking from the level of  populations. The existence of  possible pre-
emption, as well as of  analogous problems like complexity and masking, was brought forward by 
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proponents of  the initial RWT as part of  the argument that mechanisms are productive only and 
that accordingly we need the difference-making of  population studies in order to solve or 
compensate for this problems (Russo and Williamson, 2007, and also Clarke et al. 2014). The 
argument is ingenious, and I have also appealed to a form of  it in chapter 3, in order articulate the 
epistemic advantage I) of  the revised RWT. To briefly recall, I) states, on the hand, that when 
experimental interventions are not possible in order to make manifest the difference-making of  
particular mechanisms, one can appeal epistemically to the overall difference-making of  entire 
organisms, assessed by population studies, in order to establish overall causal claim, and on the 
other hand, that, even when experimental interventions are possible, one can use population studies 
to eliminate confounding and make manifest the difference-making of  mechanisms. 
However, to come back to our present discussion - JLYHQWKHLVVXHRI WKH¶SURSDJDWLRQ·RI WKe 
problems of  complexity and masking at the level of  population, we are facing a complementary 
scenario in which, on the contrary, it is the causal knowledge from the level of  mechanisms that 
could help disentangle complexity and masking from the population level. In such a complementary 
scenario, if  there are experimental interventions that can solve the problems of  masking and 
complexity, and/or that discover additional, intermediate chains in mechanistic interactions, the 
mechanistic knowledge thereby acquired can pull population studies out of  the limbo of  
ambiguous, inconclusive results by reconfiguring the space of  causal hypotheses, individualising the 
causal factors taken into account and/or controlled for in population studies, and helping to divide 
the tested population into the right groups. 
This is also a sort of  increase in the weight of  evidence brought about by mechanistic studies. 
One consequence of  it, which I will look at in chapter 7, is that explanatory considerations drawn 
from such mechanistic studies could be used to constrain the priors and the likelihood of  
hypotheses adjudicated by the Bayesian theory of  confirmation. 
 
Conclusion chapter 4 
I have shown that IBE can deal with the balance/weight distinction, and that the revised form 
of  RWT can reveal to us three interesting features of  the interplay between mechanistic studies and 
population studies - which is what was designated in the previous chapter as epistemic advantages 
II), III) and IV) of  the revised RWT. I have argued that - II) mechanistic knowledge could help to 
individualise the causal factors taken into consideration by population studies, that - III) mechanistic 
evidence could increase the weight of  population studies evidence and hence could contribute to 
the pre-confirmation grading of  its quality, and that - IV) difference-making evidence from the 
population studies could increase the weight of  mechanistic evidence and hence could contribute to 
the grading of  its quality.  
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From the next chapter on, our discussion moves from the pre-confirmation level of  grading 
evidence to the level of  establishing and extrapolating causal claims. But the results and lines of  
reasoning of  the present chapter will be taken up, heuristically used and continued.  
The next chapter will take up the epistemic advantage IV) stating that population studies could 
increase the weight of  mechanistic evidence, and will show how the evidence of  difference-making 
from population studies could fortify the evidence of  difference-making of  mechanisms, such that 
the latter be better prepared to face the problem of  extrapolation ² the latter being, in our 
classification of  the advantages of  the revised RWT, the epistemic advantage V). 
Chapter 6 will take up the epistemic advantage III) stating that mechanistic evidence could 
increase the weight of  population studies evidence, and will argue, in the framework of  a 
collaborative use of  IBE and Bayesianism for confirmation purposes, that VI) - the increase of  
weight brought about by mechanistic evidence would influence the resilience of  probabilities 
functions of  hypotheses established by the Bayesian theory taking into account population studies 
evidence.  
Finally, chapter 7 will take up the epistemic advantage II) stating that mechanistic knowledge 
could help to individualise the causal factors taken into consideration by population studies, and will 
argue, in the framework of  the same collaborative use of  IBE and Bayesianism for confirmation 
purposes, that VII) - mechanistic evidence could be used employed to constrain the prior and/or 
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 The present chapter aims to have a closer look at the problem of  extrapolation, which, as we 
have seen in chapter 3, is the subject of  one of  the main charges advanced by Howick in his 2011 
against RWT. The subject deserves a closer look because RWT strictly speaking, has been 
concerned with establishing causal claims. On the other hand, RWT proponents have spoken to a less 
extent about the claims of  extrapolation. I aim to show that my construal of  mechanisms as 
difference-makers can throw new light on the problem of  extrapolation as well, and can show us in 
a clear way how RWT extends in such cases (which is what was designated in the previous chapter 
as epistemic advantage IV) of  the revised RWT). Finally, this chapter aims to put more flesh onto 
the bones of  one crucial criterion of  grading mechanistic evidence advanced by Clarke et al., namely 
WKH FULWHULRQRI  ¶UREXVWQHVVIUDJLOLW\· DQG VKRZVKRZ WKLV FULWHULRQ FDQEHXVHIXOO\ XQGHUVWRRG LQ
relation to the problem of  extrapolation.  
Generally speaking, in the philosophy of  science, the problem of  extrapolation is the 
problem of  using results obtained in specific testing contexts, in order to justify inferences about 
the same results holding in untested, target contexts. This problem has been discussed from various 
and detailed perspectives(Guala 2010, Jimenez-Buedo 2011, Cartwright 2007) and the discussion has 
received a vital impulse through 'DQLHO6WHHO·VZRUNRQSURFHVV-tracing (Steel, 2008), which claims 
that a suitable use of  mechanism can solve this problem, although serious criticism has been 
mounted against his approach (Reiss 2009 and 2010).  
In the philosophy of  medicine, the basic insight behind the whole mechanisms has followed 
6WHHO·VDSSURDFKDQGFRXOGEH UHVXPHGDV IROORZV - given certain causal results, obtained either in 
laboratories (animal experimentation or other physiopathological assessments), and/or in controlled 
studies, these causal results could be justifiably extrapolated for other target populations, if  we knew 
that the testing and the target contexts share similar mechanisms (Thagard 1999, Steel 2010). 
Proponents of  RWT have follows the same line (Darby and Williamson 2011, Clarke et al 2014). In 
addition to his (2011) criticism of  RWT - which touches upon the problem of  extrapolation, as we 
have seen in the previous chapter - Howick also has authored, in collaboration, a large-scale critique 
addressed exclusively to the use of  mechanisms in extrapolation (Howick, Glasziou, Aronson 2013). 
This critique synthesizes both the JHQHUDO GLIILFXOWLHV RI  6WHHO·V DSSURDFK DQG also takes into 
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account the particularities of  medical mechanisms.  
Howick et al. argue in their (2013) that our understanding of  mechanisms is often 
incomplete, that medical mechanisms can behave erratically, DQG WKDW 6WHHO·V ZHOO-known 
methodology of  process tracing fails. The criticism in Howick et al. (2013), as I will show, is 
successful when applied to the very brief  treatment of  extrapolation provided by RWT proponents 
in Clarke et al (2014). My main proposal in this chapter is that, when viewing mechanisms as 
difference-making, the revised RWT has a natural extension for the realm of  extrapolation, and can 
withstand this criticism. This extension of  the revised RWT says that, when dealing with such 
untested, target contexts, one needs evidence from both mechanistic studies and population-studies, 
in order to circumscribe robust mechanisms - where robust mechanism are mechanisms whose 
difference-making is manifested, or is likely to be manifested, even when the causal context changes.  
The reason why the extension of  the revised RWT can withstand the Howick et al (2013) 
criticism is that both Howick et al and the proponents of  6WHHO·VDSSURDFKDVVXPHWKHFRQVWUXDORI 
mechanistic causation as being just production. Accordingly they miss an aspect of  mechanistic 
causation that should be vital for extrapolation claims (an indication of  this being that the very form 
of  extrapolating claims is counterfactual ² were an organism with such and such mechanism be 
present in such and such different circumstances, it will produce such and such effects). 
The main argument I will defend in this chapter - that the evidence of  difference-making from 
population studies could fortify the evidence of  difference-making of  mechanisms and accordingly 
circumscribe robust mechanisms which are better prepared to face the problem of  extrapolation ²
takes up and continues the argument from the previous chapter on the epistemic advantage II) of  
the revised RWT ² namely that population studies could increase the weight of  mechanistic 
evidence. 
The plan of  the present chapter is as follows. In §1, I present the problem of  extrapolation in 
more detail, appealing most importantly to the pivotal contribution of  Steel (2008) as well as to the 
criticisms raised in Howick et al. (2013).  In §2, I look at a case study proposed in Clarke et al. 
(2014),and show that the criticism raised in Howick et al. (2013) applies to their case study and 
discussion as well. In §3, I discuss why viewing mechanisms as difference makingshould allow us to 
better conceptualise the problem of  extrapolation. In §4, I come back to the case study provided by 
Clarke et al.(2014), and show that it can be more charitably understood as adequately describing the 





§1 Extrapolation and mechanisms in medicine 
When are we warranted to extrapolate our causal claims, i.e. to use causal results obtained in 
specific testing contexts in order to in order to infer that the same results hold in untested, target 
contexts?74 The paradigmatic cases of  concern for extrapolation are those of  experiments made in 
the highly protective media of  laboratories, whose results might or might not hold outside 
laboratories, in untested contexts. The behaviour of  electrons, for instance is of  course well 
established for any potential interaction, in the isolated media of  experimentation. But outside such 
media, the behaviour might be different, and Nancy Cartwright has illustrated how this change of  
behaviour RXWVLGH WKH WHVWLQJ DUHD PLJKW WDNH SODFH &DUWZULJKW·V  SS -61). In fact, 
Cartwright has made the point from very early on in her research that such erratic behaviour might 
show up for the entities and activities we are accustomed to think as governed by the immutable 
laws of  physics (Cartwright, 1983). Since her work initially dealt with physics, her worries on 
extrapolation problems might have seem to some commentators as exaggerated or rhetorical (e.g. 
Kline and Matheson, 1986). However, in the special sciences, the issues of  extrapolation are clearly 
present, and they need to be dealt with. It is still Cartwright who was among the first to draw 
attention to the pitfalls of  engineering social and economic policies and applying them to contexts 
in which local factors might render them either inefficient or harmful (Cartwright 1999, 2010).    
In medicine, the problem of  extrapolation shows up both for population studies (RCTs 
included) and for the results of  laboratory experiments. All results of  animal experimentation, as 
well as of  biochemical, biophysical, genetic, physio-pathological experiments (on the side of  
laboratory research research) and all results of  controlled studies made in order to test drugs and 
prophylactic measures, etc., (on the side of  population level research) - all can be subject to the 
worry of  extrapolation. How can we make sure that when we move from the tested to the untested 
contexts the causal relations we have established remain the same? The thought is that, in principle, 
the test and the target contexts should share approximately similar mechanisms. But then the difficulty 
just seems to resurface on a different level. How can we make sure that these two types of  context 
share similar mechanisms?  
One option would be to study in detail the mechanisms in the target context. However, in 
this case, the whole point of  trying to extrapolate causal claims seems to vanish, and the research 
done initially in the testing context appears to be redundant. It would be redundant because we 
                                                        
74 The same problem is sometimes formulated in WHUPVRI ´YDOLGLW\µDVWKHSUREOHPRI XVLQJWKH´LQWHUQDOYDOLGLW\µRI 
WHVWUHVXOWVWRMXVWLI\LQIHUHQFHVUHJDUGLQJWKHLU´H[WHUQDOYDOLGLW\µ,QOLJKWRI  Jimenez-%XHGR·VFKDOOHQJHWRWKH
biased utilisation of  the concepts of  ´LQWHUQDOYDOLGLW\µDQd ´H[WHUQDOYDOLGLW\µ, I will speak from now on in terms of  
extrapolating causal claims from tested contexts (i.e. the results inferred from certain experiments in well-circumscribed 
circumstances) to untested, or target contexts (see Jimenez-Buedo 2011, pp. 274²275). I will make an exception from this 
terminological usage when directly quoting or paraphrasing the authors I discuss, who trust for the most part the 
concept of  validity.  
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would not anymore project the causal relations from the testing context into the target one, but we 
would directly establish the existence and nature of  these causal relations in the target. This is what 
'DQLHO 6WHHO KDV GXEEHG DV WKH SUREOHP RI  ´H[WUDSRODWRU·V FLUFOHµ (Steel, 2008, p. 4). A related 
challenge is that the mechanisms in the study and target context might be just partly similar (as 
often is the case in animal experimentation for human medical purpose) and yet this partial 
similarity might just be sufficient in some cases to back up extrapolation claims, provided that the 
differences between the mechanisms in the target and in the study context are not significant. But 
then, when are suFKGLIIHUHQFHVVLJQLILFDQWDQGZKHQWKH\DUHQRW"7KLVLVDJDLQLQ6WHHO·VWHUPVWKH
´SUREOHPRI GLIIHUHQFHVµSteel 2008, 78²79).  
 $FFRUGLQJ WR 6WHHO·V SURFHVV WUDFLQJ DSSURDFK ZKDW RQH QHHGV WR GR LV ILUVW WR OHDUQ WKH
mechanism in the model organism by reconstructing step-by-step the production paths between 
end points (either initial cause or final effect) and identifying intermediary nodes. Then, instead of  
an overall comparison with the mechanism in the target population, one selects for comparison 
specific stages and nodes, which background knowledge indicates as most likely to differ between 
the model and the target. The nodes selected for comparison could often be situated close to the 
end-point, or to final output of  the mechanism in question. The rationale is that differences 
upstream the nodes in question matter only if  they generate differences further downstream. If  the 
mechanistic production issued at these critical points or nodes is similar, this offers a warrant for the 
extrapolation claim. If  the production is dissimilar, the extrapolating claim should be viewed with 
greater suspicion. Admittedly, by looking just at the critical nodes, we leave aside what is going on 
upstream in the mechanism. But that is the catch. One needs not know everything about the 
PHFKDQLVPLQWKHWDUJHWLQDGYDQFHDQGWKH´H[WUDSRODWRU·VFLUFOHµDSSHDUVWREHDYRLGHG6LPLODUO\
since the relevance of  any differences upstream the critical nodes only matters if  the output at the 
FULWLFDOQRGH LVPRGLILHG WKH´SUREOHPRI GLIIHUHQFHVµDOVRVHHPV WREHDYRLGHG Steel 2008, pp. 
89-90). 
6WHHO·VSURSRVDOKDVIDFHGYDULRXVREMHFWLRQV2QHVHWRI REMHFWLRQVKDYHEHHQSXWIRUZDUG
by Howick, Glasziou and Aronson, who argue that his process tracing does not avoid the 
´extrDSRODWRU·V FLUFOHµ Against Steel, Howick et al. argue that the method of  process-tracing 
depends on knowledge of  whether the significant nodes have been chosen for comparison between 
model and target (as for instance, in order to rule out that intervening on the mechanism under 
study does not trigger an alternative mechanism whose production goes downstream by bypassing 
the node in question and changing the final output). However, such knowledge can only be obtained 
by studying in detail the target and evaluating the consequences of  intervening upon the mechanism 
under study. In other words, either the process-tracing does not work as a method for extrapolating 
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causal claim (in case the desideratum not to know in detail the mechanism in the target is 
maintaLQHGRURQHKDV WRGURSWKHDERYHGHVLGHUDWXPDQGRQHIDOOV LQWR WKHH[WUDSRODWRU·VFLUFOH
(Howick et al. 2013, pp. 283, 286). 
More generally, Howick et al. argue that in medicine mechanisms cannot solve the problem 
of  extrapolation, because it is rarely possible to identify all relevant mechanisms, because studies of  
mechanisms themselves (whether in animals or humans) suffer from their own problems of  
external validity, and finally because mechanisms can behave erratically. First of  all, ignorance of  all 
relevant mechanisms is proven by recent medical history. For instance, based on mechanistic 
considerations, patients were treated anti-arrhythmic drugs after myocardial infarction, which a 
clinical trial showed to increase significantly the mortality from arrhythmias or cardiac arrest, as well 
as the all-cause mortality (Howick et al. 2013, pp. 282-283). Then, studies of  mechanisms themselves 
suffer from their own problems of  external validity because they are not governed by the type of  
universal laws we find in the exact sciences. Whereas most definitions of  mechanisms in the 
philosophical literature emphasize regularity and stability of  the final output, medical research 
shows that results obtained in laboratory research do not always show up in evaluations on a 
population level, as in the case of  the putative capacity of  Hypericum perforatum 6W-RKQ·VZRUWWR
reduce the concentration of  androgenic steroids, by inducing the activity of  cytochrome P450 
isoenzymes. Finally, the lack of  regularity and stability is epitomised by the paradoxical behaviour of  
certain drugs, which can worsen the condition they were supposed to alleviate, as for instance the 
antidepressants or antiepileptic drugs (Howick et al. 2013, p. 284).  
Now, Howick et al·VFULWLFLVPVDUe powerful, but not decisive. They also seem to apply, as I 
will show in the next section, to the case study provided in one of  the latest contributions of  RWT 
proponents, namely Clarke et al. 2014, to which I turn next, before moving on to show, in §3, §4 and 
§5 why, after all, Howick et. al.·VDUJXPHQWVDUHQRWGHFLVLYHLQWKHIUDPHZRUNRI 5:7 
 
§2 Clarke HWDO·s case-study 
 
  In its primary scope, RWT is concerned with establishing causal claims. In Clarke et al. 2014, 
RWT proponents also discuss, albeit briefly, the problem of  extrapolation. Since my approach to 
this problem supposes the framework of  the (revised) RWT, I need to touch here upon their own 
treatment as well.  
Citing Steel, the authors maintain that mechanistic evidence has a role in ascertaining the 
external validity, as it can indicate how medical drugs and measures work or should work in the test 
population, and whether, and to what extent, mechanisms from the test population are also present 
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in the target population. As an illustration, they take the case of  the hypertension treatment with 
calcium-channel blockers (CCBs). The example is important, and I provide below the full quote.  
 
´0HFKDQLVWLF evidence helps to ascertain the external validity of  treatments. Mechanistic evidence can indicate how the 
intervention works (or is supposed to work) in the test population, and whether, and to what extent, such mechanisms 
are also present in the target population (i.e. outside the trial) ² see Steel (2008). A good example of  this can be seen in 
clinical guidelines governing prescribing practices for anti-hypertensive drugs in the UK. Recent research has suggested 
that different drugs should be used for patients from different ethnic groups. NICE guidelines therefore state that 
treatment should differ depending on ethnicity: Offer step 1 anti-hypertensive treatment with calcium-channel blocker 
(CBB) to people aged over 55 and to black people of  African or Caribbean family origin of  any age... (NICE 2011c, p.5) 
This recommendation was based on RCTs that had been designed to test the efficacy of  different treatments in these 
ethnic groups. In turn, these trials were based upon the plentiful evidence suggesting the operation of  different pro-hypertensive mechanisms 
operating in different ethnic groups (see NICE 2011b, pp. 248-DQGFLWDWLRQVµ&ODUNHet. al. 2014, p.347, italics added 
 
According to Clarke et al., this anti-hypertension guideline was based on RCTs testing the 
efficacy of  drugs in different ethnic groups and ages (in this regard being cited the study of  
Kshirsagar 2006, which showed a higher risk of  hypertension for older people and people of  
African or Caribbean family origin). In turn, Clarke et al., claim that these RCTs were based on 
evidence of  different mechanisms for hypertension in different ethnic groups. That is to say, according to 
Clarke et al., this evidence of  such different mechanisms for hypertension should have been pivotal 
in extrapolating claims about the efficacy of  calcium-blockers (CBBs) from the model of  their test 
population, to the groups of  elderly, Caribbean and Afro-American patients, with RCTs playing the 
role of  control for this basically mechanistic extrapolation claim.  
Clarke et al. are entirely right that in the last decade at least, medical research has furnished 
us plentiful mechanistic evidence not just suggesting, but proving the operation of  different pro-
hypertensive mechanisms in different age and ethnic groups. But if  we look further in the history of  
cardiological treatments, what we discover is that it was not the mechanistic evidence which triggered 
a specific treatment for these special groups. It was, on the contrary, the failure of  an extrapolation 
claim, based on apparently well-established mechanistic evidence for the use of  beta-blockers (BBs), 
i.e. the drugs used before the CBBs.  
  BBs have an interesting history of  their own which I should briefly recall, since their other 
uses are yet another illuminating illustration of  how apparently safe mechanistic knowledge can hide 
epistemic surpULVHVDQGDUHDOVRVXJJHVWLYHRI DFHUWDLQDXUDRI ´ZRQGHUGUXJµ WKDW%%VXVHG WR
possess. BBs were synthesized in 1962, following the discovery of  the beta receptor in 1948, and 
were used initially to reduce stress in patients with angina pectoris, and also for arrhythmias. In the 
HDUO\ ·V WKH\ VWDUWHG WR EH XVHG DV DQWL-hypertensive treatment with evident success. The 
PHFKDQLVPZDVIDLUO\ZHOOXQGHUVWRRG%%VGLPLQLVKHGWKHKHDUWV· capacity to pump by decreasing 
the simulating action of  the sympathetic system over the cardiac muscles.  
It is worth recalling briefly from chapter 2 that beta-blockers even came to be used in heart 
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failure ² that is to say, in a clinical context in which the heart pumps much less blood than normal. 
Previously, they were formally contraindicated in heart failure (how could one use a drug that 
decreases the pump function when there is already not enough pumping?). In other words, the 
mechanistic knowledge available at the time was entirely against their use in conditions with 
diminished ejection rate of  the heart. The beneficial effect in heart failure was discovered 
accidentally, in 1973, when it was administered to a 59 year-old woman patient with tachycardia 
caused by acute pulmonary oedema owing to dilated cardiomyopathy, and this dramatically 
improved her condition (Waagstein, 1975). Increasingly complex clinical trials confirmed the 
beneficial effect in heart failure, and this entailed substituting or complementing the paradigm of  
the mechanism of  heart failure in itself  and its treatment ² from a hemodynamic model to a neuro-
hormonal model (Davies & Bashir, 1999). 
However, to return to the case of  hypertension ² there were clinical UHSRUWV LQWKHODWH·V
that BBs do not work well for people of  African or Caribbean origin (Saunders, 1988). This was 
confirmed by trials, the first being the so-called Veterans trial in 1982. There was no inkling of  a 
mechanism, except for the very general fact that drugs can act differently on different ethnic groups. 
Hence, the fourth Joint National Committee in 1988 issued the recommendation to substitute 
diuretics for BBs (with CCBs being a supplement), as first line of  treatment, in African-American 
and older patients. This recommendation was maintained even when later angiotensin-converting 
HQ]\PH$&(LQKLELWRUVFDPHLQYRJXHLQWKHPLG·VDOEHLWIRUGLIIHUHQWUHDVRQV² one needed 
between 2 and 4 times the same dose of  an ACE inhibitor to produce in an African-American 
patient the same effect as in Caucasian patients (Weir et al. 1998). The same change from beta-
blockers to CBBs happened for elderly patients, sometime later, at the fifth Joint National 
Committee in 1996, with some studies suggesting that beta-blockers might even be detrimental in 
the long run (Messerly et al., 1998, Khan & McAlister, 2006, Bangalore et al. 2007). 
Of  course, mechanistic explanations were subsequently discovered. On the one hand, the 
profile of  elderly hypertension is that of  a low cardiac output and high peripheral resistance. On the 
other hand, African-American patients tend to have low renin levels, higher sensitivity to sodium, 
reduced Na+/K+ ATPase activity, and expansion of  plasma volume. More recently, the responsible 
genes were also identified, amongst which a different gene for the beta receptor (Johnson 2006).  
However, my point here is that the history of  this use of  BBs (and of  their substitution with 
CBBs) suggests that Clarke et al.¶V K\SHUWHQVLRQ H[DPSOH LV not a case in which mechanisms 
contributed decisively to the problem of  extrapolation by triggering differentiated treatments for 
specific groups. It suggests, on the contrary, that it was a case in which BBs, whose mechanism was 
fairly well known, encountered the problem of  extrapolation, and it was in response to this problem 
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that the CCBs were substituted for them in the above-mentioned guidelines.  
Indeed, it might perhaps be also worth mentioning that CCBs have had in their history 
problems of  extrapolation as well, since it was discovered that short-acting CCBs increase the 
chances of  cardiac infarction, especially for young patients with non-atherosclerotic lesions, due to 
paradoxical stimulation of  arterial contraction. Yet another finding was that they increase the risk of  
death for patients, when administered post myocardial infarction or for unstable angina (Psaty et al. 
1995, Furberg et al. 1995).   
In the end, the sort of  example used by Clarke et al. seems to play directly into the hands of  
the criticism provided by Howick et al. It is an example in which BBs (and short-acting CBBs) acted 
erratically, or did not act at all, or acted insufficiently in certain circumstances, even if  the 
mechanistic evidence at that time did not have anything specific to say about these circumstances. 
Of  course, it has been known that specific age and ethnic groups might have clinically-significant 
particularities in their response to medical treatments, but this sort of  general knowledge is 
tantamount to the knowledge (and worry) that problems of  extrapolation might exist. And it is one 
thing to have the worry of  extrapolation, and another to trigger measures such that it could be 
prevented or mitigated. 
 In the line adopted in Howick et al. 2013, one can always formulate the following meta-
induction: if  the previous set of  drugs, based on mechanistic evidence, failed, then we have no 
assurance that the next set of  anti-hypertensive drugs will always work, or do no harm. And, further 
on, if  this is the case for anti-hypertensive drugs, then it could be the case for any other drugs or 
other medical treatments. I now turn to my positive suggestion, which is advanced in the broad 
framework of  the initial RWT, but views mechanisms as difference-making and hence follows the 
revised RWT proposed in chapter 3. 
 
§3 Mechanisms as difference making and a new look at extrapolation 
 
Howick et al. seem to leave us in a dire situation as to the extrapolation problem, at least as 
far as mechanisms are concerned. As they warn at the end of  their (2013) SDSHU $´SRVVLELOLW\WKDW
has been implied throughout this paper is that we have to learn to live with a much higher degree of  
uncertainty and scepticism about the effects of  many medical interventions, even those whose 
effects have been established in well-FRQWUROOHGSRSXODWLRQVWXGLHVµS%XWSHUKDSVWKHUHLVa 
better way of  thinking about this problem. The philosopher of  science should, of  course, be 
extremely careful when advancing proposals to tackle the issue of  extrapolation, and tragic examples 
such as that of  Thalidomide (Howick et al 2013, p. 283) should always be borne in mind as a 
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reminder that serious dangers might be associated to medical treatments. But at the same time, there 
is something that does not feel exactly right about the arguments typified by Howick et al in their 
(2013). 
For instance, in the example discussed above from Clarke et al. (2014) ² which I tried to do 
justice as much as I could to Howick et al.·VOLQHRI DUJXPHQWDWLRQ- one cannot help but think that 
after all, the hypertensive treatment is one of  the most detailed and efficient treatments in modern 
medicine. Similarly, the associated (anti-) hypertensive mechanisms are nowadays part of  the most 
well known physiopathological schemes. Again, clinical medicine is no place for philosophers to 
brazenly throw in radical proposals and re-interpretations (and PhD students should be even more 
careful), but I think the view proposed in this thesis of  mechanistic causation as both productive 
and difference-making could throw some light on the problem of  extrapolation. The purpose here 
is nRW WR ¶VROYH· WKHSUREOHPRI H[WUDSRODWLRQ ZKLFK LV\HWDQRWKHUVXEMHFW WKDWZRXOGUHTXLUHDQ
entire thesis to develop) but to suggest that by paying attention to what happens in medical practice, 
and by adopting the correct view of  mechanistic causation, we might be able to conceptualise more 
properly what the problem of  extrapolation is and what its possible solutions might be. 
As mentioned in chapter 3, most philosophers of  science differentiate mechanistic causation 
from difference-making causation, maintaining that mechanisms act by production only (Williamson 
2011; Illari and Russo, 2014; Craver and Tabery, 2015). Howick et al. are no exception, providing in 
the beginning of  their paper a list of  the production accounts of  mechanisms current in the literature 
(Howick et al.  S  7KH\ ODWHU GHILQH ¶PHFKDQLVWLF UHDVRQLQJ· DV DQ LQIHUHQFH DERXW DQ
intervention producing an effect ² which inference, since mechanisms as understood in terms of  
production, just articulates the attempt to use production in order to ground, among others, 
extrapolation claims. ´Regardless of  how they are characterized, mechanisms must have some action 
if  they are to be used to support claims that an intervention produces some effect. Following 
SUHYLRXV ZRUN ZH GHILQH ¶PHFKDQLVWLF UHDVRQLQJ· DV DQ LQIHUHQFH DERXW DQ LQWHUYHQWLRQ·V FOLQLFDO
effect from alleged knowledge of  relevant mechanisms and how they relate to one anotheUµ 
(Howick et al. 2013, p. 279). Admittedly, there is a grain of  difference-making in the way Howick et 
al. GHILQH ´PHFKDQLVWLF UHDVRQLQJµ VLQFH WKH\ PDNH XVH WKH ODQJXDJH RI  DQ ´LQWHUYHQWLRQµ 7KLV
grain of  difference-making is not developed at all, however. Nor are Howick et al discussing at all 
the very distinction between production and difference making, setting aside any foray into the 
VSHFLILFIXQFWLRQLQJRI PHFKDQLVPVZLWKWKHFODXVH´UHJDUGOHVVRI KRZWKH\DUHFKDUDFWHULVHGµ 
On his part, Steel develops one of  the classical approaches to mechanisms in terms of  
production (namely the so-called ´MDCµDSSURDFKwhile aiming of  course to look in much more 
detail at how production is enabled and preserved across contexts (Steel 2008, p.42).Just like 
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Howick, Steel uses, in addition to the MDC approach, the language of  intervention, in order to 
explain how the process-tracing method can be applied to particular nodes of  mechanistic 
production. However, the whole weight of  his argumentation rests on the process side of  his process-
tracing method, and this grain of  difference making is not developed. As for the RWT proponents, 
Clarke et al. adopt in their paper the non-committal definition of  mechanisms provided in by Illari 
and Williamson (2012, p. 120) and discussed in chapter 3 $´PHFKDQLVPIRUDSKHQRPHQRQFRQVLVWV
of  entities and activities organizeGLQVXFKDZD\WKDWWKH\DUHUHVSRQVLEOHIRUWKHSKHQRPHQRQµ. It 
is a neutral and thin definition, that could be developed to make room explicitly for difference 
making, but as things stand, is rather geared towards covering only the variety of  production 
approaches.   
Could one use this construal of  mechanisms as difference-making  that I have put forward 
in chapter 3 in order to think of  the problem of  extrapolation from a slightly different perspective - 
while adopting the framework of  RWT, and also the criteria of  mechanistic evidence provided in 
Clarke et al (2014)? One of  the crucial criteria advanced by the latter in order to organise evidence 
of  mechanisms is the differentiation between fragile and robust mechanisms (p. 357). If  we take this 
criterion, coupled with the insight into the dimension of  difference-making of  mechanisms, we 
arrive at the conception that a robust mechanism, as opposed to a fragile mechanism, is the one that 
can preserve its difference-making through various tests of  stress and across a certain variation of  
contexts.  
7KH QDWXUDO VHPDQWLFV RI  WKH QRWLRQ RI  ¶PHFKDQLVP· FDQ RQO\ UHLQIRUFH WKLV FRQFHSWLRQ of  
robustness. A part of  the very meaning of  the notion of  mechanism is linked to the idea of  a set of  
IDFWRUVWKDWDUH¶VKLHOGHG·IURPYDULDWLRQVLQH[WHUQDOIDFWRUVCartwright, 1999, pp. 29, 50, 87-90). It 
LVDQLGHDZHRZHLQODUJHSDUWWRWKHVHYHQWHHQWKFHQWXU\¶PHFKDQLFLVW·SKLORVRSK\DQGLWLVFHUWDLQO\
reflected by mechanisms in physics and chemistry. Obviously, the degUHH RI  ¶VKLHOGLQJ· RI 
mechanisms in biology is lower than the one in physics and chemistry. However, my point is simply 
that, just by unilaterally insisting on our incomplete knowledge of  medical mechanisms, on their 
potentially paradoxical effects and on their potential change of  action following change in external 
conditions (as Howick et al. do), one should not lose sight of  the fact that we still have the distinction 
between fragile and robust as concerns the mechanisms of  biology and medicine, and an adequate 
way of  conceptualising this distinction by way of  maintaining or not the difference making.  
Recall the discussion of  pre-emption from chapter 3. This discussion is not only important in 
order to show that pre-emption is not a serious problem for ontic construal of  mechanisms as both 
productive and difference-making. It is also important from the point of  view of  extrapolation, 
because taking into account phenomena such as pre-emption might be one of  the keys to 
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understand why the problem of  extrapolation shows up and what we need in order to mitigate it. 
One of  the causes of  the problem of  extrapolation are precisely phenomena such as pre-emption 
or analogous events, in which other causes neutralize or modify the effect of  the cause we are 
interested in.  
In such cases, because the difference-making of  mechanisms is no longer actually present, what 
we are actually left with, if  the mechanism is still functioning at all, is production. The sort of  
infinitesimal differences that Howick et al. describe as being sufficient to make mechanisms behave 
erratically, presumably leave  in place spatio-temporal contiguity, the transmission of  signs and 
energy, or whatever other means one might employ in order to mark out the continuity of  
processes. It is conceivable that in the case of  BBs discussed in §2, the marks of  production were in 
place for people of  African-American origin, for instance. But the difference-making specified by 
any of  the counterfactuals from above was missing.  
What we need in order to tackle the problem of  extrapolation is a bit of  modal force, as it 
were. We need a mechanism that produces indeed an effect, but following a true counterfactual that 
is actualized and that warrants that the effect would happen, were such and such conditions in place. 
As mentioned in the Introduction to this chapter, any extrapolating claim expresses itself  in a 
counterfactual way, since it states that a certain effect (observed in the test context) would be 
produced in the target context. This is the sense in which, arguably, we need a robust mechanism ² a 
mechanism whose difference-making is not influenced by pre-emption, neutralization, antidotes, etc. 
How to check whether we are dealing with a fragile or a robust mechanism, i.e. with a 
mechanism whose difference making can reasonably be expected to manifest itself  across varying 
causal contexts? Here, we can usefully rehearse the reasoning behind the revised form of  RWT. One 
access to difference making is provided by the laboratory studies, including animal experimentation, 
and it is on the laboratory studies that theorists of  extrapolation have placed the burden of  solving 
the problem (leading ultimately to skepticism about a possible solution). But the revised form of  
RWT tells us that population studies are a different epistemic way of  access into the difference-
making of  the same causal relations. If  both mechanistic evidence and evidence of  population 
studies concern difference-making and the same type of  causal relations (although mechanistic 
evidence is assessed experimentally, whereas evidence of  population studies is assessed statistically), 
then evidence coming from population studies could be used to tell us something about 
mechanisms themselves. One is thereby in position to extend RWT from the area of  establishing 
causal claims, to the area of  extrapolation.  The extension of  RWT would say that, when dealing 
with the untested, target contexts of  interest for extrapolation, one needs evidence of  difference 
making from both mechanistic studies and population-studies (as well as evidence of  production 
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from mechanistic studies), which are thus both necessary, although not necessarily sufficient, to 
solve the problem of  extrapolation. 
In order to see how precisely the interplay between population studies and microstructural 
research offers us a way of  access into the robustness of  mechanisms, we should go back, with a 
more charitable reading, to the Clarke et al.(2014) case study.  
 
§4 RWT, extrapolation and the Clarke et al. example 
Recall now the case of  the hypertension treatment with calcium-channel blockers (CCBs), 
put forward in Clarke et al. (2014) as an example of  how, in their view, mechanisms help solve the 
problem of  extrapolation.  This example seems to offer us an important dimension of  the interplay 
between mechanisms and population studies because, as Clarke et al. argue, it is primarily 
mechanisms that seem to contribute to the extrapolation claims formulated in the context of  
population studies. Clearly, we have evidence of  CBBs coming from physiopathological laboratories, 
animal experimentation, etc. about (what appear to be) robust mechanisms, and this mechanistic 
evidence that is used in the context of  population studies. In my own terms, we have evidence of  
difference-making obtained from a microstructural research that is used to ground and reinforce 
claims about difference making made at the level of  population studies in order to extrapolate them.  
My point in §2 was that this is not the whole story, and that the history of  the hypertension 
treatment does not suggest that it was a case in which mechanisms solved the problem of  
extrapolation. It suggests, on the contrary, that it was a case in which the BBs, the previously 
employed treatment for hypertension, whose mechanism was fairly well known, encountered the 
problem of  extrapolation, more precisely failed the test of  extrapolation, and it was in response to 
this problem that the CCBs were substituted for them in the guidelines cited by Clarke et al; the 
subsequent population trials strengthened the claim as to the robustness of  CBBs (eliminating, of  
course, the short-acting CBBs).  
 But this critical point of  view, which is typified in Howick et al 2013, ignores the very basics 
of  RWT and the epistemic interplay between mechanisms and population studies ² an epistemic 
interplay that is made possible, once mechanistic causation is construed in terms of  both production 
and difference making. The issue becomes clearer if  we recall that in his (2011) critique of  RWT, 
Howick repeats the same charge of  mechanisms not being able to solve alone the problem of  
extrapolation (Howick 2011, p. 930 et passim), as I showed in chapter 3. Again, this means to ignore 
the gist of  RWT, which presupposes the joint-use of  both controlled population studies and 
mechanisms, all the more intelligible in a monistic (and not pluralistic) framework of  causation.  
Let me give you a final illustration of  this critical approach, which tends to see in isolation 
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the possible means of  tackling the problems of  extrapolation. In the programmatic part of  their 
(2013), Howick et al. list five possible solutions to the problem of  extrapolation that are to be 
examined: simple induction, n-of-1 trials (in which a single patient randomly receives the 
experimental treatment or the control), pragmatic randomised trials, clinical expertise, and 
mechanistic knowledge. Each of  these possible solutions are then taken in turn and shown to be 
problematic, and I have laid down in section 1 Howick et al·VDUJXPHQWDWLRQDERXWPHFKDQLVPV%XW 
what is extremely interesting for my purposes here is that at no point do Howick et al suggest that 
this set of  possible solutions (or a subset of  them) all with their proper weaknesses, admittedly, 
could be used together, reinforcing each other, complemeQWLQJHDFKRWKHU·VZHDNQHVVHVHWF+RZLFN
et al. S2QHVHHPVWREHLQWKHVHDUFKIRUWKH¶PDJLFZDQG·$SDQDFHDGRHVQRWH[LVW
though. What we can try to do is to find the adequate way of  conceptualizing where the problem 
lies, and to use all the means at our disposal in trying to alleviate the problem (crucially, including 
difference-making evidence coming from both mechanisms and population studies), always keeping 
an eye to what happens in clinical practice.  
In the end, to come back to the example of  Clarke et al., when looking at the guidelines 
which recommends long acting CCBs as a first line treatment for elderly patients and patients of  
African-American origin, what we see is not mechanisms alone solving the problem of  
extrapolation. We see rather the collaboration between the population studies and the mechanistic 
research - a collaboration which results in the tacit definition of  CCBs as entailing a robust 
mechanism in the first line treatment of  hypertension, in contrast to BBs, which are tacitly defined 
as entailing a fragile mechanism in the first line treatment of  hypertension.  
And we also see that happened in practice was that the difference-making of  BBs, although 
apparently pretty constant and well-defined on the level of  microstructural research in laboratories, 
manifested erratically in real-life situations involving differing biological contexts. One learnt about 
it following clinical reports, and this erratic manifestation (of  the laboratory established difference 
making) was confirmed by RCTs. On the other hand, the difference making of  CBBs, also well-
defined on the level of  microstructural research, was confirmed by RCTs as manifesting itself  in the 
same way outside of  laboratories (i.e. on the population level), and hence the mechanism of  
lowering hypertension associated with them was deemed robust. 
This approach to robustness and extrapolation is consistent with the criteria for the quality 
of  evidence laid out by Clarke et al. and also coheres with their global picture of  the evidential 
interaction between mechanisms and populations (Clarke et al. 2014, p. 355). If  we added to the to-
and-fro between mechanisms and populations of  RWT the insight that the difference-making should 
be seen as issuing also from mechanisms, we would be better equipped conceptually to approach the 
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problem of  extrapolation. 
 Furthermore, using such a conceptual approach, I suggest, one could take full advantage 
both of  the emerging and very promising literature on applying Bayes nets to microstructural 
mechanisms (Clarke et al. 2014b, Casini et al. 2011) ² Bayesian nets which are thereby measuring the 
difference-making on the level of  mechanisms ² and the global approach of  systems medicine 
(Williamson, forthcoming). The perspective here is that the Bayes nets applied to mechanisms and/or 
the global results of  systems medicine could provide a numerical expression of  the robustness of  
mechanisms and accordingly of  their potential to overcome extrapolation worries.  
 
Conclusion chapter 5 
In this chapter, I have argued in favour of  the epistemic advantage V) of  the revised RWT, 
namely that joint evidence of  population studies and of  mechanisms as difference-making can be 
helpful to face the challenges of  the problem of  extrapolation. This joint evidence can help us 
circumscribe robust mechanisms ² where a robust mechanism is a mechanism which is likely to 
preserve its difference-making across a certain range of  contexts outside the testing area.  
The emerging research on systems medicine and on the application of  Bayes nets to 
mechanisms ² which could be easily integrated into the framework of  the revised RWT ² could 
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Chapter 6 
Chapter 6 looks at how the work of  the 
previous chapters on the pre-confirmation level 
of  grading evidence, vis-à-vis the increase in 
weight of  the evidence, can be put to use for 
confirmation purposes. The inferential 
background is the collaboration between IBE and 
Bayesian theory. 
 
 It is argued that by increasing the weight of  
evidence for population studies, mechanistic 
evidence contributes on explanatory grounds to 
the resilience of  probability functions employed 
by the Bayesian theory of  confirmation.  
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The present chapter aims to move the discussion of  the evidential relevance of  mechanistic 
evidence and of  the revised RWT from the pre-confirmation stage (with which it has been 
concerned in the previous chapters) to the confirmation stage. As noted in chapters 1 and 4, Lipton 
construed IBE as mainly a guide to scientific inference, given that, by being concerned mostly with 
the qualitative aspects of  evidence and lacking a quantitative expression, it could not be sufficiently 
fine grained to let us adjudicate in complicated cases of  confirmation (as opposed to the simpler 
cases in which, due to the explanatorily rich nature of  evidence, IBE could eliminate all alternative 
hypotheses and pick out the right RQHOHDGLQJDVLWZHUHWRWKH¶RQO\H[SODQDWLRQ·DVZDVVKRZQLQ
chapter 1).  
One possible extension to confirmation for IBE would be a form of  association with the 
Bayesian theory, which in principle, would usefully compensate for its lack of  quantitative 
expression, and Lipton himself  hinted at this possibility, maintaining that IBE and Bayesianism are 
FRPSDWLEOHDQGUDWKHUWKDQULYDOVWKH\VKRXOGEH¶IULHQGO\FRPSDQLRQV·Lipton 2004, pp. 107-117). 
But questions still remain to be answered. As shown in chapter 1, in principle, IBE should confirm 
hypotheses that best explain the evidence (on the basis of  explanatory virtues like simplicity, scope, 
WKHRUHWLFDO XQLW\ DQG LQGLYLGXDOL]DWLRQ SOXV 0LOO·V SULQFLSOHV LI  RQH DGRSWV /LSWRQ·V SDUWLFXODU
interpretation). In return, the Bayesian theory takes hypotheses as being more confirmed to the 
GHJUHHWRZKLFKWKHLUSUREDELOLW\LVUDLVHGE\FRQGLWLRQDOLVLQJRQHYLGHQFHXVLQJ%D\HV·WKHRUHPRU
by employing various measures of  confirmation that revolve around this increase in probability). 
How precisely could they be used together? 
This question has sparked heated debates in the literature (e.g. Okasha 2000, Iranzo 2008, 
Romeijn 2013, Mc&DLQDQG3RVWRQDQGWKHTXHVWLRQ·VUHOHYDQFHH[WHQGVEH\RQGWKHFRnfines 
of  a strictly theoretical discussion, well into our particular area of  concern, i.e. medicine. This is 
evident if  we take into account that on the one hand, Bayesianism is consistent with EBM (Ashby 
and Smith, 2000) and, given its tremendous popularity in the general philosophy of  science, it has 
been increasingly used to interpret the results of  controlled population studies. One the other hand, 
IBE is (or should be) a natural ally for RWT proponents who seek to emphasize the importance of  
mechanisms. The reason is that a traditional role that mechanisms play is precisely that of  explaining 
(Williamson, 2011). Moreover, given the work done in chapter 2 on how the Clarke et al criteria of  
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mechanistic evidence can be shown to function and be justified on explanatory grounds, a natural 
question is whether these criteria (which originally have a pre-FRQILUPDWLRQUROHDV¶UXOHVRI WKXPE·
for assessing the quality of  mechanistic evidence) could not play some role in the confirmation as 
such of  medical causal relations. 
This is then the context due to which the question of  the collaboration between Bayesianism 
and IBE is worth investigating in the present thesis. The Bayesian theory of  confirmation is and 
should still be the first choice for controlled population studies in the special sciences. But if  
mechanisms are taken to explain (as they should), and if  they are taken as both productive and 
difference-making (as they should be) - being involved in the same causal relations as those reflected 
epistemically by the dependencies of  population studies - then the revised RWT proposed in this 
thesis requires one to look at the explanatory features that could be integrated into the Bayesian 
theory of  confirmation. More specifically targeted, the question is how to integrate the explanatory 
features, which are expressed by the Clarke et al. 2014 criteria of  mechanistic evidence, in the 
Bayesian framework of  confirmation.  
I will not insist here on the point that I have already discussed in the previous chapters ² the 
evidential interplay between mechanistic evidence and evidence from laboratory studies is only 
possible in the framework of  ontic causal monism, and accordingly, only in the framework of  
mechanisms as difference making. Otherwise, one is bound to conclude that laboratory, mechanistic 
studies, and population studies, draw evidence of  different causal relations, which not only make 
impossible evidential aggregation from different sources, but also, as far as the present discussion is 
concerned, would make impossible the collaboration between IBE and Bayesian theory (in a way 
useful for RWT, at least). 
Now, it should be admitted that the issue of  the collaboration between IBE and Bayesianism is 
controversial in the philosophical literature. And the present thesis has gone already far into 
controversial issues. Therefore, my discussion of  theory confirmation in these two last chapters will 
assume a prudent development. In effect, the present chapter try to be as non-committal as possible 
when it comes to possiEOH LQWHUSUHWDWLRQV RI  WKH FRPSDWLELOLW\ DQG ¶IULHQGO\ FRPSDQLRQVKLS·
between IBE and Bayesianism, leaving the discussion of  the more contentious aspects for the next, 
final chapter.  
The description in §1 of  the state of  the art of  this debate in general philosophy of  science 
will show WKDW /LSWRQ·V LQLWLDO SURSRVDOV DV WR KRZ WKH ¶IULHQGO\ FRPSDQLRQVKLS· VKRXOG ORRN OLNH
(proposals also developed by various other authors), namely that explanatory elements should play a 
role in the assignment of  priors and likelihoods,75 bear with them a bone of  contention. Contention 
                                                        
75See Lipton 2004, pp. 107-117, but also the exchange of articles and replies in Lipton (2001) and Salmon (2001), and 
115 
 
and disagreement do not mean of  course that such issues should not be further pursued and I will 
do so in the next chapter.  In the present chapter though, while noting the initial plausibility of  
using IBE to reinforce Bayesian confirmation in the way suggested by Lipton and like-minded 
theorists - in the sense in which the Clarke et al. criteria of  mechanistic evidence could be employed 
in order to gear the abovementioned assignment of  priors and/or likelihoods ² it will be advanced a 
OHVVFRQWHQWLRXVSURSRVDORQKRZWRFRQVWUXHWKH¶IULHQGO\FRPSDQLRQVKLS· 
0RUHSUHFLVHO\WKHSURSRVDOSXWIRUZDUGLQLVEDVHGRQ%ULDQ6N\UPV·LQLWLDOGLVFXVVLRQRI 
WKH ¶UHVLOLHQFH·RI SUREDELOLWLHV 6N\UPV DQGRQDQDQDORJLFDOGLVFXVVLRQRI  WKH ¶VWDELOLVLQJ·
role that mechanisms play over causal relations, on an ontic level, inspired by Russo and 
:LOOLDPVRQ·VDFFRXQWRI HSLVWHPLFFDXVDWLRQ. In brief, the proposal says that mechanistic evidence 
can inFUHDVHWKH¶UHVLOLHQFH·RI %D\HVLDQSUREDELOLWLHVZKHUH¶UHVLOLHQFH·PHDQVWKHVWDELOLW\RI RQH·V
credences in the face of  new evidence.  
This proposal coheres with and strengthens recent arguments advanced in McCain and Poston 
(2014, and forthcoming) as to how explanatory information is evidentially relevant, and the first part 
RI 0F&DLQDQG3RVWRQ·VGLVFXVVLRQZLOOEHSUHVHQWHGLQ§3. In the thread of  the present thesis, this 
proposal takes up and continues the epistemic advantage III) of  the revised RWT, as outlined in the 
previous chapters - stating that mechanistic evidence could increase the weight of  population 
studies evidence. 
Going back in §4 to the medical aspect of  the discussion, the developed suggestion will be 
that, when dealing with the results of  controlled population studies in medicine, the stability of  
RQH·V FUHGHQFHV LQ WKH IDFHRI QHZHYLGHQFH VKRXOGEH JUHDWHU IRU WKHSRSXODWLRQ VWXGLHV UHVXOWV
where we also have attending evidence of  a mechanism for the causal relation(s) in question - an 
increasingly greater stability to the degree to which the criteria of  mechanistic evidence of  Clarke et 
al. are satisfied.  This, in effect, is precisely what was designated in the previous chapters as the 
epistemic advantage VI) of  the revised RWT. 
The next chapter, as mentioned, will discuss the more contentious aspects of  the ¶IULHQGO\
FRPSDQLRQVKLS·EHWZHHQ,%(DQG%D\HVLDQLVP. Taking its cue from the second part of  McCain and 
3RVWRQ·VGLVFXVVLRQRI HYLGHQWLDOUHOHYDQFHLWZLOOVXJJHVWWKDWDIWHr all, mechanistic evidence could 
play a role in the assignment of  priors and likelihoods, if  we adopt a strong interpretation of  the 
objective status of  explanatory values. 
 
§1 State of  the art - the relationship and compatibility between IBE and Bayesianism 
Any presentation of  the possible compatibility between IBE and Bayesianism and of  the ways 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
further discussion in Iranzo (2008) and Weisberg (2009). 
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RI  DUWLFXODWLQJ LW VKRXOG VWDUW VXUSULVLQJO\ ZLWK YDQ )UDDVVHQ·V LQLWLDO GLDJQRVLV WKDW WKH WZR DUH
actually incompatible (van Fraassen, 1989, p. 169). The reason for starting in this way is that all the 
subsequent discussions of  compatibility - LQFOXGLQJ0F&DLQDQG3RVWRQ·VGLVFXVVLRQRQHYLGential 
relevance, the first part of  which will be outlined in more detail in §3 - attempt, in one way or 
another, to resSRQGWRYDQ)UDDVVHQ·VFKDUJHV2QHVXFKFKDUJHIRULQVWDQFHKDVEHHQWKDWRI WKH
¶EDG ORW· YDQ )UDDVVHQ  S  KROGLQJ WKDW DOO RXU DWWHPSWV WR ILQG WKH EHVW H[SODQDWLRQ
notwithstanding, the right explanation might be outside of  the pool of  our available hypotheses. It 
was in response to this charge that Lipton rolled back to interpreting IBE as inferring the probable 
truth of  the best explanation (Lipton, 2004, p. 58), and this cautious move has also been adopted by 
other IBE theorists (e.g. Niiniluoto, 1999). 
$VIDUDVWKHWKHPHRI WKHSUHVHQWFKDSWHULVFRQFHUQHGLWLVDQRWKHURI YDQ)UDDVVHQ·VOLQHVRI 
attack against IBE which stands out: explanatory considerations can play no role in the context of  
Bayesian conditionalisation, on pain of  drawing unwarranted inferences. If  the posterior 
SUREDELOLWLHVRI PRUHH[SODQDWRU\K\SRWKHVHVZHUHJLYHQ¶ERQXVSRLQWV·SRVW-conditionalisation, due 
to their superior explanatory content, this would violate the demands of  Bayesian rationality and 
lead to Dutch-Book results - a set of  bets guaranteed to make one lose money in all scenarios (Van 
Fraassen, 1989, p. 169).  
An interesting answer to this irrationality charge came from Okasha (2000), followed by Lipton 
(2001) and Lipton (2004).76 Lipton and Okasha argued that associating explanatory elements to 
Bayesian reasoning, in the sense of  taking these explanatory features into account after the posterior 
probabilities have been calculated, is actually putting the cart before the horse (Okasha, 2000, pp. 
702-704, Lipton, 2004, pp.106-1177KHULJKWZD\WRFRQVWUXHWKH¶IULHQGO\FRPSDQLRQVKLS·QHHGWR
be tighter than merely taking into account the explanatory features of  hypotheses after 
conditionalisation. These explanatory features should play a part in the conditionalisation itself, in 
the sense that explanatory considerations should influence the assignment of  priors and/or 
likelihoods. 
We have seen in the previous chapters that, in the framework of  IBE, the explanatory value of  
hypotheses is standardly cashed out using several virtues as simplicity, scope, theoretical unity and 
individualization, entailing, respectively, that a more explanatory hypothesis is simpler, covers a 
greater part of  the evidence, converges with previous knowledge, and provides a mechanism or a 
fine-grained description of  the causal enchainment(s) in question, respectively. Now, according to 
                                                        
76Proponents of the view that Bayesian conditionalisation should include explanatory elements also include Iranzo 
(2008), Weisberg (2009) and Romeijn (2013). In order to keep this brief this introductory section on the state of the art, 
I will refer in the main text mainly to Lipton and Okasha, and I will note in footnotes the relevant aspects adduced to 
the main discussion by the just-mentioned authors.   
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2NDVKD·V SURSRVDO LI  RQH RU PRUH RI  WKHVH IHDWXUHV RU YLUWXHV VHWV D K\SRWKHVLV KLJKHU WKDQ LWV
competitors, then, before applying Bayes theorem to obtain the posterior probability 
(p(h/e)=p(h)p(e/h)/p(e)), one could assign to the more explanatory hypothesis either a higher prior 
(p(h)) (say, if  it converges more to previous knowledge than its rivals) and/or likelihood (say, if  it 
has a greater scope).  
+HUHLVRQHRI 2NDVKD·VH[DPSOHVDQH[DPSOHZLWKDPHGLFDOFRQWH[WDVLWKDSSHQV6XSSRVH
a mother brings her child to a doctor with leg pain complaints. The doctor has at his disposal two 
hypotheses: the first is that a muscle was strained, the second is that ligaments are torn. After 
examining the child, he opts for the second hypothesis, because for children of  that age straining of  
muscles is very rare (background knowledge), and because the hypothesis that ligaments are torn 
best explains the symptoms he notices after examining the child (greater scope and 
individualisation). In probabilistic terms, this translates to the second hypothesis having a greater 
prior probability than the first, and to the probability of  the evidence conditional on the second 
hypothesis (the likelihood) being higher than the probability of  the evidence conditional on the first 
hypothesis. After conditionalisation, the posterior probability of  the second hypothesis will be 
rendered higher, with no apparent violation of  the Bayesian rationality. 
Admittedly, not all hypotheses with a high prior and likelihood are also highly explanatory. But, 
in turn, all highly explanatory theories should have either a higher prior or likelihood, or both 
(Okasha, 2000, p. 705).  This strategy applies with a vengeance to cases in which scientists come up 
ZLWKUDGLFDOQHZK\SRWKHVHVEHFDXVH WKH%D\HVLDQ·VXVXDO VWUDWHJ\RI  UHWRUWLQJ WKDW ¶WRGD\·VSULRUV
DUH\HVWHUGD\·VSRVWHULRUV·GRHVQRWDSSO\,QVXFKFDVHVWKH¶%D\HVLDQPRGHOLVVLOHQW·RQ2NDVKD·V
stern diagnosis (Okasha, 2000, p. 709 et passim).77 A less drastic observation would be to say that, in 
the context of  new hypotheses being devised, the Bayesian has problems in assigning prior 
SUREDELOLWLHVDQGOLNHOLKRRGVDQGWKH¶IULHQGO\FRPSDQLRQVKLS·VKRXOGKROGLQWKHVHFDVHVDOVRZLWK
explanationist features helping out to circumscribe the probabilities in question (Lipton, 2004, pp. 
115-119).  
This applies for various other situations in which, although the hypotheses in question are not 
new, we still have incomplete data or evidence; and various theorists have followed up this path, 
suggesting that explanatory constraints should be employed to make the transition from subjective 
to (some sort of) objective Bayesianism and Bayesian interpretation of  probabilities. Weisberg 
(2009, p. 141) has argued that explanatory considerations should be used to constrain a priori 
probabilities, along with the Principle of  Indifference and the Principal Principle (in cases in which the 
background knowledge, and the available evidence, are such that, even if  the Principle of  Indifference 
                                                        
77 Okasha views such cases of  paradigm shift or inventing of  new hypotheses as cases in which IBE can apply alone, 
leaving aside the Bayesianism. 
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applies, we do not get a unique value of  the posterior probabilities of  hypotheses).78 
Another brand of  objective Bayesianism which incorporates explanatory elements is the one 
proposed by Jon Williamson. Of  the three main requirements of  his objective Bayesianism 
(probability, calibration and equivocation), upholding the norm of  equivocation (which asks that 
one's degrees of  belief  should equivocate as far as possible between the elementary outcomes; 
Russo and Williamson, 2007, p. 168), amounts to introducing a classical explanatory constraint, 
namely simplicity and parsimony. This can be seen by looking at the corresponding account of  
epistemic causation developed by Williamson. On this account, the norm of  equivocation asks that 
a causal graph be as non-FRPPLWWDO DV SRVVLEOH DERXW ZKDW FDXVHV ZKDW ¶$ FDXVDO JUDSK & LV
maximally non-committal, from all those in E, if  there is no other causal graph D in E which makes 
IHZHU FDXVDO FODLPV LQFOXGLQJ ERWK DUURZV DQG JDSV WKDQ &· :LOGH 	 :LOOLDPVRQ 
:LOOLDPVRQ·V REMHFWLYH %D\HVLDQLVP OHDYHV HQRXJK URRP WR LQWURGXFH RWKHU H[SODQDWRU\ HOHPHQWV
and we will shortly come back to his insightful relationship between causation and Bayesianism. 
Now, problems for this approach show up because, in certain cases, it might be wrong to use 
the explanatory virtues to constrain the priors and/or the likelihoods. Here is one example put 
forward in Weisberg (2009). Suppose you find one day your house in disarray, with the lock broken 
and valuable belongings missing. The first hypothesis that comes to mind is that a burglar broke in, 
stole the valuables and while searching for them, caused all the mess in the house. But there is 
another, improbable hypothesis, and it happens that it is the true one. One burglar did force the 
lock and entered the house, but happened to encounter in that very moment another burglar who 
had penetrated through the window. They started to fight, turning everything in the house upside 
down, until a police officer came in. They both took off, and it is the policeman who decided to 
take advantage of  the situation and take the valuables, planning to cast the blame on the two 
burglars (Weisberg, 2009, pp. 129-130).  Clearly, the first hypothesis is best explanatory, in terms of  
simplicity, theoretical unity, etc.; and yet it is the wrong one.  Why pay any attention after all to 
explanatory values at the level of  confirmation? 
([DPSOHVVXFKDV:HLVEHUJ·V VHHPWREe devastating. On the other hand, it should be noted 
that the mere fact that the hypothesis that scores higher in terms of  the explanatory virtues might in 
certain cases be false, does not directly show that those virtues should not be used to constrain the 
priors and/or likelihoods. It simply shows that the explanatory virtues can be misleading. Compare 
the analogous reasoning - there can be cases where your total evidence supports the hypothesis that 
is false as a matter of  facts, but it does not follow in such cases that you should not use your total 
evidence.  Thus, based on particular cases, one should not deny the use that explanatory values 
                                                        
78 An analogous move of  shifting away from subjective Bayesianism, in order to integrate IBE, is made in Iranzo (2008) 
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might have in the assignment of  priors and/or likelihoods.  
0RUHRYHU :HLVEHUJ·V H[DPSOH GHVFULEHG DERYH H[SORLWs one of  the most vulnerable of  the 
explanatory virtues, namely simplicity, and it is a vulnerability recognized by IBE theorists. Lipton 
KDVGXEEHG WKH FRUUHVSRQGLQJREMHFWLRQ ¶9ROWDLUH·VREMHFWLRQ· LQ FRQQHFWLRQ WR9ROWDLUH·V GLDWULEH
against the best of  the possible worlds theory of  Leibniz (Lipton, 2004, pp. 144-147). Why should 
the world (and our true hypotheses about its causal structure) be simple?  But simplicity is just one 
of  the explanatory virtues. When our explanations are based on mechanisms (which embody 
simultaneously various explanatory virtues, since mechanisms-based explanations are arguably more 
theoretically unified, have greater scope and greater individualisation), then it is much harder to 
reject as ad-hoc (or as stemming from some sort of  idealist perspective) the inferences to the best 
explanation that favour the hypotheses backed up by mechanisms over the hypotheses are not thus 
backed up. Hence, moving on to the friendly companionship between IBE and Bayesianism, to say 
that, in the realm of  medicine, one should increase the likelihood or priors for these hypotheses 
which also provide a mechanism, is not susceptible prima facie to 9ROWDLUH·V REMHFWLRQ DQG LV QRW
betraying some sort of  straightforward, simpleminded use of  the explanatory virtues of  IBE. 
However, one has to admit that there is still a bone of  contention, and I leave the discussion 
of  this use of  explanatory values in confirmation for the next chapter. In the present chapter I will 
focus on what appears to be a less controversial aspect of  the Bayesianism/IBE possible 
collaboration, which I will introduce in the next section. 
 
§2 Resilience - of  mechanisms and probabilities 
 
Using mechanisms in order to control the priors or likelihoods is not an uncontroversial move 
to make for the theorist of  medicine.  Still, mechanisms (and the criteria for mechanistic evidence) 
should have some role in the confirmation of  causal claims in medicine. But what would this role 
be? In §1, I mentioned :LOOLDPVRQ·V REMHFWLYH %D\HVLDQLVP Ds an example of  how one could 
attempt to strengthen the subjective basis of  the Bayesian theory with norms that could be derived 
IURPRUUHVHPEOHH[SODQDWRU\FRQVLGHUDWLRQV%XW:LOOLDPVRQ·VDFFRXQWLVDVRXUFHRI LQVSLUDWLRQ
at this point from yet another point of  view, precisely because, as we have discussed from a 
different perspective in chapter 3, his account of  objective Bayesianism is coupled with an account 
of  causation (in which the requirements of  objective Bayesianism have corresponding requirements 
for circumscribing causal relations).79 The lesson to be drawn immediately is that the to-and-fro 
                                                        
79 , DP XVLQJ KHUH :LOOLDPVRQ·V DFFRXQW RI  REMHFWLYH %D\HVLDQLVP DQG RI  HSLVWHPLF FDXVDWLRQ GXH WR LWV KHXULVWLF




between a theory of  subjective credences/objective probabilities and a theory of  causation can be 
illuminating by allowing us, via various analogies, to circumscribe, or rather suggest, characteristics 
of  credences/probabilities that parallel ontic characteristics of  causal relations. In other words, such 
a to-and-fro between the epistemic and ontic levels could be useful heuristically in order to suggest 
features that our theories of  confirmation should possess, in relation to the ontic structure of  reality 
that science uncovers (or, in our particular discussion, in relation to the causal structure that we 
know to be in place ontically in biology and medicine).80 
Now, what is the main characteristic of  mechanisms in medicine and biology as far as the 
causal relations are concerned? Perhaps a univocal answer to his question cannot be provided, but at 
least it would be safe to say that one of  the main characteristics of  mechanisms is that of  
¶VWDELOLVLQJ·FDXVDOUHODWLRQVKLSV7KHLGHDLVSUHVHQWLQWKHIRXQGLQJSDSHUE\:LOOLDPVRQDQG
Russo (in which the basis for the equal treatment of  mechanisms and population studies was put 
forward). Moreover, the lLWHUDWXUHRQELRORJLFDOPHFKDQLVPVDERXQGVLQUHIHUHQFHVWRWKH¶UHVLOLHQFH·
of  mechanisms (Bechtel and Abrahamsen 2005; 2011, Folke 2006)81 ² ZKHUHWKHLU¶UHVLOLHQFH·PHDQV
that they can resist and adapt to variations in inputs and parameters, both internal to the organisms, 
and external, through different paths of  feedback and self-maintenance, such that the causal 
relations that mechanisms produce are conserved.  
Moving on from this ontic level, it just so happens that we have in the literature a related 
QRWLRQ RQ WKH HSLVWHPLF VLGH QDPHO\ WKH QRWLRQ RI  WKH ¶UHVLOLHQFH· RI  SUREDELOLW\ GHYHORSHG E\
Brian Skyrms (1977; 1983). Very briefly put, Skyrms arrived at this notion in an attempt to 
characterize the probabilities that figure in statistical laws. More precisely, the attempt was to 
provide a notion of  law-OLNHREMHFWLYHFKDQFHRU¶SURSHQVLW\·LQKLVRZQWHUPVWREHGLVWLQJXLVKHG
from the mere subjective credence, by pinning down the limited variation of  such objective chances 
in law-like statements or propositions, relative to any other statements, i.e. by pinning down the 
resilience of  the respective probabilities when conditionalised on other statements. The resilience of  
a proposition q having a probability a, was defined as 1 minus the greatest difference between a and 
the probability of  q, conditional on any truth function of  other propositions which is consistent 
both with q and its negation (Skyrms, 1977, p. 405, Mellor, 1983, p. 101). 
For our purposes, it matters less how exactly Skyrms defined numerically the resilience of  
                                                        
80The epistemic/ontic distinction, as heuristically drawn above, in order to map the probabilities/causation 
differentiation (and simplify the presentation), is in order with the classical Bayesianism approach to subjective 
probabilities. Of  course, RQ FHUWDLQ RWKHU LQWHUSUHWDWLRQV RI  SUREDELOLWLHV LQFOXGLQJ :LOOLDPVRQ·V EUDQG RI  REMHFWLYH
%D\HVLDQLVP RQH ZRXOG DOVR ZDQW WR DVVLJQ WR SUREDELOLWLHV D KLJKHU UDQN WKDQ PHUHO\ WKH ¶HSLVWHPLF· FDWHJRU\ %XW
again, the epistemic/ontic distinction is drawn above heuristically, and the reader should be able to follow the role that 
this distinction plays in presenting the above proposal.  
81 7KHQDWXUDOVHPDQWLFVRI WKHQRWLRQRI ¶PHFKDQLVP·FDQRQO\UHLQIRUFHWKLVFRQFHSWLRQ$SDUWRI WKHYHU\PHDQLQJ
of  the QRWLRQ RI  PHFKDQLVP LV OLQNHG WR WKH LGHD RI  D VHW RI  IDFWRUV WKDW DUH ¶VKLHOGHG· IURP YDULDWLRQV LQ H[WHUQDO
factors; cf. for instance Cartwright, 1999, pp. 29, 50, 87-90. 
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probabilities. What matters, however, is to follow the close parallel that links analogically the 
epistemic characteristic of  the resilience of  probability functions conditional on other evidential 
statements (which, in the meantime, has become a rather uncontroversial characteristic of  the 
dynamics of  credences for Bayesian theorists) with the ontic characteristic of  mechanisms, capable 
of  conserving the causal relations they produce, in spite of  variations in the internal and external 
environment. 
Given this parallel, the following proposal can be suggested, bearing also in mind that the 
explanatory function of  mechanisms in the framework of  IBE is based on the causal relations that 
mechanisms produce. The suggestion is that the explanatory considerations that could be integrated 
by a Bayesian theory of  confirmation, refer to the evidential contribution of  mechanisms to the 
resilience of  Bayesian credences. More precisely, on this proposal, mechanistic evidence can increase 
tKHUHVLOLHQFHRI %D\HVLDQSUREDELOLWLHVZKHUH ¶UHVLOLHQFH·PHDQVWKHVWDELOLW\RI RQH·VFUHGHQFHVLQ
the face of  new evidence. 
It is worth noting that, beyond the immediate purposes for which Skyrms used the notion of  
resilience initially, this notion was subsequently applied by Joyce in order to distinguish between the 
weight and the balance of  evidence in a Bayesian framework (Joyce, 2005), by Leitgeb in order to 
differentiate between the quantitative and the qualitative aspect of  evidence and belief  (Leitgeb 2014; 
2017), and by McCain and Poston, in order to defend the evidential relevance of  explanatory 
considerations (McCain and Poston, 2014).  
Interestingly, Joyce, Leitgeb, and McCain and Poston never linked the resilience of  probabilities 
or credences to the evidence coming from mechanisms, in spite of  the evident epistemic/ontic 
DQDORJ\PHQWLRQHGDERYH+RZHYHU0F&DLQDQG3RVWRQ·VGLVFXVVLRQRI HYLGHQWLDOUHOHYDQFH (2014 
and forthcoming) - which draws, among others, on Skyrms (1983), and Joyce (2005), and whose first 
part I will briefly present and discuss in the next section - will be very useful to situate better within 
the literature (and the current debates) the proposal as to the resilience brought about by evidence 
of  mechanisms. In turn, §4 will go back to the medical context and will flesh out the consequences 




The state of  the art diVFXVVLRQLQEHJDQZLWKYDQ)UDDVVHQ·VFULWLTXHRI ,%(DVSURYLGLQJ
the reference point for all subsequent discussion on the collaboration between IBE and 
%D\HVLDQLVP7KLV DSSOLHV DOVR WR0F&DLQDQG3RVWRQ·VGLVFXVVLRQEHFDXVH WKH\ WRR VWDUW IURPD
critique advanced in the vein of  Van Fraassen, namely Roche and Sober·VFKDUJHWKDW explanatory 
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considerations are evidentially irrelevant (Roche and Sober, 2013, p. 659). As a matter of  fact, Roche 
DQG6REHU·V FULWLTXHRI  ,%( LV MXVW YDQ)UDDVVHQ·V DUJXPHQWRQ WKH LUUDWLRQDOLW\ RI  DGGLQJ ¶ERQXV
SRLQWV·LQGLVJXLVH 
5RFKHDQG6REHU·VDLPLVWRVKRZWKDWH[SODQDWRU\SURSHUWLHVGRQRWLQIOXHQFHSUREDELOLWLHVDW
all. In order to show that they cannot and should not influence probabilities, they formulate the 
issue in Bayesian terms. More precisely, they take a hypothesis H, the observations relevant to it O, 
and formulate the proposition E: if  H and O were true, H would explain O. In their terms 
therefore, E encompasses the explanatory relation between the hypothesis and the observed data. 
They ask subsequently, as the Bayesian confirmation theory asks, whether Pr(H/E&O) > Pr(H/O) 
- in other words, whether the explanatory features add anything to the confirmation of  H. Their 
answer is negative - nothing is added, because E is screened-off  by O, or in formal terms 
3U+2	( 3U+2¶WKHH[SODQDWRULQHVVRI +LVHYLGHQWLDOO\LGOHRQFHWKHWUXWKRI 2LVWDNHQ
LQWRDFFRXQW·5RFKHDQG6REHUS1RWDEO\WKHWDUJHWRI 5RFKHDQG6REHU·VVFUHHQ-off  
thesis does not concern prior probabilities, but posterior probabilities. The point is that learning E 
(i.e., that H would explain O if  H and O were true) after having already learned O should not lead 




ancient supposition, smoking and cancer are both due to a common cause. In the first scenario, E is 
in place, because H explains O. In the second scenario E does not hold, as H does not explain O 
since both H and O (or the fact corresponding to the respective propositions, as one might want to 
read them) are the result of  the common cause.  
Now, on the level of  strictly observed correlations, we will have, say: Pr(S smoked at least 
FLJDUHWWHVEHIRUHDJH_6JRWOXQJFDQFHUDIWHUDJH F$QG5RFKHDQG6REHU·VSoint 
is that c is not modified in any way if  E is added: Pr(S smoked at least 10,000 cigarettes before age 
50 | S got lung cancer after age 50 &if  S smoked at least 10,000 cigarettes before age 50 and S got lung 
cancer subsequently, then the smoking would explain the lung cancer) = Pr(S smoked at least 10,000 cigarettes 
before age 50 | S got lung cancer after age 50). The explanationist story does not change the 
probabilities, so it is evidentially irrelevant.  
*RLQJEDFNWR0F&DLQDQG3RVWRQ·VUHSO\ WKHLU main point is that, even if  the screening off  
holds, the explanation features are still evidentially relevant. In other words, they concede as much 
as they can to Roche and Sober as to their screening off  claim (although, as we have seen in the 
previous section, there is space of  discussion as to whether explanatory features can influence the 
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priors of  the hypotheses in question). However, McCain and Poston contend, there is a sense in 
which the explanatory story does have an influence on confirmation or prediction, without 
modifying as such the probabilities. What they influence is the resilience of  the Pr function, by 
making certain of  the probabilities more stable, or less volatile, given new evidence, or rather new 
information (and we shall see shortly why the distinction between evidence and information might 
be useful).  
Again, the rationality of  the Bayesian conditionalisation is not violated.  Consider once more 
the probabilities of  Roche and Sober, in a simplified form. We first have: Pr (S will get lung 
cancer/S has smoked i cigarettes to date) > Pr (S* will get lung cancer/S* has smoked j cigarettes to 
date), for all i > j. On a Bayesian analysis of  confirmation this inequality implies that S being a 
heavier smoker than S* is evidence that S has a greater chance of  getting lung cancer than S* (or, 
strictly speaking, that the hypothesis of  S getting cancer is more probable than the hypothesis of  S* 
getting cancer). At this point, one can assign different measures of  confirmation, and it is 
commonplace that there is disagreement among Bayesians as to how exactly to frame this measure 
of  confirmation (see for instance Glass 2012). McCain and Poston leave this point aside also, and 
postulate this measure of  confirmation be some d.  
Now consider the probabilities to which the explanatory element has been addedPr (S will get 
lung cancer/S has smoked i cigarettes to date & smoking causes cancer) > Pr (S will get lung cancer/S 
has smoked j cigarettes to date & smoking causes cancer), for all i > j.McCain and 3RVWRQ·V FODLP LV
that, even if  the degree of  confirmation d has not changed by integrating the explanatory story, the 
IUHTXHQF\GDWDFRUUHODWLQJVPRNLQJDQGOXQJFDQFHULV¶UHLQIRUFHG·ZLWKRXWEHLQJFKDQJHG,WLVQRW
some paradox or a mere play of  words, and in order to clarify what this means, McCain and Poston 
DSSHDOWRWKHXVHIXOGLVWLQFWLRQEHWZHHQEDODQFHDQGZHLJKWRI HYLGHQFHZKHUH¶EDODQFH·LVUHODWHG
WRWKHVWULFWO\TXDQWLWDWLYHQXPHULFDODVSHFWRI HYLGHQFHZKHUHDV¶ZHLJKW·LVUHODWHGWRWKHqualitative 
aspects of  evidence.82 
6LPSO\SXW LQ0F&DLQDQG3RVWRQ·VUDWLRQDOH WKHH[SODQDWRU\VLGHZKLOH OHDYLQJWKHEDODQFH
untouched (i.e. the degree of  confirmation), adds to the weight of  evidence ² a notion which was at 
the center of  our discussion of  the evidential interplay between mechanisms and population studies 
in chapter 4. McCain and Post introduce the notion of  weight as follows. Suppose one has a two-
sided coin, which looks fairly typical, and one assigns a value of  0.5 to the next flip resulting in 
heads. Suppose next that one flips the coin a million times and it lands heads approximately one-
half  of  the time. What is now the chance, ask McCain and Poston, that the next flip is heads? The 
                                                        
82McCain and Poston draw on Joyce (2005) in order to outline the distinction between balance and weight. As 
PHQWLRQHGDERYH-R\FHZDVRQHRI WKHDXWKRUVWRSXWWRXVH6N\UPV·QRWLRQRI UHVLOLHQFHXVHIXOGLVFXVVLRQVRI WKLV
distinction can also be found in Kelly (2005) and Kelly (2008).  
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answer is the same, 0.5. Prt(heads on next flip/k) = 0.5 and Prt+e(heads on next flip/k& e) = 0.5, 
where k is one's background evidence, e is that there have been roughly 1/2 heads among a million 
flips, Prt is one's initial probability assignment and Prt+e is the probability assignment after learning 
only e. 
The balance of  the probability has remained unchanged; strictly speaking, the probabilities are 
WKHVDPHDQGWKHPLOOLRQIOLSVDUH¶VFUHHQHGRII ·+RZHYHUHKDVDGGHGWRWKHweight of  evidence, in 
the sense that the one has learned that the two-sided coin is unbiased.83 In other words, the strictly 
numerical, quantitative aspect reflected by the balance has remained constant; but the qualitative 
aspect reflected in the weight of  evidence has changed. As a consequence Prt+eis more resilient in 
the way it changes in response to new information. Suppose that after the one million flips, the 
subject gets next an improbable sequence of  five heads in a row (I am changing McCain and 
3RVWRQ·VH[DPSOHVOLJKWO\WRPDNHLWPRUHVLPLODUWRWKHQH[WH[DPSOHWKH\Xse, which I will present 
shortly). Due to the resilience of  the probability Prt+ethe credence of  the subject that the next is 
KHDGVVKRXOGUHPDLQ&LWLQJ-R\FH·VFODLPWKDW ¶>W@he weight of  this evidence is reflected in the 
tendency for credences to stably concentrate on a small set of  hypotheses about the proposition·s objective chance" 
(Joyce 2005, p. 176, italics added), the two authorscontend that that the resilience brought in by 
explanatory stories works in the same way, by fixing the data about the relevant objective chances.  
 
´Explanatory information fixes the data about the relevant objective chances. It does not change what the data says 
the relevant objective chances are. Thus, if  one has frequency data about the relevant objective chances, that is a feature 
RI RQH·VHYLGHQFHWKDW LQGLFDWHVZKDW WKHREMHFWLYHFKDQFH LV REYLRXVO\%XWRQFHRQHDFTXLUHVDQH[SODQDWRU\-cum-
casual story that indicates that the objective chances are the same as the frequency data shows, the weight of  the evidence is significantly 
increased even though in both cases the direction of  the evidence is the same. Adding the explanatory story significantly changes the 
probabilistic role of  the Pr-IXQFWLRQ ZKHQ XSGDWLQJ RQ IXWXUH LQIRUPDWLRQµ 0F&DLQ DQG 3RVWRQ  S. 6, italics 
added)   
 
A two-sided coin being flipped one million times does not really amount to an explanatory 
story (although in an enlarged sense of  explanation, it could be reckoned with this way, if  it is taken 
to explain that the coin is not biased and that is why the chance of  heads remains 0.5). Hence, 
McCain and Poston provide another example, in which the explanatory story is neatly delineated, 
and which is all the more useful because it will help us see the transition to mechanisms and the 
quality of  evidence.  
                                                        
83The example of coins with the balance remaining unchanged after innumerable flips, in a different formulation (a 
normal coin vs. a magical coin) is also used by Romeijn (2013), in order to make the point that bare probabilities need 
supplementation in order to account for the (bare) observations and evidence. Romeijn does not go however on the 
path of the weight vs. balance distinction, but understands the need for qualitative aspects of confirmation as the need of 
¶WKHRUHWLFDOQRWLRQV·ZKLFKDUHWKHQFRQQHFWHGWRWKHH[SODQDWRU\IHDWXUHVRIWKHK\SRWKHses at hand, ending up with 
the solution of modifying the priors, which I have discussed above. Interestingly, Romeijn also brings in (a certain 
construal of) mechanisms, in the sense of the underlying features of different chance-set ups, determining different 
outcomes, as indeed it happens in the simplest case with a magic coin and a normal one (Romeijn, 2013, pp. 435-437). 
But mechanisms as such are not explicitly invoked by Romeijn. 
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In the new example, we have Sally and Tom being informed that there are 1,000 x-spheres in 
an opaque urn. Sally, but not Tom, knows that blue and red x-spheres must be stored in exactly 
equal numbers because the atomic structure of  the x-spheres is such that if  there are more or less 
blue x-spheres than red, the atoms of  all of  the x-spheres will spontaneously decay resulting in an 
enormous explosion. Now, a random sampling of  ten x-spheres without replacement provides five 
blue and five red spheres, which are replaced in the urn. Given the data, both Sally and Tom should 
assign Pr (blue|random draw)= 0.5. However, whereas Tom only has at disposal the frequency data, 
Sally also has an explanation for why the probability of  drawing a blue x-sphere at random is .5. Yet, 
this evidential difference does not show up, given the initial data, which prompts both to assign Pr 
(blue|random draw)= 0.5. Suppose, however, that 10more x-spheres are drawn at random and they 
are all blue. Given her knowledge about the atomic structure of  the x-VSKHUHV 6DOO\·V UDWLRQDO
credence in blue given a random draw remains the same - Pr Sally+E (blue|random draw)=.5, where 
this is her revised probability, upon learning the result of  the new draw, ( <HW 7RP·V UDWLRQDO
credence changes significantly. Whereas Pr Tom (blue|random draw)=.5 for the initial round of  
testing, Pr Tom+E (blue|random draw)=.75 when he OHDUQVDERXW(6R7RP·VSUREDELOLW\IXQFWLRQLV
more volatile in the face of  the new information6DOO\·VSUREDbility function is more resilient. 
 ,QWKHWHUPVRI -R\FHDGRSWHGE\0F&DLQDQG3RVWRQ6DOO\·credence stably concentrates 
on the hypothesis that the objective chance of  blue x-spheres is 0.5. Moreover, at this point, one 
could usefully recall LiptRQ·VLQVLJKWIXOREVHUYDWLRQWKDWDVHULRXVSUREOHPIRU%D\HVLDQVLVWKDWWKH\
cannot distinguish which is the relevant evidence (Lipton, 2004, p. 116).84 One would thus be 
tempted to add that the 10more x-spheres which are drawn at random and are all blue, while 
constituting information, do not constitute relevant evidence (where relevant evidence is that which can 
DIIHFW RQH·V FUHGHQFHV It is a line of  thought that McCain and Poston do not adopt explicitly, 
although it might well lie in the back of  their VSHFLILFXVHRI WKHWHUP¶LQIRUPDWLRQ·DQGRI WKHLU
repeated differentiation between frequencies, epistemic and non-epistemic, objective chances and 
epistemic probabilities. At any rate, McCain and Poston conclude that explanatoriness is evidentially 
relevant even when the screening off  condition holds, by increasing the total weight of  evidence. 
We can see that our proposal with respect to mechanisms and resilience, is consistent with, and 
QDWXUDOO\VWUHQJWKHQV0F&DLQDQG3RVWRQ·VUDWLRQDOHDVWRKRZH[Slanatory aspects are evidentially 
relevant. In a sense, our proposal is the natural continuation of  the series of  suggestions made by 
Skyrms, Joyce, and McCain and Poston, as well as of  the discussion of  evidential weight provided in 
chapter 4. If  (a) one needs to take into account the phenomenon of  resilience of  probabilities (as 
Skyrms urges); (b) resilience is an important symptom of  the weight and quality of  evidence, to be 
                                                        
84 ¶/HWXVEHJLQZLWKHYLGHQFH%D\HV·WKHRUHPGHVFULEHVWKHWUDQVLWLRQ from prior to posterior, in the face of specified 
evidence. It does not, however, say which HYLGHQFHRQHRXJKWWRFRQGLWLRQDOLVHRQ·/LSWRQS 
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distinguished from its balance (as Joyce has maintained); and (c) it is the explanatory features that 
increase the weight of  evidence and the resilience of  probabilities (as we have just see McCain and 
Poston arguing), then it would only be natural to take the evidence of  mechanisms as the main type 
of  evidence that can increase the resilience of  probabilities ² and again, the discussion in chapter 4 
on how mechanistic evidence increases the weight of  the total evidence we have, can only support 
the above rationale. It is mainly mechanisms that explain, and they do so in virtue of  stabilizing 
causal relations ² which is an ontic phenomenon that parallels the epistemic phenomenon of  
¶UHVLOLHQFH·IRU%D\HVLDQSUREDELOLWLHV 
2QHFRXOGHYHQFODLPZLWKUHVSHFWWR0F&DLQDQG3RVWRQ·VGLVFXVVLRQWKDWLQWKHLUH[DPSOHV
the evidence brought about by mechanisms is almost tacitly present. In the example with the x-
spheres for instance, it is mechanistic evidence which is at stake in the difference between the 
resilience of  the probability functions of  the two participants at the experiment. When reading such 
examples, the notion of  mechanistic evidence is, as it were, on the tip on the tongue; yet, the notion 
just remains unarticulated by McCain and Poston. We can now close the circle and return to the 
mechanistic evidence and the criteria for its quality provided in Clarke et al. 2014.  
 
§4 Evidence of  mechanisms and the resilience of  credences 
 
We have seen in the previous section that McCain and Poston ground their argument in favor 
of  the resilience of  probability functions on the distinction between weight and balance, where 
weight is related to the qualitative aspect of  evidence, which arguably cannot be captured in pure 
probabilistic terms. Now, a crucial piece in the puzzle of  how to apply in a medical context the 
rationale of  the resilience of  probability functions, is that the criteria of  mechanistic evidence 
advanced in Clarke et al. are related precisely to this qualitative aspect. As mentioned at various 
points in this thesis, these criteria are means to assess and provide a hierarchy for the quality of  
medical mechanistic evidence. They take into account traits such as independent methods, different 
research groups, proportion of  features found, knowledge of  analogous mechanisms, and 
robustness, defined in terms of  being reproducible across a wide range of  conditions.  
We have seen in chapter 2 that each of  these traits plays a role in terms of  pluses and minuses, 
and in the pre-FRQILUPDWLRQVWDJHWKH\DUHXVHGIRUJUDGLQJWKH¶TXDOLW\·RI HYLGHQFH)RULQVWDQFHLI 
we take a case in which the mechanistic evidence comes from two different teams reporting two 
mechanistic features, using the same research methodology - this evidence will be graded higher 
than the evidence of  two mechanistic features provided by a single team, but will be graded lower 
than evidence coming from two different teams reporting two mechanistic features using different 
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methodologies; in turn, the latter evidence will be graded lower than evidence coming from two 
different teams reporting three mechanistic features using different methodologies, and so on.  
Now, if  the quality of  mechanistic evidence is traced back to the balance/weight distinction, 
then we can see immediately the way to apply to our medical context the proposal concerning the 
resilience of  probabilities brought about by mechanistic evidence.  The way to apply it would be to 
say that, for the medical correlations obtained from the controlled population studies, the 
corresponding Pr function should be more resilient, to the degree to which the criteria of  Clarke et 
al. for mechanistic medical evidence are satisfied. In other words, on this rationale, the quality of  
medical mechanistic evidence will be reflected in the resilience of  the Pr function from the 
controlled population studies, which will be higher for those hypotheses for which we also have 
mechanistic evidence obtained using different methodologies, different research teams, with more 
mechanistic features found, etc.   
Take again the example of  smoking and lung cancer, as discussed by Roche and Sober. In plain 
terms, according to them, the mechanism linking smoking and lung cancer does not have any 
UHOHYDQFHIRUWKHFRUUHODWLRQEHWZHHQVPRNLQJDQGFDQFHUQRPDWWHUZKHWKHU)LVKHU·VVXSSRVLWLRQ
was adequate or not. This might be right, but, using again the plain language of  causation, it is 
evident that the mechanism in question has relevance for whether smoking does cause lung cancer 
or not (and whether any intervention or manipulation can intervene beneficially). It sounds almost 
like a truism, and denying this truism is a direct consequence of  what Roche and Sober say.  
,WLVWKLVFDXVDWLRQZRUU\ZKLFKXQGHUOLHV0F&DLQDQG3RVWRQ·VGLVWLQFWLRQEHWZHHQIUHTXHQF\
and non-epistemic chance, and finally their reasoning as to the resilience of  probability functions 
when backed up by explanatory considerations. It was also this causation worry which triggered the 
first formulation of  the thesis that evidence of  mechanisms should be placed alongside (and on the 
same footing as) evidence from controlled studies, in the original (2007) article of  Russo and 
Williamson, as we have discussed in chapter 4. More precisely, in that article it was claimed that, in 
the absence of  evidence of  the existence of  a medical mechanism, one cannot rule out that a 
correlation, however rigorously established on a population level, could be spurious (Russo and 
Williamson, 2007, p. 159) and the claim of  ruling out spuriousness is repeated in the more recent 
Clarke et al. 2014 (p. 343). 
Recall now my suggestion made in chapter 4, in the context of  the weight of  evidence 
discussion - as far as the mechanistic evidence is concerned, there should be more work they could 
do for confirmation purposes than just ruling out cases of  spurious causation. In chapter 4, I have 
postponed developing my suggestion, since the context there was the pre-confirmation grading of  
evidence. The proposal in the present chapter is precisely a development advanced in chapter 4. 
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Indeed, referring more precisely to the Clarke et al. criteria of  mechanistic evidence advanced 
in the same Clarke et al. - these criteria can do more than that, in combination with the evidence of  
correlation from population studies. It is perfectly acceptable to say that the existence of  a 
mechanism helps establish (or even establishes) that a medical correlation is non-spurious. But 
mechanisms also explain causal relations, and ontically, they stabilize causal relationships (by 
offering a degree of  protection against interfering factors, using various feed-back paths, etc.). 
Moreover, beyond the simple existence of  a mechanism, this explanatory relation is all the more 
direct, the more the criteria of  mechanistic evidence of  Clarke et al. are fulfilled. How could this 
explanatory relation of  mechanisms be put to work at the level of  confirmation? At the very least, I 
propose, it is in making more resilient the probability functions resulting from a Bayesian 
interpretation of  the acclaimed RCTs of  EBM, in direct correspondence or dependence with the 
Clarke et al. criteria.  
Suppose that a medical study S provides evidence that for the hypothesis H1  that C1 causes E, 
with a strong resulting balance ² e.g., that P(E|C1) = 0.7 > P(E) = 0.1. Hence we have that P(E|C1 
S) = 0.7. Now, some future evidence (study T) might cast doubt on this causal relation, and thus we 
would have, say, P(E|C1 S T) = 0.3, where 0.3 would be a compromise between 0.7 and 0.1 = P(E). 
The evidence of  the study T would favour another hypothesis H2, according to which it is C2, and 
not C1, which causes E.   
However, if  at the time of  doing the study S, one had good, quality evidence M1 that there is a 
mechanism of  action by which C1 causes E, then although this mechanistic evidence would make no 
difference to the original probability obtained after conditionalising on the evidence of  S, namely 
P(E | C1 S M1) = 0.7, it would make that probability more resilient under the putative future 
evidence T, such that, say, P(E | C1 S M1 T) = 0.65. And having good, quality evidence M1 in favour 
of  hypothesis H1 would mean that the Clarke et al. criteria of  mechanistic evidence are satisfied, and 
that the proportion in which they are satisfied makes it far superior to any alternative mechanistic 
evidence M2 that may be put forward in favour of  rival hypotheses such as H2. 
We can now return to another point we left in suspension in chapter 4 ² the prospects of  
theory confirmation in the current controversy as to the role of  cholesterol in atherosclerosis. Recall 
that, against the widely accepted view that cholesterol has a pathogenic role in atherosclerosis, a 
number of  (rather isolated) scientists and public figures have advanced the hypothesis that 
cholesterol is actually an innocuous factor. On this innocuousness hypothesis, the observed 
correlation between cholesterol and cardiovascular diseases is due to some common cause, like lack 
of  physical activity, mental stress, smoking and obesity (Ravnskov, 2002). Now, in adopting the 
pathogenetic hypothesis on cholesterol and rejecting the hypothesis on innocuousness, we do not 
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seem to be dealing (only) with the issue of  ruling out spurious cases of  causation. Moreover, 
proponents of  the innocuous hypothesis seem to be on the track of  a mechanism; it is not entirely 
implausible that mental stress, smoking, obesity and lack of  physical activity could induce directly 
atherosclerotic lesions. 
However, when it comes to the application (and fulfillment) of  the Clarke et al. criteria, the 
pathogenetic hypothesis fares far better than the innocuousness hypothesis. The number of  
research groups and different methodologies used to pin down the pathogenic mechanism of  
cholesterol far outreaches that used for the opposite hypothesis. What is even more important, the 
number of  discovered features of  the pathogenetic mechanism (including thirteen Nobel prize 
discoveries; see Endo, 2010) is far superior to the number of  mechanistic features backing up the 
innocuousness hypothesis. Population studies grouping participants with very different 
characteristics and background (age, race, dietary habitudes, etc.) have shown a high degree of  
robustness and stability for the pathogenetic hypothesis (Steinberg 2005; 2005b) that contrasts with 
the fluctuation of  results of  studies (mostly systematic reviews) in favour of  the innocuousness 
mechanism.85 
All in all, the quality of  mechanistic evidence for the pathogenic hypothesis is superior to the 
quality of  mechanistic evidence for the innocuousness hypothesis.  Since the explanatory role of  
mechanisms is all the more direct, the more criteria of  Clarke et al. are satisfied, we should have at 
the level of  confirmation that the Pr function resulting from a Bayesian interpretation of  
population studies in favour of  the cholesterol hypothesis is more resilient than the Pr function of  
the innocuousness hypothesis, thus reflecting the far superior quality of  mechanistic evidence (no 
matter what the balance of  population studies shows). 
Parenthetically, one of  the advantages of  this resilience approach is that it leaves room for 
revolutionary theories (and this is one of  the reasons I have chosen to return to the example of  the 
cholesterol controversy). Proponents of  the innocuousness hypothesis have often complained of  
being censured and of  having limited access to the academic publishing sphere (and this is a 
complaint which, of  course, given the tremendous influence of  pharmaceutical companies, might 
have some grain of  truth in it). However, on the resilience approach, theories such as the 
innocuousness hypothesis have still the door open.  
                                                        
85 For the latest contribution in favour of  the innocuousness hypothesis, see  Ravnskov et al. 2016. A response from 
mainstream proponents of  the pathogenic hypothesis, can be found at http://www.sciencemediacentre.org/expert-
reaction-to-systematic-review-reporting-lack-of-an-association-between-ldl-cholesterol-and-mortality-in-the-elderly/ 







What I mean is that, it is the case that quality mechanistic evidence should increase the 
resilience of  corresponding hypotheses. It is not the case that, once good mechanistic evidence is 
brought in, the rival hypotheses and contrary evidence will simply be ignored. But what is asked 
from such rival hypotheses (beyond the results of  population studies) is that they provide quality 
mechanistic evidence. Given the subtle and penetrating nature of  the Clarke et al. criteria, such 
mechanistic evidence could be judiciously assessed, and promising evidence would (and should) be 
given appropriate heed. From this perspective, the message to be sent to the proponents of  the 
innocuousness hypothesis would just be ² tell us a bit more about your mechanisms, and we will see 
what we can do about the resilience!  
Subsequent work in the application of  Bayes nets to mechanisms themselves (of  which Clarke 
et al. 2014b is a very encouraging starting point) as well as, as one should hope, developments of  
0F&DLQ DQG 3RVWRQ·V RZQ SURSRVDO DUH OLNHO\ Wo make this resilience role of  mechanisms more 
explicit. But it is, I suggest, a very fruitful path of  research. 
 
Conclusion chapter 6 
7KHUHDUHYDULRXVZD\VLQZKLFKRQHFDQFRQFHSWXDOLVHWKH¶IULHQGO\FRPSDQLRQVKLS·EHWZHHQ,%(
and Bayesianism in the realm of  confirmation. I have presented here several options and pursued 
one proposal which seems the least contentious of  all, namely that explanatory features increase the 
resilience of  probability functions. I have shown its relevance for the medical issue of  the interplay 
between mechanisms and population studies and I have proposed that, for the correlations obtained 
from the population studies, the corresponding Pr function should be more resilient, in proportion 
to the degree to which the criteria of  Clarke et al. for medical mechanistic evidence are satisfied, 
thereby developing the epistemic advantage VI) of  the revised RWT. The next chapter will look at 
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Chapter 7 
Chapter 7 also looks at how the evidential 
interplay between population studies and 
laboratory studies can be used for confirmation 
purposes, having both IBE and the Bayesian 
theory as inferential tools.  
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constrain the priors and the likelihoods of  the 
hypotheses evaluated by the Bayesian theory. In 
order to sustain this point, it is provided an 
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The present chapter looks at the more contentious aspect of  the collaboration between IBE 
and Bayesianism. As noted in the previous chapter, the use of  explanatory values in order to 
constrain the priors and likelihoods of  hypotheses, advocated among others by Lipton (2004) and 
Okasha (2001), faces the great obstacle that intuitively, with respect to theory confirmation, it is 
hard even to imagine how one could provide an objective assessment of  values and use them at all for 
confirmation purposes - irrespective of  whether those values are explanatory values, ethical or 
pragmatic.  
This intuitive difficulty is present not just in particular debates such as the possible use of  
explanatory values to constrain priors and/or likelihoods ² it also comes to the surface in general 
discussions about the principled compatibility between IBE and Bayesianism, beyond any particular 
proposal as to the details of  their collaborations. Indeed, Lipton (2004) and Okasha (2001) might 
have provided a valid respRQVH WR YDQ )UDDVVHQ·V FKDUJH RI  LQFRPSDWLELOLW\ DQG irrationality, as 
discussed in the previous chapter. But no matter how ingeniously and insightfully IBE theorists 
could argue in order to rHVSRQGWRFKDUJHVVXFKDVYDQ)UDDVVHQ·VWKHLQWXLWLYHGLIILFXOW\PHQWLRQHG
above concerning the very use of  values in theory confirmation is hard to set aside, especially for 
Bayesian authors. The critical discussion in Roche and Sober (2013) - the first half  of  which we 
have surveyed in the previous chapter - stems from the same conviction that, at bottom, IBE could 
have nothing to add to Bayesian inference, except for making the latter invalid. 
Interestingly, some IBE theorists have argued, picking the other end of  the stick, that IBE 
would be dissolved as an autonomous referential method, if  it was used complementary with 
Bayesianism, as a means to plug in explanatory considerations into the Bayesian machinery (Psillos, 
2004). This latter possibility has been a constant source of  worry for proponents of  the 
compatibility between IBE and Bayesianism (e.g. Iranzo, 2008), and naturally, has been exploited by 
adversaries of  this compatibility thesis.  
The key of  my argument in the present chapter is that, by providing a sufficiently strong 
defense of  the objectivity of  explanatory values, one can bring to relief  the both general worry of  the 
compatibility between IBE and Bayesianism and the particular worry that IBE might lose its 
substance by being mingled with Bayesian conditionalisation, and one can accordingly justify the 
constraining of  priors and likelihoods by explanatory considerations.  
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The argumentation I will employ in favour of  the objectivity of  explanatory values uses, just 
like in the previous chapter, but from a different perspective, the heuristically rich account of  
epistemic causation developed by Russo and Williamson, and appeals also to 'DYLG /HZLV·V
construal of  scientific laws. It offers a way to conceptualise the companionship between IBE and 
Bayesianism, explaining how IBE and Bayesian inference are compatible, while remaining different 
types of  inference, and also supports the more contentious proposal of  Lipton and Okasha that 
these explanatory values could constrain priors and likelihoods.  
The plan of  the present chapter is as follows. §1 offers the first line of  argumentation in 
favour of  the objectivity of  the explanatory values employed in IBE. It appeals to an ideal scenario 
UHYROYLQJDURXQG'DYLG/HZLV·VFRQVWUXDORI VFLHQWLILFOaws (or, in the terms I will rather employ, of  
the nomological structure of  the world). §2, compares my Lewis-derived strategy of  defence of  the 
objectivity of  explanatory values (and accordingly of  the IBE based inferences) with Russo and 
:LOOLDPVRQ·VVWUategy of  defending the epistemic causality associated to objective Bayesianism, which 
is based also on an ideal scenario argumentation. I show that the two strategies are, in an important 
respect, analogous, while being from another important perspective, different. My rationale is that, if  
both these strategies (and accordingly, the inferences they are supposed to justify) are analogous, 
defendable and yet different, they show the way for conceptualizing IBE and Bayesianism as distinct 
and yet complementary ways of  selecting the right causal hypotheses, in real-life situations in which the 
ideal scenarios do not hold. 
In very brief, I argue that these inferences are analogous since they are justified by the appeal 
to ideal scenarios and can be construed as hunting down the ultimate nomological structure. They 
are defendable insofar as, in real-life situations in which the ideal scenarios do not hold, their results 
can be seen as progressively approximating this nomological structure ² all the more, as science 
progresses. They are different insofar as one of  them, the Bayesian inference, hunts down for the 
quantitative aspect of  this nomological structure, whereas the other, i.e. IBE, hunts down the 
qualitative aspect of  this nomological structure. The analogy and the difference result in 
complementarity due to the fact that it is the same nomological structure that is hunted down (or 
towards which both methods of  inference are guiding).  
 §3 looks at the second part of  the dispute (and exchange of  articles between) McCain and 
Poston, on the one hand, and Roche and Sober, on the other hand; I VKRZWKDW5RFKHDQG6REHU·V
claim that explanatory features are evidentially irrelevant hinges on a neglect of  the abovementioned 
contrast between ideal and real-life scenarios.  
In §4 I return to the medical side of  the discussion and and lay down the proposal which 
corresponds to the point VII) of  the list of  epistemic advantages of  RWT, namely that the Clarke et 
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al. criteria of  mechanistic evidence could be employed to constrain the prior and/or likelihood 
probabilities established by the Bayesian theory taking into account the population studies evidence. 
Now, since the pair of  concepts of  ideal and real-life scenarios will play an important role in 
this chapter, a word of  preliminary clarification is due in this introduction. Ideal scenarios are 
epistemically transparent scenarios in which one has access either to the total evidence tout court, or 
alternatively, to all the particular evidence relevant for particular inferences, such that the reliability 
of  these inferences is guaranteed a priori by the respective epistemic transparency. Such ideal scenarios 
are useful as thought experiments in order to settle various disputes with a metaphysical background - 
we can think here, for example, of  the way the possible worlds apparatus is used in the metaphysics 
of  causality, in relation to the counterfactual approach to causation à la Lewis, or in the metaphysics 
of  natural kinds, in relation to the Kripke/Putnam account of  reference. More precisely, these ideal 
scenarios allow the theorist to speak about (metaphysical) facts, without the need to count in the 
possible ignorance or epistemic opacity on the part of  the theorist (although of  course epistemic 
opacity can be also brought in, as in the two-GLPHQVLRQDO VHPDQWLFV ,W LV WKH IDPRXV ¶*RG·V H\H
YLHZ· 
So for instance, Russo and Williamson use a type of  ideal scenario in order to show the 
coherence of  their own account of  causality, based on objective Bayesianism. On my part, I will be 
using an analogous scenario in §1, in order to lay down LQ/HZLV· IRRWVWHSVa justification of  the 
use of  values in IBE, on the ground of  these being objective values. I will also appeal to the 
discussion of  such ideal scenarios in §3, in order to disentangle the metaphysical and epistemic 
DVSHFWV RI  5RFKH DQG 6REHU·V WKHVLV RQ WKH HYLGHQWLDO LUUHOHYDQFH RI  H[SODQDWLRQV XVLQJ WKH
Kripke/Putnam account of  reference as a clarifying illustration for the way in which the notion of  
epistemic transparency has a beaULQJRQ5RFKHDQG6REHU·VWKHVLV.  
On the other hand, real-life scenarios assume explicitly the epistemic opacity of  evidence. 
The real-life scenarios are obviously useful to consider because in science we are actually dealing 
only with such scenarios, in which we do not have access to the total evidence (or to all the evidence 
relevant for particular theories and hypotheses), and therefore the reliability of  inferences is not 
guaranteed by the respective epistemic opacity. 
To underlie, the distinction between ideal (or epistemically transparent) and non-ideal (or 
epistemically obscure) scenarios is not be reduced to the distinction between availability or non-
availability of  the total evidence (although the latter distinction is a paradigmatic illustration of  the 
former), but applies also to the distinction between availability of  all relevant evidence for a particular 
theory or hypothesis, and its non-availability. This is why the use of  ideal and non-ideal scenarios is 
common in a multitude of  philosophical discussions in which there is no mention of  total evidence, 
135 
 
as for instance in the philosophy of  language. It is for this reason that the Kripke/Putnam account 
of  reference will find its place in my argumentation in §3. Actually, most discussions as to the 
correct way our words refer, employ examples in which a certain term or expression is analysed with 
respect to its capacity to refer to certain state of  affairs, where our access to the respective state of  
affairs is framed in terms of  the ideal scenario (on the part of  the theorist), and our use of  the 
respective term or expression entails the possibility that the non-ideal scenario holds, in the sense at 
OHDVWWKDWRQHPLJKWQRWEHDZDUHRI KRZDQGWRZKDWRQH·VWHUPVUHIHUGRHV¶ZDWHU·UHIHUWR+2O?; 
cf. IRULQVWDQFH4XLQH·VGLVWLQFWLRQEHWZHHQUHIHUHQWLDOO\RSDTXHDQGWUDQVSDUHQWFRQWH[WVRU7DUVNL·V
truth definition). On the other hand, theories of  explanation in the philosophy of  science are also 
congruent with the distinction between ideal and non-ideal scenarios in that the ontic theories of  
explanation suit the ideal scenarios whereas the epistemic conception of  explanation suits the non-
ideal scenario. 
Finally (and hoping the reader will not have lost her patience with this long, but necessary 
introduction to this chapter) to take the distinction from a different angle, in ideal scenarios one can 
be safe to speak about objective and logical probabilities, or objective chances; in real-life scenarios 
one can only be safe to speak about subjective probabilities and frequencies. Ideal scenarios are 
limiting cases in which the use of  explanatory values in IBE justified. On the other hand, in real life 
scenarios, IBE can only be a guide to inference, and not the ultimate inference itself, just like, in such 
real-life scenarios, the Bayesian inference needs to assume important caveats in its practical 
application. It is this difference between ideal and real-life scenarios, as I will round off  the general 
discussion in §3, that shows the useful complementarity of  Bayesianism and IBE as different ways of  
guiding our search, in the real-life situations, to inferences that approximate as much as possible 
those in the ideal-scenarios. And, as I will suggest in §4, drawing Bayesian inferences in which the 
priors and likelihoods are constrained by the available mechanistic evidence, via the Clarke et al. 
criteria, might just be such a way in which one uses the advantages of  both ways of  guiding our 
search for medical causes, in order to come as close as possible to the nomological structure that 
characterizes medicine. 
 
§1 Justifying the explanatory values 
How are explanatory values justified? One frequently cited argument in the literature, which I 
have also laid down in chapter 1, starts from the common observation that much scientific 
discovery and acceptance takes places on the lines of  IBE, and proceeds by meta-induction to the 
actual use of  these values in science is justified (Niiniluoto, 1999). Alternatively, value epistemology 
(including its neo-Aristotelian tenet) could offer plausible ways of  integrating these values in a 
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normative framework (Wilkenfeld, 2014). However, one should admit that very use of  terms such as 
¶YDOXHV· LQDVHQVLWLYHDQGKHDWHGGLVFXVVLRQDVWKDWFRQFHUQLQJFRQIirmation in the philosophy of  
VFLHQFHLVOLNHO\WRFDUU\DORQJDQDXUDRI DUELWUDULQHVV7RXVH-RQDWKDQ9RJHO·VZRUGV¶XQGHUWKHVH
circumstances, believing a hypothesis because of  its explanatory value would not be much better 
than believing it because sRPHRQHWKRXJKWLWXSRQ\RXUELUWKGD\·9RJHO2UPRUHFORVHO\WR
RXU WRSLF +HQGHUVRQ DUJXHV WKDW ¶RQH PLJKW VWLOO VWLSXODWH >«@WKDW ZH VKRXOG FRQVWUDLQ SULRUV LQ
VXFKDZD\DVWRDJUHHZLWK,%(>«@WKLVPHDQVJLYLQJ¶QRUPDWLYHSULPDF\·WR,%(DQG effectively 
UHFRPPHQGLQJDQHZIRUPRI REMHFWLYH%D\HVLDQLVP7KLVLVDSRVVLEOHUHVSRQVHWRYDQ)UDDVVHQ·V
challenge, but without independent motivation, it appears more like a stipulation designed to ensure 
that Bayesianism is compatible with IBE, rather than an explanation of  why it is. It has the 
consequence that IBE is merely accommodated in, rather than explicated by, the Bayesian 
framework. And it also raises the question of  why this new form of  objective Bayesianism should 
be preferred over previouVDWWHPSWVWRSURYLGHREMHFWLYH%D\HVLDQQRUPV·+HQGHUVRQ4, pp. 10-
11, italics added).  
So again, how could one bring in values into such a sensitive discussion as the confirmation 
of  scientific theories? I think the most fruitful way of  justifying explanatory goodness is not by 
tying them directly to the epistemic subject and the (reliable) inferences s/he is supposed to draw, but 
seeing primarily these values as part of  the ontological description of  the nomological structure of  
the world.86 
Let me begin with what might appear as a startling observation (for the reader with a 
positivistic slant). Take the famous account of  scientific laws provided by David Lewis - the laws of  
nature are the axioms or theorems of  a true deductive system that achieves the a best combination 
of  simplicity, strength and fit. Simplicity means here conciseness and lack of  additional 
assumptions, strength means covering as large as possible an area of  phenomena in the world, and 
fit means suiting with the actual outcomes of  world history (Lewis 1973, p. 73, Lewis, 1994). Now, 
on a closer look, what we see in this account of  laws, put forward by one of  the most austere 
philosophers of  science, are values, or qualitative characterizations of  the nomological structure that 
scientLILF ODZV VKRXOG UHSUHVHQW , PHDQ WR VD\ WKDW DUJXDEO\ /HZLV· ¶VLPSOLFLW\· SDUDOOHOV WKH
H[SODQDWRU\YDOXHZLWKWKHVDPHQDPHKLV¶VWUHQJWK·FRUUHVSRQGVSUHFLVHO\WRWKHH[SODQDWRU\YDOXH
                                                        
86 I would like to stress that I do not wish to diminish the importance of  meta-induction arguments from the actual use 
of  these values in current scientific practice, or disconsider the arguments coming from value epistemology. But I am 
bound to admit that in the literature on theory confirmation, IBE and its explanatory values are still regarded with a 
certain degree of  skepticism (especially by Bayesian authors). Thus, my attempt in the present paper is to offer an 
alternative justification of  explanatory values, using a strategy that is analogous to the strategy used by some established 
Bayesian authors in justifying their brand of  objective Bayesianism (e.g. Russo and Williamson, 2007, Wilde and 
Williamson, 2016). It goes the same with my attempt in the following to link the objective status of  explanatory values 
WR/HZLV·DFFRXQWRI VFLHQWLILFODZV² an account which surely has more proponents among Bayesian theorists than IBE 
itself  has.  
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RI ¶VFRSH·KLV¶ILW·LVYHU\FORVHWRWKHH[SODQDWRU\YDOXHRI  ¶LQGLYLGXDOLVDWLRQ·DQGWKHH[SODQDWRU\
YDOXHRI ¶WKHRUHWLFXQLW\·LVEXLOWLQWRWKHYHU\LGHDRI DGHGXFWLYHV\VWHPZLWKWKHRUHPVDQGD[LRPV 
Importantly, Lewis conceives of  his Best System analysis as an outcome of  knowing 
virtually everything, the entire world history. It is, that is to say, an ideal scenario in which an 
omniscient being hierarchizes the universal generalisations that can be extracted from the entire 
world history. And plausibly, the way these generalisations are obtained and hierarchized by the 
omniscient being follows a pattern that corresponds to the pattern of  explanatory values at work in 
IBE.  
To put it differently, the explanatory values could arguably be taken to correspond to the 
qualitative aspect of  the mapping of  the world realized by the Best System analysis. The Best 
System is not reducible to these values, since, for instance, its quantitative or numerical aspect is not 
fully taken into account by the pattern of  explanatory values.87 But again, it is still the case that this 
pattern plausibly constitutes a qualitative way to describe the nomological mapping of  the world in 
/HZLV·VLGHDODQDO\VLV 
The idea of  linking values to this nomological framework should not seem very surprising. 
The role of  laws is to systematize, bring phenomena under their cover, describe them accurately and 
at the same time be simpler than a purely factual description of  the world. If  we think about causal 
laws, the rationale is even more intuitive. For a multiplicity of  given effects, an etiological analysis 
reduces this multiplicity to a simpler set of  causal factors which has the respective effects under its 
scope, is descriptively adequate insofar as the causal effect-relations are brought to the fore and 
hence are individualized, and the more the etiological analysis is pursued, the more likely the set of  
causal factors is to manifest theoretical unity (by being linked up with another set of  causal factors, 
by turning up to be themselves effects of  a higher set of  causes, etc.). 
To sum up, when lRRNHG DW WKURXJK WKH OHQVHV RI  /HZLV· DFFRXQW RI  VFLHQWLILF ODZV WKH
explanatory values have an objective status, that parallels (and derives from) the objective status of  
scientific laws. Of  course, we can disagree about what precisely the ontological status of  these 
scientific laws is. That is to say, one can view them as relations between universals (à la Armstrong, 
1978) as characterisations of  essential properties of  natural kinds (à la Lowe, 1989 and Ellis, 2001) 
as systematisations of  causal relations founded in anti-Humean dispositional properties (à la Bird 
2007), or indeed, as Humean generalisations carrying with them a sort of  necessity or non-
contingency, to be described (but arguably not explained!) by the possible worlds semantics (as 
                                                        
87To clarify, this emphasis on the qualitative aspect is proper to the pattern of  explanatory values, which provide non-
numerical, non-TXDQWLWDWLYHGHVFULSWLRQRI VFLHQWLILF ODZV7KHTXDQWLWDWLYHDVSHFWFDQDOVREHIRXQGLQ/HZLV·DFFRXQW
of  laws, via the notion of  fit (which, besides this numerical aspect, is also linked, on the qualitative side, to the 
explanatory virtue of  individualisation, as I have stated above).  
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Lewis himself  maintained). However, one needs not settle here the issue of  the ultimate construal 
RI  ODZV,KDYHFKRVHQ/HZLV·VDFFRXQWDERYHIRUWKHHDVHRI H[SRVLWLRQVLQFH LWRIIHUVXVDFOHDU
view of  the justificatory framework provided by ideal scenarios, and it is an account that is more 
neutral than other, more metaphysically loaded, accounts of  laws. In spite of  the sophisticated 
disagreement of  philosophers of  science over how the fine-grained rendition of  laws should look 
like, what is generally accepted is that scientific laws have their own strain of  objectivity, no matter 
whether one takes such laws as ontologically primary or derived from more fundamental entities. 
And the point of  the present section is that, a fortiori, the explanatory values have themselves the 
same strain of  objectivity, as providing a qualitative description of  these laws.88 
Such a defence of  explanatory values, and accordingly of  the reliability of  IBE as a method 
of  inference, is stronger than the one provided by arguments driven by the actual success of  
scientific practice, or the ones advanced within value epistemology. The reason is that (with the help 
RI LGHDOVFHQDULRVVXFKDV/HZLV·RQHFDQEULQJWRWKHIRUHDPHWDSK\VLFDOVLGHRI GLVFXVVLRQWKDW
should tip the balance within an epistemic debate (not to mention that in most strictly epistemic 
discussions, this metaphysical side is also present in a tacit way).  
7R WDNH D FRPPRQSODFH H[DPSOH +XPH·V HSLVWHPLF DUJXPHQWV DJDLQVW WKH UHOLDELOLW\ RI 
induction are also based, among others, on a metaphysical stance that denies the existence of  causal 
powers. Were one to provide an argument in favour of  the objective existence of  causal powers, one 
would thereby also argue in favour of  the reliability of  induction, even though more steps would 
have to be undertaken, as for instance the argumentative step in which one shows that we can be 
acquainted with these causal powers (see Ellis, 2001). 
This is not, however, to enter into the discussion of  the existence or non-existence of  causal 
powers. It is just to use a commonplace example in order to illustrate how an apparently pure 
epistemic discussion has one of  its roots into (and can be settled by) a metaphysical argument,89 or 
more precisely, how the objectivity justified by the metaphysical side of  the discussion can be used to 
shed light on the corresponding reliability of  a certain type of  inference. One thing that this example 
shows, however, is that the move from objectivity to reliability discussed above is not immediate or 
direct, but, on the contrary, entails intermediate steps. The anti-Humean theorist will have to go 
through the intermediate step of  providing an account of  acquaintance with the causal powers. On 
its side, the IBE theorist has to face the gap between the ideal scenario and the real-life situations in 
which our access to evidence is incomplete. By and large, the optimal combination between 
simplicity, theoretic unity, scope and individualization (the latter, inter alia, fulfilled by way of  
                                                        
88 ,ZLOOFRPHEDFNWR/HZLV·DFFRXQWLQWKHFRQFOXGLQJUHPDUNVRI WKLVSDSHU when rounding off  the main thread of  
my argumentation.  
89 2QHFRXOGRI FRXUVHLQYRNHKHUH'HYLWW·VIDPRXVLPSHUDWLYHSXWPHWDSK\VLFVILUVW'HYLWW 
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providing mechanisms) should track down the truth of  the inferred hypotheses (Lipton, 2001, 
Glass, 2012, Douven and Wenmackers 2017). But limit cases, part of  real-life scenarios, could also 
be envisaged, and one just needs to recall here the burglars case envisaged in in Weisberg (2009) and 
discussed in the previous chapter.90  
Cases like this could not contribute to knock-out arguments against the principles use in 
inference of  explanatory values, but they seem to pose difficulties to deriving the complete 
reliability of  IBE in real-life situations from the objectivity of  explanatory values circumscribed in 
the ideal scenario. However, in fact, such cases and examples underlying the difference between the 
ideal and the real-life scenario provide actually the key to understand the complementarity between 
IBE and Bayesianism. In order to see why, I will look in the next section at an ideal scenario 
employed in a Bayesian framework.   
 
§2 Analogies and differences with another ideal scenario 
It is time to use again the heuristical resources of  epistemic causation. Compare the above 
justification of  the values involved in IBE with the strategy of  defending this account associated to 
the brand of  objective Bayesianism proposed by Russo and Williamson (Williamson 2006, Russo and 
Williamson, 2007). Recall that the epistemic account of  causality takes causal relations to be the 
causal beliefs that an agent with access to total evidence should adopt (Russo and Williamson, 2007, 
p.167). And the connection with the objective Bayesianism is straightforward: the causal beliefs in 
question should be represented by a directed acyclic graph whose nodes are the variables of  interest 
and whose arrows correspond to direct causal connections (Williamson 2006, pp. 75-82), where this 
graph is constrained by evidence and should otherwise be as non-committal as possible as to what 
causes what. 
The three requirements embedded in such an account, namely acyclicity (one's causal claims 
should be representable by an acyclic graph C) calibration (one's causal claims should fit evidence: C א E, the subset of  acyclic graphs that fit evidence) and equivocation (C should otherwise be as non-
committal as possible about what causes what) correspond to the three main requirements of  
objective Bayesianism, namely probability (one's degrees of  belief  should be representable by a 
probability function PE), calibration (one's degrees of  belief  should fit evidence: PEא E, the subset of  
probability functions that fit evidence) and equivocation (one's degrees of  belief  should otherwise 
equivocate as far as possible between the elementary outcomes) (Wilde and Williamson, 2016, p. 6, 
                                                        
90 ([DPSOHVVXFKDV:HLVEHUJ·VDUHXVHGWRGLVFXVVKRZRQHRUDQRWKHUH[SODQDWRU\YDOXHPLJKWEHWKe wrong guide to 
inference are frequent in the literature. Parenthetically, I think it is misleading to use just examples in which one of  the 
explanatory values fails inferentially. On the contrary, one should discuss the inferential use of  the optimal combination 
RI  WKHVHH[SODQDWRU\YDOXHV LQ WKH VDPHZD\ LQZKLFK LQ/HZLV·%HVW6\VWHP WKHUH LV DQRSWLPDOEDODQFHRI  FHUWDLQ
qualitative characteristics. But due to limited space, I will not go further in this direction. 
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Russo and Williamson, 2007, p. 168).   
Crucially, both the objectivity of  this strand of  Bayesianism, and the objectivity of  the 
corresponding epistemic account of  causation, are derived from the limiting case in which an 
RPQLVFLHQWUDWLRQDODJHQWKDVDFFHVVWRWKHWRWDOHYLGHQFH,Q5XVVRDQG:LOOLDPVRQ·VZRUGV¶&DXVDO
relationships are to be identified with the causal beliefs of  an omniscient rational agent. This gives a 
view of  causality that is analogous to the objective Bayesian view of  probability, according to which probabilistic beliefs 
DUHGHWHUPLQHGE\DQDJHQW·VHYLGHQFHDQGSUREDELOLWLHVWKHPVHOYHVDUHMXVWWKHEHOLHIVWKDWDQRPQLVFLHQWDJHQW should 
adopt·5XVVRDQG:LOOLDPVRQSLWDOLFVDGGHG 
We can see that WKH SDWWHUQ RI  H[SODQDWRU\ YDOXHV GUDZQ RXW RI  /HZLV·V %HVW 6\VWHP as 
discussed in §1, and the objective Bayesian account of  epistemic causality, as described above, are 
ways of  (nomologically) mapping the world, in ideal scenarios in which one supposes the availability 
of  the total evidence for an omniscient being. From this point view, we have a strong analogy.  
On the other hand, arguably, there are differences between these ways of  mapping. The 
pattern of  explanatory values provides a static map, concerned, as I said in the previous section, with 
the qualitative aspect of  the ideal nomological structure. The Bayes nets representing the beliefs of  
the omniscient being, even though capturing important qualitative features, provide a dynamic map 
that primarily takes into account the quantitative or numerical aspect of  the ideal nomological 
structure represented by the causal laws.91 
To summarize, the two strategies discussed above are analogous from an important 
perspective, and yet differ. They are analogous insofar as they are framed using ideal scenarios with 
an epistemic subject having access to the total evidence and mapping the facts of  the world history in 
a (causal) nomological structure. They differ, while being complementary, insofar as the Lewis-derived 
strategy for justifying the objectivity of  explanatory values captures the qualitative, static dimension 
of  the nomological structure, whereas the epistemic causality strategy captures the dynamic, 
quantitative (or numerical) aspect which is characteristic of  Bayesian networks. 
Now, crucially, Russo and Williamson argue that the conclusions drawn in the epistemically 
ideal scenario are defendable in a non-ideal scenario, insofar as the causal relations - corresponding 
to the actual causal beliefs that we form - can be seen as approximating (and progressing towards) 
the ideal Bayesian inferential structure revolving around the omniscient being. Again, in Russo and 
WilliDPVRQ·VZRUGV ¶,WPLJKWEHWKRXJKWWKDWVXFKDYLHZUHQGHUVFDXVDOUHODWLRQVKLSVXQNQRZDEOH
for none of  us can be omniscient, but it is quite plausible that, roughly, the more we know, the closer our 
rational causal beliefs will correspond to the causal facts, i.e., correspond to the causal beliefs of  an 
RPQLVFLHQWUDWLRQDODJHQW,I VRWKHQFDXVDONQRZOHGJHLVSRVVLEOH·5XVVRDQG:LOOLDPVRQS
                                                        
91Russo and Williamsondo not discuss about causal laws but such laws have an easily ascertainable place in their 
framework of  epistemic causation. 
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168, italics added). In an analogous way, in the case of  explanatory values, one can make the move 
from the ideal scenario to the real-life scenarios in which they should guide IBE inferences. What 
IBE and these explanatory values guide us towards, one would say, the more we know about the 
facts of  the world, is getting closer and closer to the qualitative description of  the nomological 
structure discussed above. 
But getting closer and approximating the nomological structure implies that a perfect 
matching, in various stages, will not be in place, as far as the inferences of  objective Bayesianism are 
concerned, on the one hand, and as far as the IBE inferences guided by explanatory values are 
concerned, on the other hand. 
I have mentioned in the previous section cases of  mismatch of  failure for IBE and the 
associated explanatory values, and there are similar cases for the Bayesian inference, in which, in 
particular contexts, evidence in favour of  the correct hypothesis brings about no change in the 
conditional probability, or even a decrease of  it (Cartwright, 2007, Achinstein, 2001, McCain and 
Poston, 2014, Strevens, 2014).92 When seeking to approximate and get increasingly closer to laws 
and the nomological structure they describe, for this perfect match, it seems more than reasonable 
that one should appeal to all forms of  support available. This means that both the qualitative (i.e. 
explanatory) and the quantitative (i.e. Bayesian) guides could and should be used together in the 
search for the perfect mapping between our hypotheses and theories and the nomological structure.  
$PHGLHYDO VD\LQJKDV LW WKDW ¶$OO URDGV OHDG WR5RPH·7KH VD\LQJ UHIHUV WR WKH Milliarium 
Aureum, the golden milestone built up by Augustus in the central forum of  ancient Rome, out of  
which all roads of  the Empire were said to originate. If  a group of  medieval pilgrims wanted to 
reach 5RPHWRGHOLYHUDPHVVDJHRUVLPSO\YLVLWWKH¶(WHUQDO&LW\·WKH\ZRXOGKDYHEHWWHUSLFNHGRXW
at least two different roads (and kept in touch through whatever means of  communication were 
then available). They would have thus minimized the risk of  sidetracking, tiredness, famine, and 
other such opposing factors, and at least a few of  could have finally reached the city. In our case, the 
saying translates into the useful convergence (and complementary use) of  different methods of  
inference, as IBE and the Bayesian inference, which should increase the chances that the way we 
treat our real-life evidence and hypotheses resembles and increasingly approximates the way an 
omniscient being draws out of  the total evidence of  world history its nomological structure. 
                                                        
92Cartwright (2007) and Achinstein (2001) discuss cases in which we have a decrease of  probability for the right 
hypothesis, brought about by relevant evidence. We have seen in the previous chapter that McCain and Poston (2014, 
and forthcoming) focus on the inability of  probabilities to reflect the distinction between weight and balance of  
evidence. Strevens (2014) has an interesting discussion of  the contrast between the logical omniscience assumption of  
%D\HVLDQLVPDQGWKH¶KXPDQL]HG·%D\HVLDQLVPRI UHDO-OLIHVLWXDWLRQV,QWHUHVWLQJO\5XVVRDQG:LOOLDPVRQ·VDUJXPHQWWKDW
population studies are unable to rule out spurious correlations in the absence of  evidence of  mechanisms (Russo and 
Williamson, 2007) could easily be interpreted as pointing to the need to integrate the qualitative aspects of  evidence in 
WKH¶LQIHUHQWLDOPDFKLQH·RU%D\HVLDQLVP,ZLOOFRPHEDFNWRWKLVLQWKHILQDOVHFWLRQRI WKis chapter.     
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Again, this is not to ignore that failings and vulnerabilities of  both IBE and Bayesianism. 
But the point is that their joint use, under the form of  probabilistic conditionalization constrained 
in one way or another by explanatory values, should compensate for at least a part of  these 
vulnerabilities.93 For instance, Daniel Kahneman has famously documented how many intuitive uses 
of  explanatory values can be vitiated by ignorance of  the basic axioms and rules of  probabilistic 
calculus (e.g. Kahneman, 2011); in the joint use of  IBE and Bayesian inference, the quantitative 
strengths of  Bayesianism should compensate for and remedy this vulnerability of  explanatory 
reasoning. To take an example from the other side, Bayesian inference has notorious problems in 
dealing with the weight of  evidence (Joyce, 2005), which is not reducible to (or reflected in) the 
simply numerical aspect of  probabilities; in the joint use of  IBE and Bayesian inference, the 
qualitative strength of  explanatory values should compensate for and remedy this vulnerability of  
probabilistic reasoning. 
I have nothing particular or technical to add here to the proposals that explanatory values 
should constrain the priors/likelihoods (Lipton 2004, Okasha, 2000), that they should increase the 
resilience of  posterior probabilities (McCain and Poston, 2014), and/or that they could contribute 
to a brand of  objective Bayesianism (Iranzo, 2000, Romeijn, 2013). 
However, the above argumentation should provide a justificatory background for pursuing 
such proposals and seeking a way to applying them in particular contexts. It should also provide an 
incentive to always bear in mind in argumentation the difference between the epistemically ideal 
scenarios and the real-life, opaque ones. I will argue in the next section - by looking at the second 
part of  the dispute between McCain and Poston vs. Roche and Sober - that it is precisely due to 
ignoring this difference that Roche and Sober are able to claim that the explanatory features are 
evidentially irrelevant, and that one should just stick with the Bayesian framework of  confirmation.  
 
§3 The dispute Roche and Sober vs. McCain and Poston 
. We have looked in the previous chapter at the first part of  the dispute Roche and Sober vs. 
McCain and Poston. This section will look at the second part of  their dispute and show that the 
disagreement between these authors can be clarified when viewed through the lenses of  the 
previous discussion from §1 and §2 on the difference between ideal and real-life scenarios.  
Recall that 5RFKH DQG 6REHU·V PDLQ DLP LV WR VKRZ WKDW WKH H[SODQDWRU\ JRRGQHVV RI  D
                                                        
93 In cases in which i) the hypothesis favoured by IBE would differ from  ii) the hypothesis favoured by the Bayesian 
approach, which in turn would differ from iii) the hypothesis favoured by combining the Bayesian approach with the use 
of  explanatory values, I would be tempted to say that iii) provides us with more chances of  hitting the target than i) and 
ii). I am aware however that this would require supplementary argumentation, and I am happy to stick with the more 
prudent position claiming that we should go with iii) in those cases in which ii) simply cannot give us a precise answer 
and ambiguity is to be dispelled; see Douven (2014) for discussion. 
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hypothesis cannot influence its posterior probability.94 They propose that we take a hypothesis H, the 
observations relevant to it O, and formulate the proposition E: if  H and O were true, H would explain 
O. In their terms therefore, the proposition E should encompass the explanatory relation between 
the hypothesis H and the observed data O. They ask subsequently, as the Bayesian confirmation 
theory demands, whether Pr(H|E) > Pr(H), or rather, whether Pr(H/E&O) > Pr(H/O). They ask, 
in other words, whether the explanatory features add anything to the confirmation of  H. The 
answer is negative. Nothing is added to confirmation, because E is screened-off  by O, or in formal 
terms, because Pr+2	( 3U+2+HQFHZHKDYHWKHFRQFOXVLRQWKDW¶WKHH[SODQDWRULQHVVRI 
+LVHYLGHQWLDOO\ LGOHRQFHWKHWUXWKRI 2LVWDNHQLQWRDFFRXQW·5RFKHDQG6REHUS
The argument has a deceivingly simple form, but of  course some of  the most powerful arguments 
LQSKLORVRSK\RZHWKHLUDSSHDOSUHFLVHO\WRWKHLUVWUDLJKWIRUZDUGH[SRVLWLRQFIIRULQVWDQFH.ULSNH·V
argumentation in favour of  the rigidity of  proper names). 
We have seen that, in their first reply, McCain and Poston argue in the main that, even 
admitting the screening off  is in place, the explanation features are still evidentially relevant. That is 
to say, they argue that the explanatory story does have an influence on confirmation or prediction, 
without modifying as such the probabilities. What they influence, more precisely, is the resilience of  
the Pr function, by making certain probabilities more stable, or less volatile, given new evidence 
(McCain and Poston, 2014, p. 148). 
And here we enter into the second part of  their dispute. RoFKH DQG 6REHU·V UHVSRQVH, 
provided in their (2014), is to acknowledge the resilience of  probabilities in cases in which the 
explanatory stories are presented, but to contend that such explanatory stories simply concern causal 
facts that could be integrated into the background knowledge of  conditionalization, and need not be 
YLHZHGDV¶H[SODQDWRU\·LQDVHQVHUHOHYDQWfor confirmation purposes, although they could be viewed 
as explanatory in themselves (Roche and Sober, 2014, pp. 196-197).95That is to say, according to 
Roche and Sober, the explanatory evidence just adds more grist to the Bayesian mill. Qua evidence 
tout court, the explanatory evidence just amounts to more data to enter into the inferential machine 
of  conditionalization. Qua explanatory, such evidence plays no role in theory confirmation and 
accordingly explanations are still evidentially irrelevant.  
Roche and Sober pick upon the example of  the x-spheres provided by McCain and Poston, 
                                                        
94 In the beginning of  their (2013) article, Roche and Sober touch briefly on the issue of  prior probabilities, dismissing 
WKH XVH RI  H[SODQDWRU\ YDOXHV IRU FRQVWUDLQLQJ SULRUV ZLWK WKH FDVXDO UHSO\ WKDW WRGD\·V SULRUV VKRXOG EH \HVWHUGD\·V
posteriors.  
95 For the purposes of  the present chapter though, whether the contribution of  IBE to the confirmation area is 
qualified as simply contributing to the background knowledge (as Roche and Sober affirm) or as bringing to the fore a 
crucial facet of  our confirmation practices (as McCain and Poston suggest) is not important. My feeling is that what is 
FRQVLGHUHG WR WKH SDUW RI  ¶EDFNJURXQG NQRZOHGJH· DQG ZKDW LV WDNHQ WR EH DV LPSRUWDQW DV WR EH EURXJKW WR WKH
forefront, will depend much on whether the theorist in question is an enthusiastic Bayesian proponent or an equally 
enthusiastic proponent of  the Inference to the Best Explanation, respectively.  
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which we have discussed in the previous chapter. Here is again the example (which I have 
transposed in a medical context).  Suppose that (i) Sally and Tom have a credence of  X in 
SURSRVLWLRQ+WKDWVPRNLQJLVIROORZHGE\FDQFHULL6DOO\·VFUHGHQFHLVPRUHUHVLOLHQWWKDQ7RP·V
(iii) Sally but not Tom knows the mechanism of  lung cancer and (iv) Sally but not Tom has an 
H[SODQDWLRQ RI  ZK\ WKH SUREDELOLW\ RI  JHWWLQJ OXQJ FDQFHU DIWHU VPRNLQJ LV ; *LYHQ 6DOO\·V
knowledge as described in (iii), her credence in H should remain at X even if  certain data from 
(biased) population studies shows a very low correlation between smoking and cancer. By contrast, 
JLYHQ7RP·VODFNRI NQRZOHGJHDVGHVFULEHGLQLLLDQGJLYHQWKXVWKDWDOOKHKDVWRJRRQLVWKH
observed frequency, it follows that if  the observed frequency of  cases of  lung cancer following 
smoking deviates from X, then his credence in H would not remain at X.  
Now, what we have here, contend Roche and Sober, is a case in which certain causal 
information from the background knowledge is relevant for evidential support (Roche and Sober 
refer to another example with x-spheres being drawn out of  an urn, but this should not matter for 
exposition purposes) 
 
This is a case where differences in credences are dictated by differences in background knowledge. It is true that Sally but 
not Tom has an explanation of  why the probability of  a blue x-sphere on a random drawing from the urn is 0.5, but this 
difference between Sally and Tom is doing no work. It might be countered that (iv) is true because (iii) is true and that, 
thus, explanatoriness is still in play. We are not denying that explanatoriness is in play. In fact, we are supposing for the 
sake of  argument that explanatoriness is in play in that (iv) is true. Our point is that (ii) is true because (iii) is true , and 
(iv) does nothing to make (ii) true once (iii) is taken into account. (Roche and Sober, 2014, pp. 196, italics added) 
 
Finally, in their last contribution, McCain and Poston·V UHSO\ LV WKDW IBE of  course brings 
about causal stories, and bringing forth such causal stories is just how it contributes to resilience 
(McCain and Poston, forthcoming, pp. 3-4). Crucially, the way McCain and Poston articulate the causal 
side of  the explanatory stories provides a way of  tying in my argument from the previous sections - 
based on the difference between ideal and non-ideal scenarios - with their argumentation as to the 
resilience of  probabilities. More precisely, the entry point is their discussion of  how knowing the 
structure of  water amounts to the possession of  an explanation for the fire-extinguishing behaviour 
of  water. Since this is a crucial juncture in my argumentation, the reader should allow me to give 
here the relevant quotation in full. 
 
>&@RQVLGHUDQDUJXPHQW>«@WKDWGHQLHVWKDWZDWHUKDVWKHSURSHUW\RI H[WLnguishing fire. Water is H2O, and 
H2O has special chemical properties that make it an excellent chemical to extinguish fire. Because of  the high degree of  
hydrogen bonding between water molecules, H2O has the second highest heat capacity of  all known substances. In 
virtue of  its high heat capacity, its transition from a liquid to a gas requires a significant amount of  energy, which 
enables it to rapidly quench flames. Once we account for these facts about H2O the fact that water is present is screened 
off. Thus, water is irrelevant to extinguishing fire because H2O is doing all the work. The response to the water/ H2O 
argument is obvious: Water = H2O. The properties of  H2O in virtue of  which it makes an excellent fire extinguisher are 
the properties of  water. They are one and the same. We might put our point thusly: to the extent that water has the 
SURSHUW\ RI  H[WLQJXLVKLQJ ILUHV H[SODQDWRULQHVV  >«@ LV HYLGHQWLDOO\ UHOHYDQW :DWHU H[WLQJXLVKHV ILUH LQ YLUWXH RI  LWV
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chemical structure. Explanatoriness is evidentially relevant in virtue of  it specifying certain relations between H and E that get 
encoded in a Pr function«LI H[SODQDWLRQVDUHFRQVWLWXWHGE\VXFKFDXVDOIDFWVWKHQFRQGLWLRQDOL]DWLRQRQFDXVDOIDFWVZLOO
screen-off  explanatoriness. But this is just the sense in which water is screened off  from H2O. In other words, it is not 
UHDOO\VFUHHQHGRII DWDOOEHFDXVHWKRVHIDFWVKDYHDOUHDG\EHHQWDNHQLQWRDFFRXQW&RQGLWLRQDOL]LQJVHSDUDWHO\RQ6DOO\·V
knowledge of  the causal relation (as expressed in (iii)) and her knowledge of  the explanation (as expressed in (iv)) is 
counting the same facts twice (McCain and Poston, forthcoming, pp. 3-4) 
 
Now, the example of  water and its microstructure, as paradigmatically employed in the 
philosophy of  language, can, I believe, make us see that what is at stake in the dispute between the 
four authors described above is the distinction between the ideal (epistemically transparent) and the 
non-ideal epistemically opaque) scenarios.  
Recall that this distinction is not be reduced to the distinction between availability or non-
availability of  the total evidence, being used in a multitude of  philosophical discussions, as for 
instance in the Kripke/Putnam account of  reference. When a certain term or expression is analysed 
as to its capacity to refer to certain state of  affairs, the  access to the respective state of  affairs is 
framed in terms of  the ideal scenario (on the part of  the theorist), and our use of  the respective 
term or expression entails the possibility that the non-ideal scenario holds, in the sense at least that 
RQHPLJKWQRWEHDZDUHRI KRZDQGWRZKDWRQH·VWHUPVUHIHUcf. IRULQVWDQFH4XLQH·VGLVWLQFWLRQ
EHWZHHQ UHIHUHQWLDOO\ RSDTXH DQG WUDQVSDUHQW FRQWH[WV 4XLQH  'RHV ¶ZDWHU· UHIHU WR +2O?  
Perhaps, but in order for the very proposal of  Kripke and Putnam to make sense in the first place, 
one needs to assume the ideal scenario on the part of  the theorist, just like, on the other hand, 
intensionalist (or two-dimensionalist) theories of  reference are working within the non-ideal 
scenario.  
Let us come back to the main points of  contention between the four authors above, this 
WLPHZLWKWKHGLVWLQFWLRQEHWZHHQWKHWZRVFHQDULRVDWKDQG5RFKHDQG6REHU·VFODLPWKDWEULQJLQJ
in as evidence explanatory stories, in the form of  causal mechanisms, does not contribute 
explanatorily to the confirmation of  hypotheses but is a mere (background) causal information, 
assumes the ideal scenario, in which the relevance, for our (potentially fallible) epistemic position, of  
the (causal) facts in question, is substituted with (or by-SDVVHGE\D¶*RG·VH\HYLHZ·UHWDLQLQJIURP
the explanatory and causal features of  the evidence at hand just the causal features. But the 
explanatory side does not let itself  be effaced so easily.  
Mechanisms, under the heading of  the explanatory value of  individualization, figure 
prominently in the structure of  IBE, and one would have to provide some quite strong reasons 
(stronger than the ones advanced by Roche and Sober) to strip off  from the mechanistic evidence 
its explanatory dimension. Imagine an analogous example in which one comes to have evidence 
showing that a certain hypothesis, in contrast to its competitors, has a larger scope (is doing justice 
to a larger area of  the phenomena in question). This evidence, which concerns the scope of  a 
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hypothesis, would have a bearing upon the resilience of  the probabilities in question (that is to say, 
would modify the weight of  the evidence, without modifying its balance). We should naturally ask: 
how come the resilience of  the probabilities is raised? The Roche and Sober-type of  answer would 
be to underlie the purely factual aspects of  the evidence in question. We are dealing with, the answer 
ZRXOGJRZLWK¶REVHUYDWLRQGDWD·VKRZLQJKRZVXFKDQGVuch hypothesis is linked with such and 
such (previously unrelated, scattered) phenomena.  
UQGHQLDEO\ZHZRXOGEHGHDOLQJZLWK¶REVHUYDWLRQGDWD· here, but this is not the whole story. 
Because one would then need to ask: why is it, in the first place, that evidence about the greater 
scope of  a hypothesis would in any way be considered relevant for the resilience of  probabilities? 
And here, irrespective of  whether one adopts the ideal or the non-ideal scenario, one would have to 
appeal to the explanatory virtues. On the non-ideal scenario, it would naturally follow that such 
evidence is relevant because we should be guided by the explanatory virtues, and the greater scope 
of  a hypothesis should have a bearing on the weight of  evidence and the resilience of  posterior 
probabilities. On the ideal scenario, the one tacitly adopted by Roche and Sober, one would have to 
appeal to the ideal description of  laws or nomological structure available to an omniscient being, 
which has (the greatest possible) scope (in optimal combination with other characteristics) as a 
qualitative feature.96 
Claiming, for the case of  mechanisms - that is to say, for the case of  the explanatory virtue 
of  individuation - that this is just background (causal) information, which is relevant but which 
should be relegated to the background knowledge, might do for practical purposes (because tacitly, 
we are more imbued with the use of  explanatory features than we think), but it does not do for 
theoretical purposes, when the very use of  such causal knowledge should be justified. 
A SURSRQHQW6REHUDQG5RFKH·VYLHZPLJKW UHSO\ WKDW , DPEXUGHQLQJ WKHLU DFFRXQWZLWK
features that they have not put forward, and that, when speaking about the background knowledge 
of  certain (causal) facts that should increase the reliability of  evidence, they only appeal to 
knowledge of  certain conditionals referring to the microstructure of  the analysed macroscopic 
phenomena (or, in my terms, referring to the mechanism of  the analysed microscopic phenomena), 
and that there LVQRWKHUH WKH VOLJKWHVWKLQWRI  DQ LGHDO VFHQDULRRURI  ¶*RG·V H\HYLHZ·%XW WKLV
would not do either (and the point here is not whether one is a Humean about causation or not). 
Again, why would such a condition be relevant and increase the resilience of  probabilities?  
                                                        
96 One could also argue here that, as I mentioned in the Introduction to this chapter, theories of  explanation in the 
philosophy of  science can be mapped upon the distinction between ideal and non-ideal scenarios, in that the ontic 
theories of  explanation suit the ideal scenarios whereas the epistemic conception of  explanation suits the non-ideal 
VFHQDULR 5RFKH DQG 6REHU·V VWDQFH LV , EHOLHYH FRQVLVWHQW ZLWK DQ RQWLF YLHZ RI  H[SODQDWLRQ ZKHUHDV 0F&DLQ DQG 
Poston clearly stick to the epistemic view of  explanation. This would complicate however the (already intricate) 
argument above.   
147 
 
For the explanationist, i.e. the IBE proponent, who works within the epistemically opaque 
scenario, it is simple. Mechanisms explain, and invoking them amounts to applying the explanatory 
values of  individuation and increasing the weight of  evidence, because thereby, our inferences 
approximate closer the nomological structure expressed by laws (and significantly, the very notion 
of  resilience of  probabilities was introduced in Skyrms 1977, in order to account for the 
nomological character of  statistical law-statements). In the case of  the epistemically transparent 
scenario, an omniscient being would know that evidence of  mechanisms goes hand in hand with the 
resilience of  probabilities, because the nomological structure he has at disposal just has as a 
TXDOLWDWLYHFKDUDFWHULVWLF WKH ¶LQGLYLGXDWLRQ· LH WKH ILQH-grained description of  the causal relations 
underlying the macroscopic phenomena.  
Importantly, in both scenarios, the use of  explanatory values is already in place ² in the 
epistemically opaque one, as inferential guides towards approximating the nomological structure, 
and in the epistemically transparent scenario as qualitative characteristics of  this nomological 
structure itself. Sober and Roche mix these scenarios and they should not.97 That is to say, they 
H[SOLFLWO\DGRSWWKHHSLVWHPLFDOO\RSDTXHVFHQDULRQR*RG·VH\HYLHZWKHFRQGLWLRQDOVLQTXHVWLRQ
are part of  the background knowledge of  the epistemic subject) but the justification for the use of  
such conditionals for increasing the resilience of  posterior probabilities, if  the explanationist talk is 
excluded, can only come from an epistemically transparent scenario.  
+HQFH ZH KDYH WKH IROORZLQJ GRXEOH GLVMXQFWLYH LI  WKHUH LV QR *RG·V H\H YLHZ LQ WKHLU
arguments about the background knowledge increasing the resilience of  probabilities, then either 
the arguments in question are non-conclusive, or they are conclusive and the evidential relevance of  
explanations, i.e. the role of  explanatory values as inferential guides, is tacitly present. If  there is a 
*RG·V H\H YLHZ WKHQ HLWKHU WKHLU DUJXPHQWV DUH QRQ-conclusive, or they are conclusive and the 
explanatory values are already accepted as objective qualitative characterisations of  the nomological 
structure. 
I would like to think that their arguments are after all conclusive. This would be a proper 
perspective in order to adequately consider the ways in which IBE and could fruitfully be used 
together. 
 
§4  Back the Clarke et al criteria of  mechanistic evidence 
 
Before going back to the medical side of  discussion, let me briefly take stock of  the general 
                                                        
97 I am not claiming one should not appeal to both these types of  scenarios in argumentation; I did it myself  in the 
previous section. However, one should distinguish between them and seek out the justifiable transitions or bridging 
principles from one to another.  
148 
 
arguments provided in this chapter. I have offered in the previous sections a way to conceptualise 
the collaboration between IBE and Bayesianism, which explains how IBE and Bayesian inference are 
compatible, while remaining different types of  inference. I have argued that these types of  
inferences are analogous, since they are justified by the appeal to ideal scenarios and can be construed 
as hunting down the ultimate nomological structure. They are defendable insofar as, in real-life 
situations in which the ideal scenarios do not hold, their results can be seen as progressively 
approximating this nomological structure - the more so, the more science progresses.  They are 
different insofar as one hunts down for the quantitative aspect of  this nomological structure (IBE), 
whereas the other (the Bayesian inference) hunts down, or has its role of  inferential guide 
underpinned by the qualitative aspect of  this nomological structure. The analogy and the difference 
result in complementarity due to the fact that it is the same nomological structure that is hunted down 
(or towards which both methods of  inference are guiding). Furthermore, the resulting 
complementarity is not vulnerable to the type of  incompatibilist arguments advanced by Sober and 
Roche. By accepting the role of  causal information in evidential support (as brought about by 
mechanisms), Sober and Roche already accept the use of  explanatory elements in confirmation.   
In discussing the distinctness and complementarity between Bayesianism and IBE, I have 
DSSHDOHG WR WKH DQDORJ\ EHWZHHQ 5XVVR DQG :LOOLDPVRQ·V DFFRXQW RI  HSLVWHPLF FDXVDWLRQ DQG
objective Bayesianism, on the one hand, and my own justificatory account of  inferential use of  the 
explanatory values of  IBE, on the other. The reason I have drawn this analogy is that their account 
RIIHUVDQLQVLJKWIXOLOOXVWUDWLRQRI WKHGLIIHUHQFHEHWZHHQWKH¶REMHFWLYH·RULGHDODQGWKHQRQ-ideal 
use of  key notions at work in the theory of  confirmation (causation, probability, explanation, etc.). 
On the other hand, their account is usefully minimalistic. Epistemic causality, for instance, is a 
minimalist description of  what causation and causal laws should mean. It is minimalistic because it 
is a Humean account, and it useful because, beyond its heuristic use, it could be accepted by the 
proponent of  a more theory loaded account of  causation and laws, a proponent who would have to 
add some extra-content to this minimalistic framework.  
For instance, an anti-Humean theorist of  laws à la Bird (2007) could add that the omniscient 
being of  the respective ideal scenarios would well be acquainted with the existence of  causal powers 
in the world, a necessitarian theorist à la Armstrong (1978) could add that the omniscient being 
should be aware of  the relation of  necessitation holding between universals, etc.). In other words, 
one needs not buy entirely into their account of  epistemic causation (and objective Bayesianism)98 - 
which is sufficiently neutral and minimalistic in order to be accepted by a wide variety of  theorists 
with various theoretical commitments ² in order to profit from the heuristic value of  their 
                                                        
98 See Dragulinescu (2012) which criticizes the Humean aspect of  the epistemic account of  causation. 
149 
 
arguments, involving, as I have showed, ideal and non-ideal scenarios. 
Mutatis mutandis, WKH VDPH FDQ EH VDLG DERXW /HZLV· DFFRXQW RI  ODZV (YHQ WKHRULVWV ZLWK
anti-+XPHDQFRPPLWPHQWVVKRXOGILQGLQ/HZLV·DFFRXQWDXVHIXOGHVFULSWLRQRI KRZODZVVKRXOG
look like on a minimalistic perspective (even if  they would demand additional modal constraints). I 
cannot go here into the details of  a discussion that I do not wish to simplify; 99 but even when 
DGPLWWLQJ WKDW /HZLV· DFFRXQW RI  ODZV LV QRW XQLYHUVDOO\ DFFHSWHG LW UHPDLQV WKDW if one accepts 
/HZLV· DFFRXQW OI  ODZV DV D PLQLPDOLVW GHVFULSWLRQ Rf  the ontological structure (and surely this 
account has more proponents among Bayesian theorists than the thesis of  the compatibility 
between IBE and the Bayesian theory has) and/or if RQHDFFHSWV:LOOLDPVRQ·VDFFRXQWRI REMHFWLYH
Bayesianism (and surely this account has more proponents among Bayesians than the thesis of  the 
compatibility between IBE and the Bayesian theory has), then one should also accept the 
compatibility between IBE and the Bayesian theory. It is not a triumphalist conclusion, but it makes 
a significant headway.  
+RZHYHU5XVVRDQG:LOOLDPVRQ·VDFFRXQWRIIHUVHYHQPRUHWRWKHSURVSHFWLYHFROODERUDWLRQ
between IBE and the Bayesian account of  confirmation. For one, as noted in the previous chapter, 
their stand of  objective Bayesianism arguably includes already one central explanatory value, namely 
simplicity (encoded in the requirement of  equivocation, expressed in particular by the 
corresponding demand of  epistemic causation; Russo and Williamson, 2007, p. 168). In the medical 
area, their RWT-based arguments that population studies are unable to rule out spurious 
correlations in the absence of  evidence of  mechanisms (Russo and Williamson, 2007, p. 159) can 
easily be interpreted as indicating the need to integrate the qualitative aspects of  evidence in the 
¶LQIHUHQWLDOPDFKLQH·RI %D\HVLDQLVP 
The previous chapter discussed one way to integrate these qualitative aspects - via the 
criteria of  mechanistic evidence, in the sense that these criteria could well be used for an account of  
the resilience of  PHGLFDO %D\HVLDQ SUREDELOLWLHV %XW 5XVVR DQG :LOOLDPVRQ·V strand of  objective 
Bayesianism could well offer a framework to integrate the proposal that these mechanistic criteria 
could also constrain the priors and likelihoods the prior and/or likelihood probabilities established 
by the Bayesian theory taking into account the population studies evidence (which corresponds to 
the point VII) of  my list of  the epistemic advantages of  the revised RWT). Such an integration into 
objective Bayesianism could only be smoothed by my argumentation in the present chapter in 
favour of  the objectivity of  explanatory values ² an argumentation based, among others, on an 
DQDORJ\ ZLWK WKH YHU\ UHDVRQLQJ WKDW VWDQGV EHKLQG 5XVVR DQG :LOOLDPVRQ·V MRLQW DFFRXQWV RI 
                                                        
99 However, see for instance Beebee (2000) who argues that the main difference between Humean and anti-Humean 
DFFRXQWVRI ODZVUHVLGHVLQKRZWKHLVVXHRI WKH¶JRYHUQLQJ·RI ODZVLVFRQVWUXHG7KHVDPHSRLQWRI YLHZLVDGYDQFHG
in Bird (2005).  
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epistemic causation/objective Bayesianism.  
 
Conclusion chapter 7 
In this chapter, I have offered way to conceptualise the collaboration between IBE and 
Bayesianism, which explains how IBE and Bayesian inference are compatible, while remaining 
different types of  inference. I have argued that these types of  inferences analogous as being justified 
by the appeal to ideal scenarios and as hunting down the ultimate nomological structure. They are 
defendable insofar as, in real-life situations in which the ideal scenarios do not hold, their results can 
be seen as progressively approximating this nomological structure - the more so, the more science 
progresses.  They are different insofar as one hunts down for the quantitative aspect of  this 
nomological structure, whereas the other hunts down (or has its role of  inferential guide 
underpinned by) the qualitative aspect of  this nomological structure. The analogy and the difference 
result in complementarity due to the fact that it is the same nomological structure that is hunted 
down (or towards which both methods of  inference are guiding). The resulting complementarity is 
not vulnerable to the type of  incompatibilist arguments advanced by Sober and Roche, and can 
accommodate the proposal that in medicine, the criteria of  grading mechanistic evidence of  Clarke 
et al could constrain, as explanatory, the prior and likelihood probabilities established by the 










The present thesis has taken its cue from the list of  criteria for assessing the quality of  
mechanistic evidence, i.e. for grading mechanistic evidence in medicine at a pre-confirmation level, 
as provided in Clarke et al. (2014).  Having as case studies the history of  atherosclerosis and the 
medical treatments of  hypertension and heart failure, I have sought to extend the work done by 
Clarke et al. in three (interconnected) directions, with the aim of 
 
i)  first, on a general level, providing an epistemological argumentation to justify these 
criteria for grading evidence. 
i)  second, putting more flesh onto the bones of  these criteria (in particular on the criterion 
of  robustness) in terms of  the ontology of  mechanisms and causal relations in medicine, and 
enquiring into how these criteria work in the context of  the entire medical evidence, i.e. when taking 
into account  also the evidence of  population studies.  
iii) third, setting out a plausible way in which the quality mechanistic evidence ² hierarchized 
and graded using these criteria at a pre-confirmation stage ² could make a contribution at the 
confirmation stage itself.  
 
The results of  my research have been that  
 
i) I have provided an epistemic justification for the Clarke et al. criteria, using as an 
inferential method the Inference to the Best Explanation (IBE), which I have shown to be a useful 
epistemic framework for dealing with mechanistic evidence in medicine.  
ii) I have defended the view that mechanisms in medicine should be viewed as entailing both 
production and difference-making. I have shown moreover that, on this construal of  mechanisms, 
we can grasp a hold on the reciprocal increasing of  quality between the evidence of  mechanisms 
and the evidence of  population studies, which is obtained when the two types of  evidence are 
graded together. Finally, I have shown that, on this construal of  mechanisms, one can define the 
robustness of  mechanisms as their capacity to maintain their difference making across varying 
contexts, and that, in turn, this approach to robustness allows us to better conceptualise the 
problem of  extrapolation in medicine and how mechanisms can contribute to solve it. 
iii) I have argued that the quality of  mechanistic evidence could make a contribution at the 




sense,  could supplement the balance of  evidence assessed quantitatively by the Bayesian theory.    
More precisely, I have proposed - along the lines of  a proposal made by McCain and Poston 
in their (2014) - that the contribution of  explanatory features to the Bayesian confirmation of  
medical causal claims amounts to the increase of  the resilience of  probability functions 
corresponding to population level assessments that are backed up by mechanistic evidence. I have 
also suggested, after adopting a strong defense of  the objectivity of  explanatory values, that such 
explanatory values employed to grade the evidence of  medical mechanisms, could subsequently be 
used to constrain the priors and/or likelihoods of  the Bayesian confirmation stage. 
 
The importance of  all the above research lies I believe in i) bringing to the fore the role 
played by the qualitative aspect of  evidence when assessing medical claims, ii) drawing attention to 
the close relationship between the ontic end epistemic approaches to medical mechanisms and iii) 
pressing for a fruitful utilisation of  both IBE and Bayesianism, which would integrate the qualitative 
aspect of  evidence and a sharper look at the ontology of  mechanisms.  
 
These points can lend themselves to further research. I would hope, in particular, that the 
approach to mechanistic robustness in terms of  different making could be useful for the current 
research into systems medicine, and that the discussion of  the compatibility between IBE and 
Bayesianism could spur interest in integrating the Clarke et al. criteria of  mechanistic evidence into 
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